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General Introduction
Searching for a trading partner is time-consuming, and can often end up unfruitful. In
economic terms, the market is said to feature search and matching frictions. Prominent
examples of contexts where such friction is quantitatively important are labor, housing, and
marriage markets etc. Admitting such a friction, in search theory, we are concerned with to
which extent can the resources be allocated efficiently.
From a macroeconomic perspective, Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) are the first to
formalize this friction in an equilibrium model to study the labor market coexistence of
unemployment and unfilled vacancies. In this traditional framework, the mechanism of
determination of trading price and the mechanism how search friction takes place are inde-
pendently framed. A direct consequence is the appearance of search externality, which drives
the economy away from efficient allocation of labor.
The underlying reason of such inefficiency is the negligence of the important relationship
between price and search behavior: observing the prices, an agent who chooses which price
to visit is able to anticipate how intensively the others are going to frequent each price in
question, and this anticipation allows her to calculate her own probability of successful
trading. Moen (1997) finds that when agents are price-takers and maximize income subject
to a given set of market parameters, the search externality can be internalized and efficiency
can result. He provides informally a justification on how competitive search equilibrium
can be implemented by the above relationship - a process with profit-maximizing firms’
price posting, and workers’ subsequent application to the observed prices that give them the
highest expected utility from search.
Burdette, Shi and Wright (2001) take a first step in formalizing how the posted price
can direct subsequent search. Their contribution consists in pointing out the distinction of
a market where the number of agents is finite and the market where this number tends to
be large, and deriving endogenously the matching function. A recent work from Manolis
and Kircher (2012) provide preliminarily game theoretical foundation of these price posting
models with subsequent search, and shows formally how competitive search equilibrium
results when the number of agents tends to be large. Apart from the advancement of pure
theory in this direction, there are few works which apply this theory to understand stylized
xfacts, while this framework has a clear advantage in abstracting from the inefficiency arising
from search externality, which allows us to focus solely on other market imperfections that
are of our concern. Hence, in this dissertation, we take this price posting approach to study
three issues in labor market.
The first issue concerns the premature quitting of workers in an employment relation-
ship. Our framework is especially suitable for contexts such as disability shock, retirement,
maternity leaves etc. Such premature quitting creates turnover risks for firms, hence the
firms would like to propose wage profiles to minimize or avoid it. In this issue, the asym-
metric information plays an important role. We adopt an approach of mechanism design
and consider different timings when the private information is realized. In a follow-up
paper, we propose a specific age-directed policy by which this inefficiency can be alleviated,
and study its implication on welfare and aggregate output. In the second issue, we revisit
classical welfare analysis of impact of discrimination on skill choice in the presence of search
friction. Our main contribution is to consider a multi-dimensional hiring norm along both
productivity-related and -unrelated characteristics. We show how strategic skill investment
between favored and discriminated group endogenously arises. We compare also two wage
determination mechanisms (posted and bargained wage) to check the robustness of our result.
In the third issue, we consider to which extent can unemployment benefit and minimum
wage correct inefficient allocations arising from firms’ market power. Our context concerns
small markets where the workers/firms ratio is not large. The significance of such small
sub-markets is highlighted by Shimer (2007) who finds that the market can be small down
to a tightness of on average 10 unemployed workers per firm when taking the “occupation,
geographical area” as the sub-market characteristic. The market imperfection comes from
the fact that in such a small labor market firms pay less than competitive level of wages.
We proceed from an Industrial organizational perspective, and suggest focusing on both
misallocation of labor and misallocation of surplus when analyzing the effectiveness of the
policy instrument.
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Chapter 1
Dynamic Contracts in Search
Equilibrium under Asymmetric
Information
Coauthored with Professor François Langot

Abstract
We consider a multi-period competitive search equilibrium where inefficiency is due to
asymmetrical information. At the time when firms commit to specific hiring costs, workers
hold private information on their intention of quitting before the termination of the contract.
A long-term employment relationship leads to both higher wages and employment rate. The
optimal separating contract is an ascending wage profile, which distorts the allocation of the
workers who will quit later (the ’good’ workers) in order to prevent the workers who will quit
earlier (the ’bad’ workers) from applying for these jobs. We also endogenize the separation
decision (the extensive margin). Two cases are considered, where heterogeneity either
happens ex ante or ex post stage. Apart from the similar ascending wage profile as in the
benchmark, we establish that there is excessive separations compared to the full-information
economy.
Keywords: Competitive search equilibrium, asymmetric information, dynamic contract,
extensive margin
JEL classification: D82, D86, J14, J26, J64
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1.1 Introduction
The basic message of [the Phelps volume published in 1970] was that one could
and should consider the [labor market] problems as the outcomes of market
behavior of individual agents who act in their own interests as best they can in a
market environment characterized by uncertainties and incomplete information.
Mortensen (2011)
Since Phelps (1970), the search and matching frictions are presented as typical depar-
tures from the Walrasian theory of the labor market, allowing to account for the trading
externalities. But the competitive search equilibrium leads to reducing the distance between
the matching model and the Walrasian paradigm: a decentralized market can internalize
the search externality, leading to an efficient equilibrium (Moen (1997)).1 As in Guerrieri,
Shimer and Wright (2010), (GSW), this paper re-introduces informational incompleteness
in a competitive search environment to account for the inefficiency of the labor market
allocation. The ’good’ workers generate higher surplus, however, for employers who target
such workers, they expect to wait longer to get matched with them, which implies higher
virtual cost. Given their commitment on hiring strategy, these employers want to prevent
undesirable (’bad’) workers from applying, and it is achieved by sacrificing part of surplus
with these ’good’ workers. Then even if the discrimination process2 is directed ’against’ the
bad, its induced cost (information rent) is ’paid’ by the good - those who have incentive to
work longer in our context.
The aim of this paper is to extend the GSW’s results to a dynamic context. The in-
tertemporal choices allow us to account for (i) the large turnover risks that are faced by
the firms, and (ii) the risk aversion that characterizes the worker utility function leading
them to ask for a smoothing of the wage profile. Thus, in our benchmark, the unobservable
characteristic is workers’ quitting probability, whereas in the static context of GSW, this is
the labor productivity. Moreover, we analyze two types of asymmetrical information: (i) a
classical ex ante heterogeneity where the employers’ problem is to screen the undesirable
types and to induce self-selection among the pool of ex-ante informed workers (adverse
1In competitive search equilibrium, the information on these ex-post matching returns is perfectly observ-
able. Thus, an optimal segmentation occurs at the equilibrium: the ’good’ and ’bad’ workers are attracted to
specific markets. This leads to the conventional view that the market gives optimally more chances to ’good’
workers: the segmentation process is applied to the less profitable workers. One may then have the tendency
to believe that the cost associated with these risks of heterogenous returns are borne by workers, the ’optimal
discrimination’ being borne by these ’bad’ agents.
2We say the ’bad’ workers are discriminated against in the sense that their expected utility from search is
less than proportional compared to the good workers. We do not mean that the firms always prefer hiring bad
workers to good workers. Firms are actually ex-ante identical, and indifferent to posting long term or short term
contracts.
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selection), (ii) an ex post heterogeneity where the worker observes a private information
only after the employment relationship has been established, leading employer to propose
contracts allowing her both to sort and retain workers (a commitment problem). We also
extend the results from Guerrieri (2008) by taking into account of risk aversion.
From a methodological point of view, we describe our main results in a two-period
stylized model of the labor market and also extend in the last section our benchmark to three
periods to study wage growth. This extension allows us to account for the transitory choice of
worker mobilities: after a separation, they can re-enter into the labor market. Fundamentally,
there are two types of workers in the labor market: the ones that have a better outside option
after a tenure of one ’period’, and the others having this option only after a tenure of two
’periods’.3 Given this heterogeneity, the search frictions can lead the employers to sort
workers, since the ex-post returns for the firms are heterogeneous, even if the costs of posting
a vacancy are homogenous. In the context of the ex ante heterogeneity, we show that GSW’s
results can be extended to this dynamic context. More precisely, the search and matching
frictions ensure that the separating equilibrium can always be achieved. Indeed, with respect
to a competitive environment à la Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), (RS), the competitive
search equilibrium introduces a new restriction: the matching is bilateral – each principal can
serve at most one agent ex post, whereas in RS, each principal can serve the total population.4
When the numbers of principals and agents are sufficiently large, any pooling deviation is
proved to be unprofitable. Thus, the meeting probabilities adjust endogenously to clear the
market. Hence GSW’s study provides theoretical benchmark for our problem, and there are
mainly two aspects along which our paper is different from theirs.
1. Firstly, our paper captures wage dynamics in a tractable way. In our model, asymmetric
information not only affects the trade-off between ex post surplus and the trading
probability, it also leads to distortion on the intertemporal wage dynamics originated
from workers’ risk aversion. As is well known in terms of contract theory, we show
that workers are required to concede certain amounts of wages in the firm as guarantee
at the beginning of the employment relationship, and in case they indeed stay with the
3If we interpret these ’periods’ as the duration of the employment contract in a firm submitted to large
turnover costs, the outside option is related to the workers’ private preferences for the type of work she likes
to do, location, alternative job opportunities etc... We model these diverse options as a reduced-form outside
option. Alternatively, one can interpret this outside option as the realization of risks linked to maternity or to
health, which is thus exogenous. Finally, if we think at the labor market of the older workers, one can interpret
the outside option as the retirement value, considered as exogenous.
4This trading restriction acts as a sort of capacity constraint that plays the crucial role in resolving the RS
non existence problem: when agents are not able to obtain a contract with probability 1 (due to coordination
friction), they engage themselves actively in a subgame to maximize their expected payoff related to optimal
search, which is the solution of a trade-off between the wage and the probability of obtaining it.
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firm in the following period, the amount can be recouped along with the interest rate
(tenure-increasing wage profile): workers should be responsible for the risk caused
by themselves. The crucial question is then whether the firms are over- or under-
compensating the workers under distortion caused by workers’ private information.
We prove that it is the former situation: under competitive search, risk neutral firms cut
1st-period wage to such an extent that bad types are disincentivized to apply. However,
in order not to lose the applications from the good types, the 2nd-period wage has to
increase to such an extent that the total lifetime wages given to good type workers
manage to surpass the full-information level, i.e., firms over-compensate in terms of
total wage transfer. Compared to the full-information case, firms have lower ex post
surplus, but in exchange, they are to receive more often applications from workers due
to the excessive wage amounts posted. Thus, our paper gives equilibrium foundations
to the old result of Salop and Salop (1976), where an optimal compensation policy is
such that employees are asked to make an up-front payment at the beginning of the
employment relationship, which will be refunded gradually in the subsequent periods,
conditional on their stay with the firm. Workers with a higher quit probability choose
not to apply to firms with this contract offer, since they expect that they will have a
low probability of receiving the repayments in the future. A self-selection mechanism
is thus induced. It is also important to mention that the results from Salop and Salop
are not robust enough: if workers are risk-averse, and if firms are risk-neutral on a
competitive market with a free-entry condition, the Salop and Salop model immediately
collapses to share the same problem as RS model: there may exist no equilibrium in
such a competitive market, when the fraction of bad workers is sufficiently low in
the economy. Within a competitive search equilibrium in the manner of GSW, this
problem is naturally solved.
2. Secondly, our immediate extension features variations of the extensive margin. This
is absent in GSW and most of the standard adverse selection literature. Risk averse
workers differ in their outside option value, and choose whether to enter into a long-
term or short-term employment relationship before search. Workers with lower outside
option value wish to avoid non-employment risk, and in response, the market offers a
high employment rate. However, this high job finding rate raises firms’ vacancy risks.
We then show that, under asymmetric information, workers choose to enter into short-
term relationship more often because the introduce of incentive constraint discretely
lowers workers’ expected utility from entering into a long-term relationship. Also,
the ’good’ workers suffer from inferior employment rate compared to the case of full
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information, which implies a higher average non-employment rate in the decentralized
economy.
If we depart from the informational structure a la GSW, our stylized model of the labor
market also extends the results of Guerrieri (2008) where workers only know their types
after the acceptance of the contract. In this case, the contract should ensure that ex post
the workers do not break the match unilaterally. Specifically, we are in a situation where
firms have full commitment, whereas workers have limited commitment. Compared to
Guerrieri (2008), our second extension features risk aversion and we focus on workers’
outside option (denoted by h), which depends on permanent opportunities outside the firm,
instead of matching specific disutility, conditional on a transitory specific match. We find
that there is a markup on the term related to information rent, i.e. we have G(h)g(h) u
′
(h) instead
of G(h)g(h) .
5 Standard literature assumes that G(h)g(h) is increasing, while
G(h)
g(h) u
′
(h) clearly may not.
Under risk aversion (u
′′
(h)< 0), the slope of the information rent is less steep. It suggests
that risk averse workers are more conservative about the attractiveness of the outside option
captured by G(h)g(h) ; in other words, the distortion of quitting threshold is less responsive to the
degree of severity of the information problem (measured by the Lagrangian multiplier of the
information constraint). However, it is clear that compared to the full-information economy,
the quit rate is larger and the employment rate is lower.
The paper is organized as follows. In the first part of the paper (section 2), we present
the benchmark where workers’ quitting probability is known ex ante, exogenous, and not
observable by the firms. There are two types of workers: those who quit sooner and the rest
who quit later. As in GSW, we show that there always exists a separating contract, which
is characterized by a distortion of the wage profile afforded by the good (those who quit
later): in the segment of these workers, the posted wage profile is age-increasing as a direct
consequence of the incentive compatibility constraint, whereas, In the segment of the bad,
there is no distortion (flat wage rate). This suggests that the lack of information concerning
the workers’ horizon leads to sub-optimal welfare of the workers accepting a priori to work
longer. The second part of the paper (section 3) shows how the dynamic wage contract
induces additional distortion on the extensive margin of the labor market. Indeed, the decision
on working horizon depends crucially on the outside option of the workers. Workers can be
aware of this heterogeneity before (ex ante heterogeneity) or after (ex post heterogeneity)
the matching process. We analyze these two types of heterogeneity. First, we show that the
optimal contracts lead to introducing wage distortions (characterized by an age-increasing
wage profile) on the labor market for the good workers, for both types of heterogeneity, as
5G(h) is the CDF of the random variable h, g(h) is the pdf of h, and u
′
is the marginal utility.
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in the benchmark. In the case of ex ante heterogeneity (section 3.1), the new result is that
the equilibrium reservation threshold is lower than in the full-information economy: the
less transparent is the information on the outside options, the greater the number of workers
that choose short-term employment relationship. With ex post heterogeneity (section 3.2),
we also show that not only do more workers choose to quit the labor market early, but the
employment rate of the workers who want to work for two ’periods’ is lower than in the full
information case. In the section 4, we discuss the robustness of our result in a multi-period
extension of the benchmark. The section 5 concludes.
1.2 Competitive search with exogenous separations
Consider a 2-period economy with search friction. There is a fixed quantity of workers, as
well as a pool of firms, the amount of which is to be determined in the equilibrium. Workers
start unemployed, and can get hired by a firm through a job-search process. We assume that
an employed may leave the firm before the termination of the employment relationship with
certain probability, which is interpreted as probability of quitting6. There are two possible
types of workers7: a fraction α remain in the second period with probability pH , called type
“H”; while the rest, with fraction of (1−α), are type “L” workers, who remain in the second
period with probability pL. We assume pH > pL.
All firms are ex ante identical. To start production, each has to create a vacancy with a
sunk cost C, and then announce wages in hopes of getting matched with a worker.8 When an
employer hires a worker, the match produces y per period. We assume that firms and workers
share the same subjective discount rate β .
There are matching frictions. We define q to be the tightness of the labor market, i.e. the
workers/firms ratio.9 The hiring probability for the firms is H (q) , while F (q) denotes the
workers’ job finding rate. As is common in the matching models, we assume
• the constant return to scale relationship H (q) = qF (q);
• F (q) the workers’ job finding rate is decreasing and concave in q, the expected number
of workers per firm, i.e. F ′ (q)< 0 and F ′′ (q)< 0;
6It would be useful to think of the following activities as examples:(i) mobilities toward another sector or
toward another geographical area, (ii) non-participation due to disability or retirement
7Introducing more types does not alter the main results, we stick to this case for the ease of exposition and
refer interested readers to GSW (2010) for discretely many types.
8Following Acemoglu and Shimer (1999), we make use of the concept of submarket, where each firm,
although ex ante homogeneous, will choose which type of agents to attract.
9In terms of directed search, the queue length is the expected number of applicants from a job seeker’s
perspective, as in Acemoglu and Shimer (1999).
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• H (q) the firms’ hiring probability is increasing and concave in q, i.e. H ′ (q)> 0 and
H ′′ (q)< 0;
• The elasticity of firms’ hiring probability is a decreasing function in q and between
(0,1), i.e. ε ′ (q) =
[
H ′(q)
H(q)/q
]′
< 0 and ε (q) ∈ (0,1).
For each period, the wage posting game has three stages: (i) wage posting stage, where
firms announce wages; (ii) job search stage, in which workers observe the posted wages, and
choose where to apply; (iii) production stage, where the workers who get matched with firms
produce, and payoffs are realized.10
1.2.1 The competitive search equilibrium under full information
In this section, we will describe the benchmark model, and show that with full information,
workers who can build a long-term employment relationship (have higher probability of
remaining in the firm) expect higher expected utility from search.
Workers. With full information, two types of workers search respectively in different
submarkets opened to them. These two submarkets are indexed according to their types, i.e.,
H or L. At the beginning of the first period, each worker enters her submarket to search
for a job. When a worker finds a job today, a type H (L) will remain at the second period
with a probability of pH (pL); when she fails to find a job in the first period, she enjoys
unemployment benefit z today, and could search again at the beginning of the second period.
Since the second period is the end of the economy, any worker who searches for a job at
second period works only for one period if a job is found, and otherwise she enjoys the
unemployment benefit. Notice that if the worker leaves the market in the second period (with
probability (1− p)), they receive utility from some outside option z2. Since under such a
formulation the value of z2 does not alter our result, we normalize it to zero.11 The worker’s
expected utility could be written in the following way where t ∈ {L,H}, p ∈ {pL, pH}, and
10Competitive search could be understood as directed search in a large economy, in the sense that when
the number of agents tends to infinity, individual deviations are not able to alter the payoff expected from the
market. Galenianos and Kircher (2012) demonstrated this result.
11In general, this uncertainty can be related to a ’negative’ or a ’positive’ shock. Examples for negative
shock can be productivity drop, disability etc..., in which case z2 ≤ z. An example for the interpretation as a
positive shock is job-to-job transition.
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1p stands for one-period:
Ut (p) = F (qt) [u(wt,1)+β (pu(wt,2)+(1− p)u(z2))]
+(1−F (qt))
[
u(z)+β
[
pU1p+(1− p)u(z2)
]]
where
U1p = F
(
q1p
)
u(w)+
(
1−F (q1p))u(z)
Firms. Ex ante identical firms choose which submarket to enter, and the corresponding
wages. This implies that each firm can only attract one type of worker at most.12 We assume
that once the worker leaves the firm prematurely with probability 1− p, the job is destroyed,
the firm in question exits the market and is replaced immediately by another. The profit
of firms is written as follows, where the first line is the profit for a firm contracting with a
two-period worker, and the second line is the profit for a firm contracting with a one-period
worker:
πt(p) = H (qt) [(y−wt,1)+β p(y−wt,2)]−C
π1p = H(q1p)(y−w1p)−C
Definition 1. A competitive search equilibrium is a set of wage profiles w∗(p)= {w∗t,1(p);w∗t,2(p)},
together with a function q∗(p) = q(w∗(p)) and utility levels U∗t (p) for p ∈ {0, pL, pH} that
satisfy the following conditions:
(1) employers’ profit maximization and free entry,
H (q∗t (p))
[(
y−w∗t,1(p)
)
+β p
(
y−w∗t,2(p)
)]−C ≤ 0
(2) workers’ optimal job application,
U∗t (p) ≥ F (q∗t (p))
[
u
(
w∗t,1 (p)
)
+β
(
pu
(
w∗t,2 (p)
)
+(1− p)u(z2)
)]
+(1−F (q∗t (p)))
[
u(z)+β
[
pU1p+(1− p)u(z2)
]]
12If firms are allowed to attract both types of workers at the same time, firms are showing a portfolio problem
where workers with higher value of p are always hired in preference to the workers with lower value of p. The
problem is more complex, and we refer interested readers to Shi (2006) for more details.
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where U∗t (p) is given by
U∗t (p) = max
w(p)
{
F (q∗t (w(p))) [u(wt,1 (p))+β (pu(wt,2 (p))+(1− p)u(z2))]
+(1−F (q∗t (w(p))))
[
u(z)+β
[
pU1p+(1− p)u(z2)
]] }
The solution is characterized by the following equations: for p ∈ {0, pL, pH}, we have
w∗t,1(p) = w
∗
t,2(p) = w
∗
t (p)
H (q∗t (p))(1+β p)(y−w∗t (p)) = C
1− ε (q∗t (p))
ε (q∗t (p))
=
y−w∗t (p)
1
u′(w∗t (p))
[
u(w∗t (p))− 11+β p
(
u(z)+β pU∗1p(p)
)]
where ε (q) denotes the elasticity of the firms’ hiring probability with respect to the queue
length. Leaving aside the conditions of free entry, the last equality (from the first order
condition on q) could be interpreted in the following manner: the LHS gives the relative
contribution of firms and workers to the total number of matches created, as the ratio between
the firms’ search effort to the workers’ search effort, whereas the RHS gives the surplus ratios
between firms and workers, in units of goods (the surplus of the workers is thus corrected by
the marginal utility).
By the comparison of allocations for the type-H and type-L workers, we have the
following proposition, where we may use the superscript ’∗’ and ’FI’ interchangeably to
stipulate that the allocation is achieved under full information (FI):
Proposition 1. The competitive search equilibrium is characterized by:
• The optimal level of per period wage is such that w∗H > w∗L
• The optimal level of expected queue length is such that q∗L > q∗H
• The value from search is such that U∗H >U∗L .
• The wage increases less faster than the increment of productivity with respect to p:
(1+β pH)w∗H − (1+β pL)w∗L < (1+β pH)y− (1+β pL)y.
Proof. See Appendix 1.6.1.
This proposition states that not only do the type H workers earn higher per-period wages,
but they also get matched more often compared to the type L workers whose expected
employment horizon is of shorter term (pL < pH).
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There is one further observation. Consider a particular pair of parameter values by setting
pH = 1 and pL = 0,13 so that in the second period workers either remain in the firm for
sure or leave for sure. Now suppose that a worker can choose to be involved in a long
term or repeated short term relationship, then workers are better off involved in a long-term
relationship. This result is formalized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2. Take pH = 1 and pL = 0. Suppose that a worker can choose to be involved in a
long-term (2 periods) or repeated short-term (1-period) relationship, then workers are better
off involved in a long-term relationship in terms of value from search, i.e. U∗H > (1+β )U∗L .
Proof. See Appendix 1.6.2.
It is important to remark that although firms pay the same entry cost C on each sub-market,
the effective cost, defined as CH(q) , is larger than the unit cost C, because it is obtained by
multiplying the average duration of the search. The inequality q∗L > q∗H coincides with our
intuition that in order to earn higher ex post surplus, the firms which post type H contracts
anticipate that they have to wait longer till such a worker appears.
With perfect information, we have established that the workers who expect longer em-
ployment relationship (measured by p) receive higher expected utility from search. Although
all different types offer the same quality of labor, type-L workers receive lower wages and
suffer from a lower expected utility. It is this situation which generates incentives for the
type-L workers to visit the submarket for the type-H workers, if information is not perfectly
shared. Thus firms which post long-term employment contracts and are uninformed about
the workers’ types may suffer loss if they hire a type-L worker, despite the fact that they have
incentives to hire a type-H worker. We are thus led to consider the possibility for the firms to
manipulate wage profiles to induce self-selection among the workers, such that no workers
will misrepresent their types.
1.2.2 The allocation under asymmetric information
In the previous subsection, we have shown that type-L workers have incentive to misrepresent
their type, because they find that higher expected utility could be obtained if they send
applications to a market where firms want to hire type-H workers. In order to discourage
type-L workers from joining the submarket for type-H workers, an alternative wage profile
should be posted to induce self-selection. A standard way is to introduce an incentive
compatibility constraint, such that type-L workers find it unattractive to pretend to be a type
13In this case, the type L is equivalent to type 1p
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H. The optimization program is now written as follows where the index AI denotes the
equilibrium allocation under asymmetric information:
UAIH = max{q,wH,1,wH,2}
{
F (qH) [u(wH,1)+β pHu(wH,2)]
+(1−F (qH))
[
u(z)+β pHU1p
] }
s.to H (q) [y−wH,1+β pH (y−wH,2)] =C
I.C.
{
(qH) [u(wH,1)+β pLu(wH,2)]
+(1−F (qH))
[
u(z)+β pLU1p
] }≤UAIL
where
UAIL = max{q,wL,1,wL,2}
{
F (qL) [u(wL,1)+β pLu(wL,2)]
+(1−F (qL))
[
u(z)+β pLU1p
] }
s.to H (q) [y−wL,1+β pL (y−wL,2)] =C
and
U1p = max{q,w}
{F (q)u(w)+(1−F (q))u(z)}
s.to H (q) [y−w] =C
We remark that the incentive constraint which prevents type H workers from misrepre-
senting their type as L is not binding hence not included, because we could verify that type
H workers are worse off choosing the allocation of type L instead of sticking to their own.14
This economy is an extension to the theoretical context proposed by Guerrieri, Shimer and
Wright (2010). And the following result could be achieved:
Proposition 3. In our economy, the separating equilibrium exists and is unique.
Proof. To show the uniqueness and existence, it suffices to check that 3 mild assumptions
proposed in Guerrieri, Shimer and Wright (2010), which are common in contract literature,
are satisfied. In Appendix 1.6.3, the verification of these assumptions in our context is
provided.
Hence, we extend GSW’s proof of the existence of a separating equilibrium to a two-
period model. The interest is then to discuss the properties of this dynamic equilibrium with
respect to observed features of the labor market where short and long term contracts coexist.
We remark that the separating equilibrium always exists. The separating equilibrium here is
immune to the Rothschild and Stigliz (1976) non-existence of equilibrium problem, because
14We refer the readers to proof of Proposition 4 for this.
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with endogenous matching any pooling deviation could be proved to yield negative profit
when the number of agents in the economy becomes large. We now turn to the properties of
this equilibrium.
Proposition 4. Under asymmetric information, the equilibrium allocation is such that:
• for type pL, we have qAIL = q
∗
L, and w
AI
L,1 = w
AI
L,2 = w
∗
L;
• for type pH , we have wAIH,1 < w
∗
L < w
∗
H < w
AI
H,2;
• the type pH workers are worse off in terms of expected utility, compared to the full-
information case (UAIH <U
∗
H);
• the type pL worker receives the same expected utility (UAIL =U
∗
L <U
AI
H );
• we have q∗H < qAIH < q∗L. Firms over-compensate workers in terms of total wage transfer
compared to the full information case: w∗H −wAIH,1 < β pH
(
wAIH,2−w∗H
)
.
Proof. See Appendix 1.6.4.
In the presence of asymmetric information, separating equilibrium is achieved by in-
creasing the wage of the type-H worker with his tenure in the firm. This wage profile
discourages type-L workers from applying. Since type-L workers have a lower probability
of staying, choosing this non-smoothed wage profile makes them receive a lower expected
utility compared to the smoothed wage payment. In contrast, type-H workers have a higher
probability of remaining at work tomorrow. Thus they are willing to sacrifice some wages
today in exchange for higher earnings tomorrow.
Salop and Salop (1976) describe the same mechanism to induce self-selection. They
consider a so-called Two-Part Wage (TPW) requiring that a new employee at the matching
stage pays the firm an entrance fee of D1, in return for which she will receive w+D2 in
the subsequent periods. In the equilibrium, the worker should pay her own turnover costs.
This is equivalent to say that this worker guarantees that she will pay for the consequences
of her potential premature quit. Our wage profile (Proposition 4) could also be interpreted
in a fashion similar to Salop and Salop (1976). Recall that the free-entry condition in the
presence of asymmetric information specifies C
H(qAIH )
= y−wAIH,1+β pH
(
y−wAIH,2
)
, and in
the absence of asymmetric information C
H(q∗H)
= y−w∗H +β pH (y−w∗H). We could thus
define the following difference: D1 = w∗H −wAIH,1 > 0 and D2 = wAIH,2−w∗H > 0. Salop and
Salop (1976) obtain the equality D1D2 = β pH (the self-selection ratio) at the equilibrium,
due to worker’s risk-neutrality. In our context, under risk-aversion, the result becomes
D1
D2
< β pH which is equivalent to w∗H +β pHw∗H < wAIH,1+β pHw
AI
H,2. Hence, firms have to
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over compensate workers in terms of wage transfer. On one hand, the 1st-period wage has
to be reduced to a sufficiently low level to prevent undesirable types from applying. This
reduction of 1st-period wage at the same time harms the good type’s incentive from applying.
On the other hand, the 2nd-period wage has to be set to a sufficiently high level to rescue the
reduced incentives due to the decrease of 1st-period wage. Under risk aversion, the marginal
gain from changing the 2nd-period wage is larger compared to changing the 1st-period
wage, so that in order to attract workers through increasing 2nd-period wage, more than
proportional amount of wage transfer should be foreseen.
To look into more details, let us turn to the first order conditions with respect to the wages.
Notice that in case of asymmetric information, the first order conditions with respect to w1
and w2 are respectively
u
′ (
wAIH,1
)
=
λqAIH
1−δ
u
′ (
wAIH,2
)
=
λqAIH
1−δ pLpH
where λ is the Lagrangian multiplier for firms’ breakeven constraint, and δ is the lagrangian
multiplier associated with the incentive compatibility constraint. Dividing these two equations
and rearranging, we are able to obtain
u
′ (
wAIH,1
)
u′
(
wAIH,2
) = 1+ δ
1−δ
pH − pL
pH
The expression δ1−δ
pH−pL
pH
could be regarded as a measure of the extent of agency cost in the
economy. This index δ1−δ
pH−pL
pH
is a product of δ , which measures the tightness of the IC
constraint, and the likelihood ratio pH−pLpH , which measures the degree to which the agents’
misbehavior (shirking) related to their realized type distorts the full information allocation.
From the intuitive perspective, when pL = 0, the information problem is the most serious
in the economy, because the bad types will leave for sure in the subsequent period. This
annihilates the firm’s production. Thus, in this case, the incentive constraint should be "very"
tight, with a "high" shadow price (cost). Hence, there should be a very large gap between w1
and w2 to induce some incentives. When pL → pH , the IC problems becomes gradually less
important (more relaxed), because the bad types behave almost as good as the good types.
In this case, the IC constraint should be slack, with a low shadow price (cost). Hence, there
should be gradually smaller gap between w1 and w2 to induce some incentives.
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From the technical perspective, if pL → 0, then δ1−δ pH−pLpH is very large. Indeed, the
likelihood ratio pH−pLpH attains its maximal value 1. Moreover, the ratio
δ (pL)
1−δ (pL) also attains
its largest value. Naturally, when the IC constraint is very tight, the shadow price δ (cost)
is at its highest value. Hence, we have the largest gap between w2 and w1 when pL = 0.
If pL → pH , then δ1−δ pH−pLpH will be very small. Firstly because
pH−pL
pH
tends to 0 in this
case, and secondly because δ (pL)1−δ (pL) also takes its lowest value, because, in this case the IC
constraint tends to be very slack, leading to a low value of the shadow price δ . Hence, when
pL → pH , there is no gap between w1 and w2, because there is no more information problem.
As a summary, risk aversion plays an important role in restricting the inter-temporal
transfers. The following proposition examines to which extent the separating equilibrium
is away from efficiency. Precisely, we compare the separating allocation with the pooling
allocation, and we find that when the fraction of bad types is small enough, the separating
allocation may be less efficient than the pooling allocation.15
Proposition 5. The separating equilibrium may be Pareto inefficient under certain particular
parameter values.
Proof. See Appendix 1.6.5.
If the share of the bad workers is small enough, the pooling allocation dominates the
separating equilibrium, even though the pooling equilibrium never exists. Indeed, the
optimization program of the pooling allocation approaches the optimization program for the
type-H workers in the full information case, implying that w∗α → w∗H , q∗α → q∗H and thus the
good workers will be better off. Given that the allocation under full information is such that
q∗H < q∗L and w∗H > w∗L, the type L-workers could be employed more often, receive higher
wages with this constructed pooling allocation and thus will also be better off.
1.3 Competitive search with endogenous separations
In the previous section, we have considered separation as an event which happens exoge-
nously. In this section, we allow the agents to choose the period at which they quit the labor
market. We study how this extensive margin can be manipulated by the optimal contract.
The introduction of an outside option in the second part of the life cycle allows us to analyze
how an incentive scheme distorts separation choices.16 For simplicity, we assume that each
15In Salop and Salop (1976),there is no efficiency gain from introducing this self-selection mechanism,
because both workers and firms are risk-neutral.
16If the outside option of the worker is an alternative job in another area, sector... the information of this
job prospect is not directly observed by the employer. In the same spirit, if the outside option of the worker
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worker is characterized by a specific realization of this outside option, which leads to a
worker-specific tenure on this labor market.
In this context, a simple way to endogenize separation choice is to introduce an outside
option which is worker-specific. Intuitively, low value of outside option induces the agent to
stay, while high value of outside option induces the agent to leave the contract prematurely.
In this sense, we say individuals’ decisions about quitting are ’endogenous’.
We will distinguish two timings: in the first, each worker knows her characteristic before
she searches for a job, whereas in the second, the information on her characteristic is revealed
after the matching. In the first case, the asymmetry in the information is ex ante, whereas in
the second, it is ex post.
1.3.1 Ex ante heterogeneity, quitting choice and dynamic contracts
We start with the case where the workers are ex ante different and know their value of
second-period home production h before searching for a job. The value of h is assumed to be
drawn from a distribution G(h). According to the duration of the employment relationship,
the labor market is segmented into two: the two-period, and the one-period submarket. We
will abuse the terminology to call the two-period submarket the type-H market, and the
one-period submarket the type-L market. Each worker, before searching for a job, has to
choose which submarket to enter according to her value of h. There are several situations,
and we now describe them heuristically. We start with full information.
Starting from workers with sufficiently small values of h. In case these workers do not
find a job today, they will remain in the market and search again tomorrow, because their
values of h are low compared to the value from search again. Then their choice is to enter the
two-period (type-H) market. Using the same equilibrium definition as the previous section,
the problem of such a worker with value h is written as follows17:
U∗H1 (h,z) = max{q,wH,1,wH,2}
{
F (qH1) [u(wH1,1)+βu(wH1,2)]
+(1−F (qH1))
[
u(z)+βU1p (h,z)
] }
s.t. H (qH1) [y−wH1,1+β (y−wH1,2)] =C
is a non-participation value, linked to health, social security wealth or financial assets, firms must extract
information by a mechanism design.
17Notice that we assumed h and z to be additively separable in terms of utility.
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where
U1p (h,z) = max{q,w}
{F (q)u(w)+(1−F (q)) [u(h)+u(z)]}
s.t. H (q) [y−w] =C
An important remark is that the posted wage and induced queue length both depend on h,
although h does not enter explicitly into firms’ profit equation. Indeed, workers of different h
will have correspondingly different demands on wages, and there will always be firms which
post corresponding wages to cater each workers’ wage demand, as in Acemoglu and Shimer
(1999): a competitive search context with unemployment insurance as outside option for
workers. It could be verified by implicit function theorem that both the equilibrium wage and
queue length are increasing in h. Technically, this two-period submarket is composed of a
continuum of subsubmarket indexed by h.
Now we turn attention to the program U1p (h,z). We know that workers with high value
of h will demand high wages corresponding to their value of h; and as h increases, there is a
point of h above which the firm can no longer manage to attract workers. In that situation,
those workers may not choose to search again tomorrow in case they do not secure a job
today: they may simply leave the market and enjoy the home production u(h) if u(h) is such
that max
{
U1p (h,z) ,u(h)
}
= u(h). The corresponding program then becomes
U∗H2 (h,z) = max{q,wH,1,wH,2}
{
F (qH2) [u(wH2,1)+βu(wH2,2)]
+(1−F (qH2)) [u(z)+βu(h)]
}
s.t. H (qH2) [y−wH2,1+β (y−wH2,2)] =C
Now we are able to succinctly represent the above two situations in the following program:
U∗H (hH ,z) = max{q,wH,1,wH,2}
{
F (qH) [u(wH,1)+βu(wH,2)]
+(1−F (qH))
[
u(z)+βmax
{
u(hH) ,U1p (hH ,z)
}] }
s.t. H (qH) [y−wH,1+β (y−wH,2)] =C
Notice that in the above two situations, workers always have intention to work for two
periods as long as they find the job today. The firms can observe workers’ value of h. They
could choose to either enter into the one-period or the two-period market, and they know that
workers in the two-period market will never break the employment relationship unilaterally.
As h further increases, up to a point such that u(h) is weakly greater than u(wH,2), the
corresponding worker becomes gradually unwilling to accept the job offer because she finds
herself better off staying at home instead of working at the second period. To make the
workers effectively unwilling to stay in the two-period market, it has to be that u(h)−u(wH,2)
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is positive and sufficiently large, because if they choose the one-period market at the point
u(h) = u(wH,2), there would be a discrete drop in their expected utility, owing to our finding
in the previous section that a two-period worker enjoys higher per period expected utility
from search compared to a one-period worker. The firms know that workers with large values
of h will prefer to stay at home at the second period (i.e. choose to enter the one-period
market), so if they want to attract these workers, they should enter the one-period market.
This justifies the existence of the one-period market at first period, because there is demand
from workers’ side. We write the problem for these potential one-period (type-L) workers’
as follows:
U∗L (hL,z) = max{q,wL}
{
F (qL)u(wL)+(1−F (qL))u(z)
+βu(h)
}
s.t. H (qL) [y−wL] =C
Notice that these one-period workers do not have incentive to search for a job again in
the second period. Suppose they have incentive to do so, then we shall substitute u(h)
for U1p (h,z). This implies that there is at some point u(h) may be smaller than U1p (h,z).
However, we have learnt from the above arguments that for the workers who enter into the
one-period market, their level of h is such that u(h)> u(wH,2)>U1p (h,z). We thus obtain
a contradiction.
As a summary, a worker’s decision on whether entering into a two-period (type-H) or a
one-period (type-L) market is captured by the comparison of the expected utility between
U∗H (h,z) and U∗L (h,z). If the h is such that U∗H (h,z) > U∗L (h,z), this worker in question
will choose to enter the two-period market; If the h is such that U∗H (h,z) < U∗L (h,z), this
worker chooses to enter into the one-period market; And if U∗H (h,z) =U∗L (h,z) workers are
indifferent, we assume that she always chooses to leave the labor market. We denote now
hˆFI as the threshold captured by U∗H
(
hˆFI,z
)
=U∗L
(
hˆFI,z
)
in case of full information, and
we regarded it as the separation threshold.
Equilibrium with dynamic contract
Our main focus in this section is to examine how does asymmetric information have impact
on this separation threshold. To this end, we should check whether certain type with a given
value of h can be better off by choosing the other types’ optimal allocations, so that in case
of asymmetric information there is potential misrepresentation of type. Since the value of h
does not explicitly enter into firms’ profit equation, it is straightforward to verify by revealed
preference as in Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) that among the pool of workers with h < hˆFI
(within the two-period market), no worker will have incentive to choose to apply to wages
20 Dynamic Contracts in Search Equilibrium under Asymmetric Information
destined for another worker of different h. As for the workers with h ≥ hˆFI (with in the
one-period market), their allocation does not depend on h, so there is no information problem.
Our problem is then reduced to whether the workers with h≥ hˆFI (from two-period market)
have incentive to misrepresent their types as certain workers with h < hˆFI (from one-period
market), as in the previous section. Recall that we term those workers with h≥ hˆFI as type-H
workers, and those workers with h < hˆFI as type-H workers; We have the following result
concerning workers’ mimicking behavior.
Proposition 6. Type-L workers are always better off by misrepresenting their types as type-H
workers.
Proof. See Appendix 1.6.6.
This Proposition suggests that workers from one-period market indeed have intention
to deviate to apply to wages posted in the two-period market. More precisely, given that
the two-period market consists again of a continuum of submarkets indexed by h, workers
from the one-period market will have incentive to misrepresent themselves to join all these
submarkets. This result is expected. Notice that in the one-period market, the term associated
with β becomes absent in the firm’s profit equation. Due to this indirect impact from h,
information problem arises between these two markets. Again, firms in the two-period
market must implement a mechanism to avoid the risk of hiring a worker with a one-period
(short) term on the job where the search costs can only be recouped by hiring a worker with
a two-period (long) term on the job. Analogous to the previous section, the optimization
program for a given h in the two-period market is written as follows:
UAIH (hH ,z) = max{q,wH,1,wH,2}
{
F (qH) [u(wH,1)+βu(wH,2)]
+(1−F (qH))
[
u(z)+β max
{
u(hH) ,U1p (hH ,z)
}] }
s.t. H (qH) [y−wH,1+β (y−wH,2)] =C
IC constraint F (qH) [u(wH,1)]+(1−F (qH)) [u(z1)]+βu(hL)≤UL
where
U1p (h,z) = max{q,w}
{F (q)u(w)+(1−F (q)) [u(h)+u(z)]}
s.t. H (q) [y−w] =C
The properties of the allocation of asymmetric information are summarized in the follow-
ing proposition.
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Proposition 7. The optimal contract is such that
• for the wages, wAIH,1 < w
∗
L < w
∗
H < w
AI
H,2, and w
AI
H,1+βw
AI
H,2 > (1+β )w
∗
H .
• for the application strategies (or the queue lengths), q∗H < qAIH < qAIL = q∗L.
Proof. See Appendix 1.6.7.
The incentive contract introduces an age-increasing wage. More precisely, by setting
wAIH,1 < w
∗
H < w
AI
H,2, the agents who would choose to quit the labor market early are dis-
couraged from applying. The mechanisms which lead to firms’ over-compensation, i.e.
wAIH,1+βw
AI
H,2 > (1+β )w
∗
H , share the same interpretation as the previous section. We move
now to the next proposition on the separation threshold:
Proposition 8. The threshold of the pooling equilibrium is such that hˆAI < hˆFI .
Proof. By definition, we should have UAIH (hˆ
AI) =UAIL (hˆ
AI) and U∗H(hˆFI) =U∗L (hˆFI). Now
suppose that hˆAI ≥ hˆFI . This implies that UAIH (hˆFI) ≥ UAIL (hˆFI), i.e., the type hˆFI in the
asymmetric information economy will not choose to enter into the one-period submarket.
However, this in turn implies that UAIH (hˆ
FI) ≥ U∗L (hˆFI) = U∗H(hˆFI), which is impossible,
because we know UAIH <U
∗
H for any level of h.
At the equilibrium, the optimal contract reaches a separating equilibrium while retaining
fewer worker on long-term contract. This is a direct consequence of the separation decision.
As in the previous context, to achieve separating equilibrium, it is necessary to distort the
contract of type-H workers. However, here an additional loss is induced: the worker who
should have remained active now chooses to enter into the one-period submarket. Indeed
the firm must discourage the undesirable workers from applying for the job posted for the
workers who want to work for two periods (the ones that prefer “long-term” contracts).
However, this is done through firms’ ex ante decisions in restricting the set of the workers
who apply for long term contracts in order to screen the applicants.
By nature, when the risk from search is endogenously affected by the posted contract, the
good workers have to pay for the information rent by receiving distorted allocation, which
further decreases their expected utility, and leads them to quit in the second period. Hence,
we observe that if the extensive margin (the separation decision) is ’endogenized’ in this
sense, the distorted wage offer operates through the extensive margin of search to lower the
total labor supply when there is asymmetric information.
Importantly, this contrasts with the results of Guerrieri, Shimer and Wright (2010) where
the separating contract leads to a rise of the intensive margin in the asymmetric information
case. Nevertheless, in our dynamic context, even if the contract proposes an tenure-increasing
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wage, this cannot lead agents to prefer the long-term relationship because the screening
process is done ex ante. This is not the case in Guerrieri, Shimer and Wright (2010) because
the intensive margin can react immediately to the wage.
1.3.2 Ex post heterogeneity and credible commitment
In this section, we study the case where the workers learn their outside option value after
getting matched with an employer. The difference between this economy and the previous
ones is that now the heterogeneity is privately observed by the workers after the employment
relationship has been established (ex post). Then the problem is no longer adverse selection,
but one related to commitment: the contracts posted ex ante, if accepted by workers, should
induce them to make proper ex post quitting decisions which are conformable to what is
agreed ex ante.18 In other words, the contract should ensure that ex post the workers have
no incentive breaking it unilaterally. Specifically, we are in a situation where firms have
full commitment on wage posting, whereas workers have limited commitment on premature
quitting.
Our economy is closely related to Guerrieri (2008), who treats a competitive search
context where workers hold private information on their idiosyncratic disutility realized
immediately after the match is formed. Apart from difference in workers’ preference and
length of periods, we also differ in the fact that in Guerrieri (2008) workers’ premature
quitting incentive is driven by high disutility at work, while in our context it is driven by
higher outside option.19 How does workers’ quitting incentive generate distortion? Whenever
workers can quit prematurely (without commitment and without paying any extra cost), firms
are not able to assure production and recoup the sunk vacancy cost. Anticipating this, firms
want to propose a countermeasure which provides themselves more insurance.
We propose some straightforward modifications of the techniques developed in Guerrieri
(2008) to solve our problem, and obtain the following results: (i) the equilibrium wage
contract consists of an ascending wage profile where the wage per period is lower than the
full information level; (ii) these low wages allow firms to assure higher ex post surplus, but
lead workers less willing to stay due to comparatively more attractive outside option, so that
a lower participation margin results, i.e. hˆAI < hˆFI (qualitatively, this result is the same as
18With ex ante heterogeneity under asymmetric information, the employers’ problem is to screen the
undesirable types and to induce self-selection among the pool of workers knowing their characteristic before
the employment relationship is established (ex ante).
19With this framework, we do not limit the heterogeneity to a match-specific event, but we also account for
permanent distributions in outside opportunities that are available in different sectors/geographic areas or in
preferences for inactivity.
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the one obtained in the previous section), (iii) there is inferior job creation compared to the
full information economy.
We will put emphasis on the elements different from the previous contexts. Workers
and firms are now ex ante identical. Once a match is formed, the worker receives an
outside option shock which takes place at the end of the 1st period during this employment
relationship. Depending on the realization of the outside option, the worker decides to work
for another period or to leave the market early (without paying any compensation to the
firm). We assume that the level of the outside option shock h is drawn randomly from a
cumulative distribution function G(·), within the interval H ≡ [h,h]. This realization is a
private information of workers. Thus the firm’s problem is to propose a wage contract that
(i) guarantees participation (Individual rationality), and (ii) makes sure the workers reveal
truthfully their home production realization (Incentive compatibility).
We consider direct revelation mechanisms, where a contract is a function which maps
each reported h to a retaining probability e(h) ∈ [0,1], as well as the wages ω (h) =
(w1 (h) ,w2 (h)) ∈ (R+,R+). We use J
(
h, h˜
)
to denote the ex post extra value from staying
in the time between for the worker who is of type h but reports h˜, and it is written as:
J
(
h, h˜
)
= e
(
h˜
)
u
(
w2
(
h˜
))− e(h˜)u(h)
Then incentive compatibility (IC) implies J (h,h)≥ J (h, h˜) for all h and h˜ belonging to
the support of h. Individual rationality (IR) requires J (h,h) ≥ 0 for all h belonging to its
support. According to the following lemma, we could reduce the number of the constraints
related to IC and IR.
Lemma 1. The IC and IR constraints are equivalent to the following conditions:
(1) e(h) being non-increasing.
(2) J (h,h)− J (h,h) = ∫ hh e(x)u′ (x)dx
(3) J
(
h,h
)≥ 0
Proof. See Appendix 1.6.8.
The competitive search equilibrium is adapted as follows:
Definition 2. A competitive search equilibrium consists of a set of incentive compatible and
individual rational mechanisms M = {e(h) ,ω (h)} for all h, an induced application strategy
from workers Q∗ (M), as well as a utility function UAI which satisfies:
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(1) Employers’ profit maximization and free entry:
H (Q∗ (M))×
(
y−w1 (h)+β
∫ h
h e(h)(y−w2 (h))dG(h)
)
≤ C
subject to IC and IR
(2) Workers’ optimal application:
UAI ≥ F (Q∗ (M))×
[
u(w1 (h))+β
∫ h
h
{
e(h)u(w2 (h))
+(1− e(h))u(h)
}
dG(h)
]
+(1−F (Q∗ (M)))×
[
u(z)+β
∫ h
h max
{
U1p,u(h)
}
dG(h)
]
where UAI is given by
UAI = max
M′

F
(
Q∗
(
M
′))×[u(w1 (h))+β ∫ hh
{
e(h)u(w2 (h))
+(1− e(h))u(h)
}
dG(h)
]
+
(
1−F
(
Q∗
(
M
′)))×[u(z)+β ∫ hh max{U1p,u(h)}dG(h)]

In equilibrium, the functional relationship between the contract M and the queue length
Q is learnt by both the workers and firms. From the firms’ perspective, they anticipate how
the posted incentive compatible and individually rational contract can induce the workers to
choose their application strategy (captured by Q), even for contracts which are not posted in
equilibrium. From the workers’ perspective, given any wage contract, they optimally choose
the contract among them, taking into account the trade-off between the contract and the
probability of obtaining it - there is subgame perfection. At last, since the firms can anticipate
that non-optimal contracts will not receive application (queue length is zero), they will never
post such non-optimal contracts.
As in Guerrieri (2008), the competitive search equilibrium defined is equivalent to the
solution of the following program:
UAI = max
{e(h),w1(h),w2(h),q}

F (q)×
[
u(w1 (h))+β
∫ h
h
{
e(h)u(w2 (h))
+(1− e(h))u(h)
}
dG(h)
]
+(1−F (q))×
[
u(z)+β
∫ h
h max
{
U1p,u(h)
}
dG(h)
]

s.to e(h) being non-increasing
IC, IR and Zero Profit condition.
With standard procedure in contract theory (see, e.g. Laffont and Martimort (2001)), and
following Guerrieri (2008), we could further simplify the IC and IR conditions such that it
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suffices to solve the following program:
UAI = max
{e(h),w1(h),w2(h),q}

F (q)×
[
u(w1 (h))+β
∫ h
h
{
e(h)u(w2 (h))
+(1− e(h))u(h)
}
dG(h)
]
+(1−F (q))×
[
u(z)+β
∫ h
h max
{
U1p,u(h)
}
dG(h)
]

s.to e(h) being non-increasing
H (q)×
(
y−w1 (h)+β
∫ h
h
e(h)(y−w2 (h))dG(h)
)
=C
∫ h
h
e(h)
[
u(w2 (h))−u(h)− G(h)g(h) u
′
(h)
]
dG(h)≥ 0
The FOCs with respect to w1 and w2 show that wages are type-dependent, and increasing in
time:
u
′ (
wAI1
)
= λqAI
u
′ (
wAI2
)
= λqAI 11+δ
The pointwise maximization with respect to e(h) yields
u
(
wAI2
)
+u
′ (
wAI2
)(
y−wAI2
)
= u
(
hˆ
)
+ δ1+δ
G(hˆ)
g(hˆ)
u
′ (
hˆ
)
where the existence of hˆ hinges on the term
G(hˆ)
g(hˆ)
u
′ (
hˆ
)
. If without risk aversion, the monotone
hazard rate property d G(h)g(h) /dh > 0 is sufficient to guarantee a unique value of hˆ. With risk
aversion, we notice that the increase is damped by the decrease of the u
′ (
hˆ
)
. If u
′ (
hˆ
)
decreases faster than
G(hˆ)
g(hˆ)
increases, the firm then is not able to induce self-selection with
this mechanism, and there may be bunching. We abstract from the complexity through that
direction and focus on the case where
G(hˆ)
g(hˆ)
u
′ (
hˆ
)
in total is increasing, so that a unique value
of hˆ is implied by this equality. In this case, it implies that this pointwise maximization leads
to a cutoff value hˆ such that
e(h) =
0 if h≥ hˆ1 if h < hˆ
This is conformable to the restriction that e(h) should be weakly decreasing, and we
hence verify that the solution of the program is equivalent to the solution of the program
where the monotonicity constraint on e(h) is imposed.
The level of shadow value δ reflects to which extent the allocations are affected by
asymmetric information. From the binding constraint associated with δ , we know that wAI2 is
increasing with hˆ. Together with the FOC with respect to e(h), it implies that the higher the
26 Dynamic Contracts in Search Equilibrium under Asymmetric Information
value of δ , the lower should be the value of threshold hˆ. In other words, when the constraint
is tighter (measured by higher value of δ ), in equilibrium less trade takes place (captured by
lower value of hˆ).
In particular, when δ = 0, the information constraint is not binding. Then, from the FOCs
with respect to wages we deduce wˆFI1 = wˆ
FI
2 ; at the same time, it is straightforward to verify
from the FOC with respect to e(h) that wFI2 = y = hˆ
FI . Putting these two equalities into the
zero profit condition of firms, we find that the zero profit condition can only be satisfied
when the fixed vacancy cost is nil (C = 0) as in Guerrieri (2008). Hence the economy is
necessarily distorted away from the first best case as long as fixed vacancy cost is sunk ex
ante and positive.
We now summarize in the following proposition the comparison of allocations between
the full information and asymmetric information case:
Proposition 9. In the asymmetric information case, ie. when δ > 0, we have
• wAI1 < w
AI
2 < y = w
FI ,
• hˆAI < hˆFI and
• qAI > qFI
Since qAI > qFI implies F(qFI)> F(qAI), and since G(hˆFI)> G(hˆAI), we are able to con-
clude that F(qFI)G(hˆFI)> F(qAI)G(hˆAI), which implies that the job matching is inferior in
the asymmetric information case.
Proof. See Appendix 1.6.9
This proposition shows that an increasing wage profile is induced in order to achieve
commitment, contrary to the case with full information where the wages are flat. Given that
the reservation threshold of the outside option is lower in the economy with asymmetric
information, there is less trade in the economy with asymmetric information, in other words,
there is under-employment.
Notice that we have established that in both the case of ex ante and the case of ex post
heterogeneity, this extensive margin is downwards distorted, however, the driving forces are
not the same. With ex ante heterogeneity, firms can post wage profiles to induce self-selection
by preventing the undesired workers from applying. With ex post heterogeneity, no one has
information priority before search. The problem of the firm is to design a mechanism which
consists of the wage profile, together with a rationing rule, such that workers truthfully reveal
their type, based on which firms decide whether to retain the worker in question. This costly
ex post information rent implies a discrete drop of ex post surplus for the firms, which hence
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reduces firms’ ex ante incentive of vacancy opening - less firms enter and the workers/firms
ratio increases: workers become difficult to get matched, and there is less job matching from
the workers’ perspective.
1.4 Extension: A three-period framework
We have studied a two-period model in the benchmark, where workers when facing a short-
term separation shock, no longer remain in the market. Such a separation shock is absorbing,
in the sense that whenever workers are “shocked” out of the labor force once, the economy
ends. In this section, we propose a straightforward extension of the benchmark which allows
us to account for the transitional aspect of the labor market occupations/states. A sufficient
way is to extend our two-period model to a three-period economy, where workers face
recurrently separation shock, and those who are shocked in the second period have another
chance of re-entering into the market. We will solve this straightforward extension, and
discuss possible future developments upon it.
With a little abuse of terminology, we will use the subscript l (long-term contract) for the
workers who have potentially three periods of working horizon, the subscript m (median-term
contract) for those with two periods of horizon, and the subscript s (short-term contract) for
those with one period of horizon. The parameter p still represents workers’ probability to
keep her job. Extending the definition of competitive search equilibrium to three periods, we
arrive at the following maximization program with full information:
Ul,1 = max{wl,1,wl,2,wl,3,ql,1}
 F
(
ql,1
)[
u
(
wl,1
)
+β
(
p× [u(wl,2)+β pu(wl,3)]
+(1− p)×β pUl,3
)]
+
(
1−F (ql,1))[u(z)+β pUl,2+β (1− p)×β pUl,3]

s.to H
(
ql,1
)[
y−wl,1+β p
(
y−wl,2
)
+(β p)2
(
y−wl,3
)]
=C
where Ul,2 =Um,1, given that the three-period workers at the second period has the same
behavior as a two-period worker,
Um,1 = max{wm,1,wm,2,qm,1}
{
F (qm,1) [u(wm,1)+β pu(wm,2)]
+(1−F (qm,1)) [u(z)+β pUm,2]
}
s.to H (qm,1) [y−wm,1+β p(y−wm,2)] =C
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And based on similar argument, we have Ul,3 =Um,2 =Us,1, for the last period of three-period
workers,
Us,1 = max{ws,1,qs,1}
{
F (qs,1) [u(ws,1)]
+(1−F (qs,1)) [u(z)]
}
s.to H (qs,1) [y−ws,1] =C
In section 2, we have shown that the per-period wage wFIm,1 = w
FI
m,2 = w
FI
m is increasing,
while the expected queue length qFIm decreasing in β and p. So that we conclude wFIm > wFIs ,
and qFIm < q
FI
s . We can generalize this result using the same method in the proof of proposition
1 that “The per-period wage wFIl,1 = w
FI
l,2 = w
FI
l,3 = w
FI
l is increasing, while the expected queue
length qFIl is decreasing in β and p”. By this, we could conclude w
FI
l > w
FI
s , and q
FI
l < q
FI
s .
The result that wFIl > w
FI
m and q
FI
l < q
FI
m can also be obtained using the same argument:
simply by introducing another parameter k homogenous to the scalar (β p)2, such that when
k = 0, it coincides with Um,1, and when k = 1, it coincides with Ul,1.
Now we move to the case where information is asymmetric. We assume that firms are
able to perfectly observe the workers’ working horizon (i ∈ {s,m, l}), and can post wages
conditional on it. Then there is no information problem with respect to it. However, there is
unobservable heterogeneity p ∈ {pL, pH} within each working horizon, i.e., pH > pL > 0.
In the previous section, we have dealt with the case for two period workers (median-term).
Here we examine the case for three-period workers (long-term). To avoid multi-dimensional
asymmetric information, we focus on the case where workers are either type L (with pL) or
type H (with pH) during her employment expected lifespan.20
The corresponding program under asymmetric information is as follows:
UAIl,1 (H) = max{wl,1,wl,2,wl,3,ql,1|H}
 F
(
ql,1
)[
u
(
wl,1
)
+β
(
pH ×
[
u
(
wl,2
)
+β pHu
(
wl,3
)]
+(1− pH)×β pHUl,3
)]
+
(
1−F (ql,1))[u(z)+β pHUl,2+β (1− pH)×β pHUl,3]

s.to H
(
ql,1
)[
y−wl,1+β pH
(
y−wl,2
)
+(β pH)2
(
y−wl,3
)]
=C F
(
ql,1
)[
u
(
wl,1
)
+β
(
pL×
[
u
(
wl,2
)
+β pLu
(
wl,3
)]
+(1− pL)×β pLUl,3
)]
+
(
1−F (ql,1))[u(z)+β pLUl,2+β (1− pL)×β pLUl,3]
≤Ul,1 (L)
where
20This assumption is not in contradiction with the empirical fact that the hazard rate of separations declines
with the tenure (see e.g. Farber (1994)). Indeed, the share of the "bad-type" workers declines in the population of
worker having a long tenure. Hence, even with a constant separation rate during the contract, the heterogeneity
of the worker population can lead to a decreasing relation between separation and tenure.
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Ul,1 (L) = max{wl,1,wl,2,wl,3,ql,1|L}
 F
(
ql,1
)[
u
(
wl,1
)
+β
(
pL×
[
u
(
wl,2
)
+β pLu
(
wl,3
)]
+(1− pL)×β pLUl,3
)]
+
(
1−F (ql,1))[u(z)+β pLUl,2+β (1− pL)×β pLUl,3]

s.to H
(
ql,1
)[
y−wl,1+β pL
(
y−wl,2
)
+(β pL)2
(
y−wl,3
)]
=C
Wage growth and tenure. With exactly the same argument, we can replicate the results
that for the expected number of applicants we have qFIl (H)< q
AI
l (H)< q
AI
l (H) = q
FI
l (L),
and for the wages we have wAIl,1 (H)<w
AI
l,2 (H)<w
AI
l,3 (H), and w
AI
l,1 (H)<w
FI
l (H)<w
AI
l,3 (H).
Most importantly, with three periods, we are able to provide the profile of the wage during
the worker’ career in a firm, i.e. the link between the wage growth and the tenure, conditional
on the worker’s type.
Proposition 10. When u′′′ (.) < 0, the wage growth of the type H worker is concave:
wAIl,2 (H)−wAIl,1 (H)< wAIl,3 (H)−wAIl,2 (H)
Proof. See Appendix 1.6.10
Firstly, our results give some foundation to the observed increase of the real wage with
tenure.21 Secondly, our model generates a composition effect in the measure of tenure on the
wage growth. Indeed, heterogeneous workers ("bad type" and "good type") can have the same
tenure but not the same contract: "good type" workers have an increasing wage (Proposition
10), whereas "bad type" workers have a flat wage. This explains why the "staying" workers
have larger wage increases linked to tenure than "moving" workers (see Altonji and Williams
(1998)).
Tenure-dependent probability of separation. In the above extension of the baseline
economy, we maintained the homogeneity of the separation probability p along the contract
duration to avoid difficulties arising from multi-dimensional heterogeneity. However, there
are good reasons that the separation probability p may be varying along the duration of the
contract.
Firstly, p may be tenure-decreasing: workers with higher tenure can be closer to re-
tirement, and hence have higher probability of leaving the labor market. Our model could
partially capture this scenario. Consider the following example. Instead of having tenure-
independent p, we now distinguish the second-period and third-period p as “p2 (H) and
21Even if the tenure’ contribution is not the largest component of the wage growth, all empirical studies
show that it is significant and concave: see Altonji and Williams (1998) or Bagger, Fontaine, Postel-Vinay and
Robin (2014).
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p3 (H)” for type H, while “p2 (L) and p3 (L)” for type L.22 Assume further
p2(L)
p2(H)
≤ p3(L)p3(H) ≤ 1,
where at least one inequality should hold strict to guarantee heterogeneity. These inequalities
mean that at the end of the contract (period 3), the probability for workers of different types
differs to a less extent. Then our above results on the queue length and wage profile can carry
through, and the proof is exactly the same as those in section 2.23
Another situation arises when p depends positively on workers’ tenure. In this case, one
can preserve our results on the queue length and on the wage profile only if we introduce
some restrictions on the parameters ensuring that the increase in p is not "too large".
The unemployment benefits. At last, we would like to raise some concern on the different
effects from the working horizon (measured by p), and the outside option (measured by z),
which can include unemployment benefits. It is well known from Acemoglu and Shimer
(1999) that a higher outside option z leads risk-averse workers to demand higher wages more
aggressively. This implies that implicitly we have both dwdz > 0 and
dq
dz > 0. While recall that
we have shown dwd p > 0 but
dq
d p < 0, albeit higher value of p actually implies higher outside
option. It is thus also important to study separately these two effects, and give conditions
under which the working horizon (or outside option) effect dominates. This will be left for
future work, and the comparative statics offered in the proof of Proposition 1 will serve as a
useful tool.
1.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we deal with an asymmetric information problem within competitive search
environment. Firms sink investment in vacancies ex ante and post wages in the hope of
attracting the right workers to recoup invest costs; however, whether to quit the employment
relationship prematurely is worker’s private information; hence the posted wage profiles
should induce self-selection.
In the baseline model where separation is an exogenous event, we firstly identify that it is
the ’bad’ workers (those with shorter horizon) who have incentive to misrepresent their type
by applying for a long-term contract. We show that the optimal separating contract results in
a distorted allocation for the ’good’ workers (those with longer horizon) in order to prevent
the ’bad’ from applying for these jobs. The equilibrium wage profile has to be increasing,
albeit premature quitting has the same consequence as a productivity drop. Our solution
22We still assume there are only two types to avoid multi-dimensional heterogeneity.
23Remark that another scenario implying a tenure-decreasing p is a case where past experiences of frequently
unemployment episodes may discourage workers to search for an alternative opportunities (loss of trust,
stigmatization effect...).
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is close to the one discussed by Salop and Salop (1976), who considers a Two-Part Wage
mechanism to induce self-selection.24 We generalize the Salop and Salop (1976) result in a
context of an equilibrium search model where risk aversion provides sufficient restrictions
for the uniqueness of wage path and we extend the Guerrieri, Shimer and Wright (2010)
result with wage dynamics and verify that this contract ensures the existence of a separating
equilibrium. Finally, it is straightforward to observe that when the fraction of bad types is
low, a pooling allocation can be constructed to make both types of workers better off, so that
the separating equilibrium could be Pareto dominated.
In the second part, the separation decision is endogenized by introducing home production
value as the source of asymmetric information. Such an extension permits us to study the
impact of asymmetric information on the extensive margin. Two cases are considered: ex
ante or ex post heterogeneity. For the case with ex ante heterogeneity, we obtain the same
increasing wage profile which is necessary to achieve self-selection, as in the benchmark case
where separation is exogenous. In addition, the extensive margin is distorted downwards,
in the sense that more workers switch to search in the one-period submarket, and choose
to be inactive in the second period. This is because the contract posted by the firms in the
two-period is distorted for the sake of discouraging the one-period workers from applying,
and this in turn leads to lower anticipated expected payoff in the two-period submarket.
Finally, in the case of ex-post heterogeneity (e.g. in the case of an unexpected outside
option shock during the career), since asymmetric information takes place after matching,
there is ex ante only one submarket. The mechanism comprises a wage profile, as well
as a retaining decision; in equilibrium, the wage profile is increasing, while the retaining
decision leads to a cut-off value on the realisation of home production level, above which the
workers in question choose to quit prematurely. The extensive margin compared to the full
information economy is lower due to the existence of costly information rent. Thus, it seems
that excessive separation linked to the asymmetry in the information is a robust result in a
competitive search environment.
24This Two-Part Wage device requires that a new employee pays the firm an entrance fee, in return for which
she will receive in the subsequent periods a higher wage (the wages increase with the tenure of the workers).
In the equilibrium, the workers should pay for their own turnover costs. This is equivalent to saying that this
worker pays a deposit which is a guarantee corresponding to the consequences of the lack of commitment.
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1.6 Appendix
1.6.1 Proof of the Proposition 1
The solution for a type pH worker is determined by the following two equations 25 (By
substituting L for H, we obtain the solution for the type pL workers):
1−εH(q∗H)
εH(q∗H)
=
y−w∗H
1
u′(w∗H)
×
[
u(w∗H)− 11+β pH (β pHU1p+u(z))
]
C = H (qH)(1+β pH)(y−wH)
Result 1: w∗H > w∗L. Since type H’s problem coincides with the type L’s problem when
pH = pL, if we could verify that
dw∗H
d pH
> 0, it implies that w∗H > w∗L. We consider the implicit
function defined by rearranging the first order condition:
I (w∗H , pH) = u(w∗H)− 11+β pH
(
β pHU1p+u(z)
)−u′ (w∗H)(y−w∗H) εH(q∗H(w∗H))1−εH(q∗H(w∗H)) = 0
where q∗H (w∗H) is defined by the Free-entry condition. We want to show
dw∗H
d pH
=− IpHIw∗H > 0,
where IpH =
dI
d pH
and Iw∗H =
dI
dw∗H
. Given I (w∗H , pH), we have
IpH = −
β
(1+β pH)2
U1p+
β
(1+β pH)2
u(z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
−u′ (w∗H)(y−w∗H)
1
(1− εH)2
ε
′
H
−βC
(1+β pH)2 (y−w∗H)H ′ (q∗H)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
< 0
On the other hand, I (w∗H , pH) leads to
Iw∗H = u
′
(w∗H)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
−u′′ (w∗H)(y−w∗H)
εH (q∗H (w∗H))
1− εH (q∗H (w∗H))︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+u
′
(w∗H)
εH (q∗H (w∗H))
1− εH (q∗H (w∗H))︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
−u′ (w∗H)(y−w∗H)
ε ′H
(1− εH)2
× 1
H ′ (q∗H)
C
(1+β pH)
1
(y−w∗H)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
Thus in total dw
∗
H
d pH
> 0, leading to w∗H > w∗L.
25The elasticity for the workers’ job finding rate and the elasticity for the firms’ hiring probability admit the
following relationship: εF (qp) = εH (qp)−1.
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Result 2: q∗H < q∗L. The simplest way is to use the same argument as above and to prove
dq∗H
d pH
< 0. We thus consider the implicit function defined and obtained by rearranging the first
order condition:
X (q∗H , pH) = 0
= u(w∗H (q∗H))− 11+β pH (β pHU1p+u(z))−u
′
(w∗H (q∗H))(y−w∗H (q∗H))
εH(q∗H)
1−εH(q∗H)
where w∗H (q∗H) is defined by the Free-entry condition. Implicit function theorem leads to
dq∗H
d pH
=−XpHXq∗H , where Xq
∗
H
= dXdq∗H
and XpH =
dX
d pH
. These derivatives are given by:
Xq∗H = u
′× dw
∗
H
dq∗H︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
−u′′× dw
∗
H
dq∗H
(y−w∗H (q∗H))
εH (q∗H)
1− εH (q∗H)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+u
′× dw
∗
H
dq∗H
× εH (q
∗
H)
1− εH (q∗H)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
−u′× (y−w∗H (q∗H))
1
(1− εH)2
ε
′
H︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
> 0
XpH =
≷0︷ ︸︸ ︷
u
′× dw
∗
H
d pH︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
− β
(1+β pH)2
U1p+
β
(1+β pH)2
u(z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
−u′′× dw
∗
H
d pH
(y−w∗H (q∗H))
εH (q∗H)
1− εH (q∗H)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+u
′× dw
∗
H
d pH
× εH (q
∗
H)
1− εH (q∗H)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
There seems to be ambiguity for the sign of XpH . We now try to rearrange it:
XpH = u
′ × dw∗Hd pH −
β
(1+β pH )2
U1p+
β
(1+β pH )2
u(z)
−u′′ × dw∗Hd pH (y−w∗H (q∗H))
εH(q∗H)
1−εH(q∗H)
+u
′ × dw∗Hd pH ×
εH(q∗H)
1−εH(q∗H)
= β
(1+β pH )2
×
[
u
′ 1
1−εH
C
H(q∗H)
− (U1p−u(z))
]
+ β
(1+β pH )2
×
[
−u′′ × (y−w∗H) εH1−εH
C
H(q∗H)
]
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We use first order condition to rewrite it, and obtain
XpH =
β
(1+β pH )2
×
[
u
′ 1
1−εH
C
H(q∗H)
− (U1p−u(z))−u′′ × (y−w∗H) εH1−εH
C
H(q∗H)
]
= β
(1+β pH )2
×

>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
εH
[β pHu(w∗H)−β pHU1p]+
>1︷︸︸︷
1
εH
[u(w∗H)−u(z)]− (U1p−u(z))︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0

+ β
(1+β pH )2
×
[
−u′′ × (y−w∗H) εH1−εH
C
H(q∗H)
]
> 0
We thus deduce that XpH > 0, and thus
dq∗H
d pH
=−XpHXq∗H < 0. This implies that the surplus of
the firms is increasing in the value of pH , leading to q∗H < q∗L.
Result 3: U∗H >U∗L . When pL = pH , U∗L =U∗H . In addition, since by Envelope Theorem
the U∗L is increasing in pL (higher value of p corresponds to higher value from search), we
have U∗H >U∗L .
Result 4: (1+β pH)w∗H − (1+β pL)w∗L < (1+β pH)y− (1+β pL)y. By the binding
zero profit condition for both types, we have
(1+β pH)y− (1+β pH)w∗H = CH(q∗H)
(1+β pL)y− (1+β pH)w∗L = CH(q∗L)
Since q∗H < q∗L, we have (1+β pH)w∗H − (1+β pL)w∗L < (1+β pH)y− (1+β pL)y.
1.6.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. When pH = 1 and pL = 0, the programs are reduced to
U∗H = F (q∗H)
[
u
(
w∗H,1
)
+βu
(
w∗H,2
)]
+(1−F (q∗H))
[
u(z)+βU1p
]
U∗L = F (q∗L) [u(w∗L)]+(1−F (q∗L)) [u(z)]
We need to show that U∗H > (1+β )U∗L . Recall that when pL = 0, U∗L =U1p. We could
reorganize terms in the following manner:
U∗H = F (q∗H)
[
u
(
w∗H,1
)
+βu
(
w∗H,2
)]
+(1−F (q∗H))
[
u(z)+βU1p
]
= F (q∗H)
(
u
(
w∗H,1
)
−u(z)
)
+u(z)+β
[
F (q∗H)
(
u
(
w∗H,1
)
−U1p
)
+U1p
]
> U∗L +β
[
F (q∗H)
(
u
(
w∗H,1
)
−U1p
)
+U1p
]
> U∗L +βU∗L
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where the first inequality is induced by virtue of Proposition 1.
1.6.3 Proof of Proposition 3
A separating contract always exists. We will show that the equilibrium allocation satisfies
the 3 main assumptions (emphasized by GSW), which are required for the existence and
uniqueness of the competitive search equilibrium.
A1) Monotonicity. Given any wage profile (w1,w2), the ex post surplus of firms should
be monotonic in p. This is satisfied, because (y−w1)+β pH (y−w2) > (y−w1)+
β pL (y−w2)
A2) Local non-satiation. Let (wi,1,wi,2) be a feasible contract for type i. Consider
wˆ1 = wi,1+h, and wˆ2 = wi,2+ k in the neighborhood of (wi,1,wi,2), so that y−wi,1+
β pi (y−wi,2)− (h+β pik)≥ 0, and
√
h2+ k2 < ε . Then we require
(1) y− wˆ1+β pi (y− wˆ2)> y−wi,1+β pi (y−wi,2)≥ 0, and
(2) for j < i (p j < pi),
u(wˆ1)+β p ju(wˆ2)−u(z)−β p jU1p ≤ u(wi,1)+β p ju(wi,2)−u(z)−β p jU1p.
It suffices that we have (1) h+β pik < 0, and (2) u
′
(wi,1)h+β p ju
′
(wi,2)k ≤ 0. Or
equivalently, min
{
−β pi,−β p j u
′
(wi,2)
u′(wi,1)
}
> hk for h < 0 and k > 0.
A3) Sorting (similar to single-crossing). Given any type i, and given any feasible wage
profile (wi,1,wi,2) for this type i, there exists a wage profile (wˆ1, wˆ2) which is close
enough to (wi,1,wi,2), i.e., in some ε neighborhood of (wi,1,wi,2) such that
1) for j ≥ i (types better than i):
u(wˆ1)+β p ju(wˆ2)−u(z)−β p jU1p ≥ u(wi,1)+β p ju(wi,2)−u(z)−β p jU1p
2) for j < i (types worse than i):
u(wˆ1)+β p ju(wˆ2)−u(z)−β p jU1p < u(wi,1)+β pu(wi,2)−u(z)−β p jU1p
Proof of A3): Let (wi,1,wi,2) be a feasible contract for type i. Consider wˆ1 = wi,1+h,
and wˆ2 = wi,2+k in the neighborhood of (wi,1,wi,2), so that y−wi,1+β pi (y−wi,2)−
(h+β pik)≥ 0, and
√
h2+ k2 < ε .
For j ≥ i, we require
u(wˆ1)+β p ju(wˆ2)−u(z)−β p jU1p > u(wi,1)+β p ju(wi,2)−u(z)−β p jU1p
For j
′
< i, we require
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u(wˆ1)+β p j′u(wˆ2)−u(z)−β p j′U1p < u(wi,1)+β p j′u(wi,2)−u(z)−β p j′U1p
The former can be satisfied as long as u
′
(wi,1)h+β p ju
′
(wi,2)k > 0; The latter can
be satisfied as long as u
′
(wi,1)h+β p j′u
′
(wi,2)k < 0. Equivalently, we should require
−β p j′
u
′
(wi,2)
u′(wi,1)
> hk >−β p j
u
′
(wi,2)
u′(wi,1)
with h < 0 and k > 0, which is possible for p j′ < p j.
1.6.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Claim 1: wAIH,1 < w
AI
H,2. Consider the lagrangian of the program:
L = F (q) [u(wH,1)+β pHu(wH,2)]+(1−F (q))(u(z)+β pHU1p)
+λ {H (q) [y−wH,1+β pH (y−wH,2)]−C}
−δ {F (q) [u(wH,1)+β pLu(wH,2)]+(1−F (q))(u(z)+β pLU1p)−UL}
Solving the FOCs, with respect to w1, w2 and q:
F
(
qAIH
)
u
′ (
wAIH,1
)
−λH (qAIH )−δF (qAIH )u′ (wAIH,1) = 0
F
(
qAIH
)
β pHu
′ (
wAIH,2
)
−λβ pHH
(
qAIH
)−δF (qAIH )β pLu′ (wAIH,2) = 0
F
′ (
qAIH
)[
u
(
wAIH,1
)
+β pHu
(
wAIH,2
)
−u(z)−β pHU1p
]
+λH ′
(
qAIH
)[
y−wAIH,1+β pH
(
y−wAIH,2
)]
−δF ′ (qAIH ){[u(wAIH,1)+β pLu(wAIH,2)− (u(z)+β pLU1p)]} = 0
We can rearrange the two first FOCs to obtain the following equations:
u
′ (
wAIH,1
)
=
λq
1−δ
u
′ (
wAIH,2
)
=
λq
1−δ pLpH
<
λq
1−δ = u
′ (
wAIH,1
)
We deduce that (i) wAIH,1 < w
AI
H,2 and (ii) 0 < δ < 1. The result that δ is greater than zero
follows readily from the method of Lagrangian multiplier with inequality constraint.
Claim 2a: wAIH,1 < w
∗
L. Notice that since the allocation for the type L workers are not
distorted, we have w∗L = wAIL,1 = w
AI
L,2, and q
∗
L = q
AI
L . Now suppose w
AI
H ≥ w∗L. Because we
already established wAIH,1 < w
AI
H,2, then from the binding IC constraint
F
(
qAIH
)[
u
(
wAIH,1
)
+β pLu
(
wAIH,2
)]
+
(
1−F (qAIH ))(u(z)+β pLU1p)
= F
(
qAIL
)[
u
(
wAIL,1
)
+β pLu
(
wAIL,2
)]
+
(
1−F (qAIL ))(u(z)+β pLU1p)
= UAIL
We could conclude that F
(
qAIH
)≤ F (qAIL ). Thus qAIH ≥ qAIL .
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The FOC with respect to q for type H could be rewritten in the following way:
1
1−δ
1
u′
(
wAIH,1
)

[
u
(
wAIH,1
)
+β pHu
(
wAIH,2
)
−u(z)−β pHU1p
]
−δ
[
u
(
wAIH,1
)
+β pLu
(
wAIH,2
)
−u(z)−β pLU1p
] 
= −H
′
(qAIH )
F ′(qAIH )
1
qAIH
C
H(qAIH )
The FOC with respect to q for type L could be rewritten in the following way:
1
u′ (w∗L)
[u(w∗L)+β pLu(w
∗
L)−u(z)−β pLU1p] =−
H
′
(q∗L)
F ′ (q∗L)
1
q∗L
C
H (q∗L)
First, we notice that, the RHS of both FOC is strictly decreasing in q. Because we can make
use of the relationship H (q) = F (q)q to rewrite it as
−H
′
(q)
F ′ (q)
1
q
C
H (q)
=− H
′
(q)
H ′(q)
q − H(q)q2
1
q
C
H (q)
=
εH
1− εH︸ ︷︷ ︸
decreasing in qH
C
H (q)
Secondly, it could be noticed that if we substitute wL on the LHS of the FOC for type H, it
becomes:
LHStypeH (wL,wL) = 11−δ
1
u′(w∗L)
{
[u(w∗L)+β pHu(w∗L)−u(z)−β pHU1p]
−δ [u(w∗L)+β pLu(w∗L)−u(z)−β pLU1p]
}
=
1
1−δ
β (pH − pL) [u(w∗L)−U1p]
u′ (w∗L)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+
1
u′ (w∗L)
[u(w∗L)+β pLu(w
∗
L)−u(z)−β pLU1p]︸ ︷︷ ︸
LHStypeL
Thus LHStypeH (w∗L,w∗L) is always greater than the LHS of the FOC for type L, i.e.
LHStypeH (w∗L,w∗L) > LHStypeL (w∗L,w∗L). But if it is so, then LHStypeH
(
wAIH,1,w
AI
H,2
)
>
LHStypeH (w∗L,w∗L), because we supposed w∗L ≤ wAIH,1 < wAIH,2.
These will imply that the RHS of the FOC for type H should be strictly greater than the
RHS of the FOC for type L, i.e. RHStypeH > RHStypeL. Since the RHS of both FOCs have
the same functional form, then it must be that qAIH < q
∗
L, given that the RHS is decreasing in
q. However, we established at the beginning of this proof that qAIH ≥ q∗L, we could reach the
contradiction.
Claim 2b: w∗H < wAIH,2. This could be shown using the same way as in the proof of claim
2a. Thus in total we have wAIH,1 < w
∗
L < w
∗
H < w
AI
H,2.
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Claim 3: UAIH <U
∗
H . This is true because U
AI
H is the utility at the maximum level of an
optimization program with an additional constraint, compared to U∗H .
Claim 4: qAIH < q
∗
L. We are going to proceed by contradiction. Suppose that q
AI
H ≥ q∗L.
From the IC constraints
F
(
qAIH
)
×
(
u
(
wAIH,1
)
+β pLu
(
wAIH,2
))
+
(
1−F
(
qAIH
))(
u(z)+β pLU1p
)≤U∗L
we are able to obtain u
(
wAIH,1
)
+β pLu
(
wAIH,2
)
≥ (1+β pL)u(w∗L).
Then we can use the same arugments as in the proof of proposition 4 in appendix D to
show that, the first order constraints imply that qAIH < q
∗
L. We hence obtain a contradiction.
So we conclude that qAIH < q
∗
L.
Claim 5: q∗H < qAIH . Firstly, we have that in the equilibrium with asymmetric information,
wAIH,1 is negatively correlated with q
AI
H , and w
AI
H,2 is positively correlated with q
AI
H .
Secondly, notice that when pL → pH , the asymmetric information allocation should tend
to the full information allocation by continuity. More precisely, since wAIH,1 < w
∗
L < w
∗
H <
wAIH,2, we know that w
AI
H,1 should gradually increase to w
∗
H and w
AI
H,2 should gradually decrease
to w∗H .26
Now suppose that qAIH ≤ q∗H . So when pL → pH , qAIH should increase to q∗H . Then both
wAIH,1 and q
AI
H increase with pL, and it implies that w
AI
H,1 is positively correlated with q
AI
H - a
contradiction.
On the other hand, if q∗H < qAIH , then when pL → pH , qAIH decreases to q∗H . At the same
time, wAIH,2 decreases to w
∗
H and w
AI
H,1 increases to w
∗
H . This is consistent with the fact that
wAIH,1 is negatively correlated with q
AI
H , and w
AI
H,2 is positively correlated with q
AI
H .
Claim 6: Type H workers are worse off choosing type L’s allocation, so that they do no
have incentive to misrepresent themselves as type L. If type H workers choose the allocation
of type L workers, the expected utility that they would enjoy is
F (q∗L)(u(w∗L)+β pHu(w∗L))+(1−F (q∗L))
(
u(z)+β pHU1p
)
We want to show that this amount is smaller than the following which is the amount type
H would secure if they stick to their own allocation:
26(w∗L and w∗H will coincide when pL → pH )
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F
(
qAIH
)(
u
(
wAIH,1
)
+β pHu
(
wAIH,2
))
+(1−F (q∗H))
(
u(z)+β pHU1p
)
The comparison could be simplified to the following
F (q∗L)
[
(u(w∗L)+β pHu(w∗L))−
(
u(z)+β pHU1p
)]
< F
(
qAIH
)[(
u
(
wAIH,1
)
+β pHu
(
wAIH,2
))
− (u(z)+β pHU1p)]
According to the incentive constraint as follows
F (q∗L)
[
u(w∗L)+β pLu(w∗L)−u(z)−β pLU1p
]
= F
(
qAIH
)[
u
(
wAIH,1
)
+β pLu
(
wAIH,2
)
−u(z)−β pLU1p
]
, it suffices that the following inequality is true
F (q∗L)
[
u(w∗L)−U1p
]
< F
(
qAIH
)[
u
(
wAIH,2
)
−U1p
]
On one hand, since qAIH < q
∗
L, we have F
(
qAIH
)
> F (q∗L). On the other hand, since
wAIH,2 > w
∗
H > w
∗
L, we have u
(
wAIH,2
)
> u(w∗L). So it indeed holds true.
Claim 7: UAIH >U
∗
L . It follows from the following relationships.
U∗L
= F
(
qAIH
)(
u
(
wAIH,1
)
+β pLu
(
wAIH,2
))
+(1−F (q∗H))
(
u(z)+β pLU1p
)
< F
(
qAIH
)(
u
(
wAIH,1
)
+β pHu
(
wAIH,2
))
+(1−F (q∗H))
(
u(z)+β pHU1p
)
The equality comes from the incentive constraint, and the inequality comes from the fact
that pL < pH .
1.6.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Consider a pooling allocation which treats both types identically. All firms post w1st period =
w2nd period = wα . The queue length qα = α
N
M +(1−α) NM = NHM + NLM will satisfy:
H (qα) [(y−wα)+β pα (y−wα)] =C
where pα = α pH +(1−α) pL. Furthermore, let (qα ,wα) be the solution of the following
program:
Uα = max
{
F (q) [u(wα)+β pαu(wα)]+(1−F (q))(u(z)+β pαU1p)
}
s.to H (q) [y−wα +β pα (y−wα)] =C
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If we compare the above zero profit condition (H (qα) [(y−wα)+β pα (y−wα)] =C) to
firms’ zero profit condition in the separating equilibrium with asymmetric information,
H
(
qAIH
)[(
y−wAI1,H
)
+β pH
(
y−wAI2,H
)]
=C, we notice that, when pα → pH , i.e., when the
fraction of bad workers is sufficiently low, the optimization program constructed just above
approaches the optimization program for the type-H workers in the full information (FI) case
where IC constraint is absent. This implies that, when pα → pH , we obtain wα → wFIH and
qα → qFIH , hence the good workers will be better off in terms of expected utility, when the
fraction of bad workers is negligible
Furthermore, recall that in the full information case, the equilibrium allocation is such
that qFIH < q
FI
L and w
FI
H > w
FI
L . These two inequalities imply that the type L-workers could
be employed more often, and receive higher ex post wages under this constructed pooling
allocation. We could in turn conclude that the bad workers will also be better off in terms of
expected utility under this pooling contract.
1.6.6 Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. the optimization program under full information is as follows. For firms which desire
the type-H workers, we have
U∗H (hH ,z) = max{q,wH,1,wH,2}
{
F (qH) [u(wH,1)+βu(wH,2)]
+(1−F (qH))
[
u(z)+βmax
{
u(hH) ,U1p (hH ,z)
}] }
s.t. H (qH) [y−wH,1+β (y−wH,2)] =C
where
U1p (h,z) = max{q,w} {F (q)u(w)+(1−F (q)) [u(h)+u(z)]}
s.t. H (q) [y−w] =C
and for the firms which desire the the type-L workers, we have
U∗L (hL,z) = max{q,wL,1,wL,2} {F (qL)u(wL)+(1−F (qL))u(z)+βu(hL)}
s.t. H (qL) [y−wL] =C
We are going to proceed as follows. Firstly (Step 1), we show that when hH tends to zero,
the type-L workers will have incentive to mimic these type-H workers. Then (Step 2), we
show that as hH increases, the expected payoff from misrepresenting their types becomes
less and less attractive for the type-L workers. Finally (Step 3), we show that for the type-H
workers with hH slightly below hˆ, the type-L workers do have incentive to mimic them;
then by continuity, we are able to conclude that type-L workers are always better off by
misrepresenting their types as any type-H workers.
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Step 1. Consider the case where the value of hH is small enough such that h→ 0. In that
case, the type-H’s problem coincides with the two-period workers’ problem in the previous
section. And the type-L’s allocation coincides with the one-period workers’ allocation. We
have shown that the one-period workers will misrepresent their types when information is
asymmetric. Step 2. We should show that as hH increases towards hˆ, the extra payoff from
choosing the allocation of these hH types becomes less and less for those type-L workers.
We shall firstly define UhH |hL as the expected payoff of a type-L worker who chooses the
allocation of type-H worker. And we have
UhH |hL = F (q
∗ (hH))u(w∗ (hH))+(1−F (q∗ (hH)))u(z)+βu(hL)
and
UhL|hL = F (q
∗
L)u(w
∗
L)+(1−F (q∗L))u(z)+βu(hL)
Notice that in Step 1, we have when hH = 0, UhH |hL > UhL|hL . We shall show that UhH |hL
decreases with hH , or equivalently we want to examine whether
∂UhH |hL
∂hH
=
[
∂F(q∗H)
∂q∗H
dq∗H
dhH
u(w∗H)+F (q∗H)u
′
(w∗H)
dw∗H
dhH
]
− ∂F(q∗H)∂q∗H
dq∗H
dhH
u(z)
<
?
0
By Envelope theorem we have
∂U∗H
∂hH
=
(1−F (q∗H))×βu
′
(hH) for u(hH)≥U1p (hH ,z)
(1−F (q∗H))×β
(
1−F (q1p))u′ (hH) for u(hH)<U1p (hH ,z)
This implies that by implicit differentiation of U∗H with respect to hH , we should have
0 = ∂F(q
∗
H)
∂q∗H
dq∗H
dhH
[u(w∗H)+βu(w∗H)]+F (q∗H)(1+β )u
′
(w∗H)
dw∗H
dhH
−∂F(q∗H)∂q∗H
dq∗H
dhH
[
u(z)+βmax
{
u(hH) ,U1p (hH ,z)
}]
We firstly rearrange the above expression in the following way to obtain
0 =
Term A︷ ︸︸ ︷[
∂F (q∗H)
∂q∗H
dq∗H
dhH
u(w∗H)+F (q
∗
H)u
′
(w∗H)
dw∗H
dhH
]
+β ×
[
∂F(q∗H)
∂q∗H
dq∗H
dhH
u(w∗H)+F (q∗H)u
′
(w∗H)
dw∗H
dhH
]
−∂F (q
∗
H)
∂q∗H
dq∗H
dhH
u(z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term B
+β ×
(
−∂F (q
∗
H)
∂q∗H
dq∗H
dhH
max
{
u(hH) ,U1p (hH ,z)
})
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term C
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Since it could be straightforwardly verified that both the equilibrium value of w∗H increases
and the equilibrium q∗H increase with hH (either by revealed preference or by implicit
differentiation), we could conclude that Term A is negative, owing to the fact that Term B
and Term C are both positive. We can then rearrange again the expression in the following
way:
0 =
Term A<0︷ ︸︸ ︷[
∂F (q∗H)
∂q∗H
dq∗H
dhH
u(w∗H)+F (q
∗
H)u
′
(w∗H)
dw∗H
dhH
] Term B>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
−∂F (q
∗
H)
∂q∗H
dq∗H
dhH
u(z)
+β
∂F (q∗H)∂q∗H dq
∗
H
dhH
u(w∗H)+F (q
∗
H)u
′
(w∗H)
dw∗H
dhH︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term A<0
−∂F (q
∗
H)
∂q∗H
dq∗H
dhH
max
{
u(hH) ,U1p (hH ,z)
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term C>0

Then since “Term A + Term B” is always smaller than “Term A + Term C”, we could con-
clude that Term A + Term B < 0 and Term A + Term C > 0. So that we have proved that
∂UhH |hL
∂hH
=
Term A<0︷ ︸︸ ︷[
∂F (q∗H)
∂q∗H
dq∗H
dhH
u(w∗H)+F (q
∗
H)u
′
(w∗H)
dw∗H
dhH
] Term B>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
−∂F (q
∗
H)
∂q∗H
dq∗H
dhH
u(z)
< 0
which means that as hH increases towards hˆ, the extra payoff from choosing the allocation of
these hH types becomes less and less for those type-L workers.
Step 3. At last, we would like to show that for values of hH slightly below hˆ, the type L
workers always have incentive to misrepresent their types. For values of hH slightly below
hˆFI , the expected payoff for the type-H workers is written as
U∗H (hH ,z) =
{
F (q∗H) [u(w∗H)+βu(w∗H)]
+(1−F (q∗H)) [u(z)+βu(hH)]
}
=
{
F (q∗H)u(w∗H)+(1−F (q∗H))u(z)
+βF (q∗H) [u(w∗H)−u(hH)]+βu(hH)
}
We now compare this payoff with the payoff of the threshold type-L workers, which is
U∗L
(
hˆ,z
)
=
{
F (q∗L)u(w∗L)+(1−F (q∗L))u(z)
+βu
(
hˆ
) }
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Since U∗H (hH)/U∗H
(
hˆ
)
=U∗L
(
hˆ
)
, we then have
F (q∗H)u(w∗H)+(1−F (q∗H))u(z)+βF (q∗H) [u(w∗H)−u(hH)]
≈ F (q∗L)u(w∗L)+(1−F (q∗L))u(z)
and we can rearrange it to
F (q∗H)u(w∗H)+(1−F (q∗H))u(z)− [F (q∗L)u(w∗L)+(1−F (q∗L))u(z)]
≈ −βF (q∗H) [u(w∗H)−u(hH)]
Notice that the left-hand side of the quasi-equality represents the net gain from misrepresent-
ing the type for a type-L workers, i.e.,
[
UhH |hL −u(hL)
]− [UhL|hL −u(hL)], where UhH |hL =
[F (q∗H)u(w∗H)+(1−F (q∗H))u(z)] and UhL|hL = [F (q∗L)u(w∗L)+(1−F (q∗L))u(z)]. Now it
suffices to show that on the right hand side, [u(w∗H)−u(hH)]≈
[
u(w∗H)−u
(
hˆFI
)]
is smaller
than zero. This is always true. Recall that we argued that an individual only chooses
to enter into the one-period market whenever u(h)− u(wH) is strictly greater than zero,
because there is a discrete drop of utility by changing from a two period wage contract(
w∗2−period,q
∗
2−period
)
to a one-period contract
(
w∗1−period,q
∗
1−period
)
as we showed in the
benchmark section - within a 2-period contract, the worker always gets matched more often
and enjoys higher per-period wage.
1.6.7 Proof of Proposition 7
The first order conditions with respect to wH,1, wH,2 and qH are:
F
(
qAIH
)
u
′ (
wAIH,1
)
−λH (qAIH )−δF (qAIH )u′ (wAIH,1) = 0
F
(
qAIH
)
βu′
(
wAIH,2
)
−λβH (qAIH ) = 0
F
′ (
qAIH
)[
u
(
wAIH,1
)
+βu
(
wAIH,2
)
−u(z)−βmax{u(hH) ,U1p}]
+λH ′
(
qAIH
)[
y−wAIH,1+β
(
y−wAIH,2
)]
−δF ′ (qAIH )[u(wAIH,1)−u(z)] = 0
where λ and δ are the Lagrangian multipliers associated with the first and the second
constraint. Given that H(q)/F(q) = q, the FOC leads to
u
′ (
wAIH,1
)
=
λqAIH
1−δ
u
′ (
wAIH,1
)
= λqAIH
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implying that wAIH,1 < w
AI
H,2. Suppose that w
AI
H,1 ≥ w∗H , then since wAIH,1 < wAIH,2, we have
wAIH,2 > w
AI
H,1 ≥ w∗H . On the one hand, by the binding zero profit conditions
H(q∗H)((1+β )y−w∗H −βw∗H) = 0
H(qAIH )((1+β )y−wAIH,1−βwAIH,2) = 0
we have qAIH > q
∗
H . However, on the other hand, by the first order condition with respect to q,
which could be rewritten in the following manner,
u
′
(w∗H)−u(z)
u′(w∗H)
+β u
′
(w∗H)−max{u(hH),U1p}
u′(w∗H)
=
ε(q∗H)
1−ε(q∗H)
C
H(q∗H)
u
′
(wAIH,1)−u(z)
u′(wAIH,1)
+β
u
′
(wAIH,2)−max{u(hH),U1p}
u′(wAIH,2)
=
ε(qAIH )
1−ε(qAIH )
C
H(qAIH )
we then could conclude that qAIH < q
∗
H , because Φ(w) ≡ u(w)−u(z)u′(w) is increasing in w and
Ψ(q)≡ ε(q)1−ε(q) CH(q) is decreasing in q. We then reach a contradiction, so that wAIH,1 < w∗H . To
prove w∗H < wAIH,2, we could proceed by exactly the same argument.
The other results can be similarly reproduced as in Proposition 4, given that this program
is just a particular case of the problem there with pH = 1 and pL = 0.
1.6.8 Proof of Lemma 1
(1) Incentive constraint implies that
e(h)u(w2 (h))− e(h)u(h) ≥ e
(
h˜
)
u
(
w2
(
h˜
))− e(h˜)u(h)
and
e
(
h˜
)
u
(
w2
(
h˜
))− e(h˜)u(h˜) ≥ e(h)u(w2 (h))− e(h)u(h˜)
Adding these two together, we obtain
(
e(h)− e(h˜))(u(h˜)−u(h)) ≥ 0
Hence e(h) is non-increasing in h. And it is also differentiable almost everywhere, from
which w2 (h) is also differentiable with the same points of non-differentiability.
(2) By standard argument as in Laffont and Martimort (2001), it could be verified that
the local incentive constraints imply the global incentive constraints. So that J (h,h) =
maxh˜J
(
h, h˜
)
. This implies that we can use the Envelope condition to obtain
∂J(h,h)
∂h = −e(h)u
′
(h)≤ 0
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By integration with respect to h, we obtain
J (h,h)− J (h,h) = ∫ hh e(x)u′ (x)dx
(3) Since ∂J(h,h)∂h ≤ 0 , it suffices to impose J
(
h,h
)≥ 0 to make sure that all types
participate.
by virtue of the fact that 0 < F (qˆ)< 1. We hence obtain the following relationship:
1.6.9 Proof of Proposition 9
We have proved above that wAI1 < w
AI
2 < y = w
FI . Now we prove hˆAI < hˆFI . Suppose
hˆAI ≥ hˆFI . Then it implies that hˆAI > wAI2 . Then, according to the optimal solution of
firms’ retaining choice, there exists some value of h with hˆAI > h > wAI2 such that e(h) = 1.
However, this contradicts the individual rationality constraint which requires that J (h,h) =
e(h)× (u(wAI2 )−u(h))≥ 0 for all h.
Now we prove qAI > qFI . Firstly, we have the following FOC with respect to qAI in case
of asymmetric information:
u(wAI1 )−u(z)
u′(wAI1 )
+β
{
G(hˆAI)u(wAI2 )+
∫ h
hˆAI
u(h)dG(h)−∫ hh max{U1p,u(h)}dG(h)}
u′(wAI1 )
y−wAI1 +βG
(
hˆAI
)(
y−wAI2
)
= 1
1−ε(qAI)
C
H(qAI)
Secondly, we define that qFI as being solved by the following program:
UFI = F (q)
{
u(y)+β
∫ y
h [u(y)−u(h)]dG(h)+β
∫ h
h u(h)dG(h)
}
+(1−F (q))
{
u(z)+β
∫ h
h max
{
U1p,u(h)
}
dG(h)
}
− 1qC×u
′
(y)
And the FOC with respect to q gives
u(y)−u(z)
u′ (y)
+β
{
G(y)u(y)+
∫ h
y u(h)dG(h)+
∫ h
h [u(h)−max{U1p,u(h)}]dG(h)
}
u′ (y)
+y− y+βG(y)(y− y) = 1
1−ε(qFI)
C
H(qFI)
We observe three elements:
1. the “LHS” of the FOC for the Asymmetric-information economy is increasing in w;
2. when w1 = w2 = y, the “LHS” of the FOC for the Asymmetric-information economy
coincides with the “LHS” of FOC for the Full-information economy;
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3. the “RHS” of both equations are both of functional form and decreasing in q.
Thus to show qFI < qAI , it is sufficient to show that LHSFI > LHSAI . We will proceed in the
following way:
(i) Since wAI1 < y, we could obtain
u(wAI1 )−u(z)
u′(wAI1 )
+ y−wAI1 < u(y)−u(z)u′(y) + y− y, because
u(wAI1 )−u(z)
u′(wAI1 )
+ y−wAI1 is increasing in wAI1 .
(ii) In the following, The first inequality comes from the facts that wAI1 < w
AI
2 and u
′
(w)
being decreasing, and the second inequality is due to the same argument stated in (i):{
G(hˆAI)u(wAI2 )+
∫ h
hˆAI
u(h)dG(h)−∫ hh max{U1p,u(h)}dG(h)}
u′(wAI1 )
+G
(
hˆAI
)(
y−wAI2
)
<
{
G(hˆAI)u(wAI2 )+
∫ h
hˆAI
u(h)dG(h)−∫ hh max{U1p,u(h)}dG(h)}
u′(wAI2 )
+G
(
hˆAI
)(
y−wAI2
)
<
{
G(y)u(y)+
∫ h
hˆAI
u(h)dG(h)−∫ hh max{U1p,u(h)}dG(h)}
u′(y)
+G(y)(y− y)
Thus the LHSFI > LHSAI , which implies RHSFI > RHSAI , and it turns out that qFI <
qAI by the fact that the right hand sides of the above FOCs are of the same functional
form and decreasing in q.
To conclude, it implies that F(qAI)G(hˆAI)< F(qFI)G(hˆFI), the job matching is inferior in
the economy with asymmetric information.
1.6.10 Proof of Proposition 1.6.10
We use δ as the Lagrangian multiplier for the incentive constraint. The first order condition
with respect to wL,1, wL,2 and wL,3 gives respectively:
F
(
qAIl (H)
)
u
′ (
wAIl,1 (H)
)
−λAIl (H)H
(
qAIl (H)
)−δAIl (H)F (qAIl (H))u′ (wAIl,1 (H)) = 0
F
(
qAIl (H)
)
β pHu
′ (
wAIl,2 (H)
)
−λAIl (H)β pHH
(
qAIl (H)
)
−δAIl (H)F
(
qAIl (H)
)
β pLu
′ (
wAIl,2 (H)
) = 0
F
(
qAIl (H)
)
β 2 p2Hu
′ (
wAIl,3 (H)
)
−λAIl (H)β 2 p2HH
(
qAIl (H)
)
−δAIl (H)F
(
qAIl (H)
)
β 2 p2Lu
′ (
wAIl,3 (H)
) = 0
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Rearranging, we obtain
u
′ (
wAIl,1 (H)
)
=
λAIl (H)q
AI
l (H)
1−δAIl (H)
u
′ (
wAIl,2 (H)
)
=
λAIl (H)q
AI
l (H)
1− pLpH δ
AI
l (H)
u
′ (
wAIl,3 (H)
)
=
λAIl (H)q
AI
l (H)
1− pLpH
pL
pH
δAIl (H)
Since pLpH
pL
pH
< pLpH < 1, we could conclude that we have w
AI
l,1 (H)< w
AI
l,2 (H)< w
AI
l,3 (H).
Notice that now we have three points of wages, instead of merely two points as in Section 2.
A natural question to ask is how wage grows. We first prove the following claim, then show
that when u
′′′
< 0, the wage growth is concave.
Claim. u′
(
wAIl,1 (H)
)
−u′
(
wAIl,2 (H)
)
> u
′ (
wAIl,2 (H)
)
−u′
(
wAIl,3 (H)
)
.
Proof of Claim. From the above first order condition, we have
u
′ (
wAIl,1 (H)
)
u′
(
wAIl,2 (H)
) = 1− pLpH δAIl (H)
1−δAIl (H)
u
′ (
wAIl,2 (H)
)
u′
(
wAIl,3 (H)
) = 1− pLpH pLpH δAIl (H)
1− pLpH δAIl (H)
Denote p(L)p(H) = κ < 1, then
u
′
(wAIl,1(H))
u′
(
wAIl,2(H)
) − u′(wAIl,2(H))
u′
(
wAIl,3(H)
) = (κ2+1−2κ)δ(1−κδ )(1−δ ) > 0 ⇒ u
′
(wAIl,1(H))
u′
(
wAIl,2(H)
) > u′(wAIl,2(H))
u′
(
wAIl,3(H)
)
We subtract 1 at both sides, and we obtain
u
′ (
wAIl,1 (H)
)
−u′
(
wAIl,2 (H)
)
u′
(
wAIl,2 (H)
) > u′
(
wAIl,2 (H)
)
−u′
(
wAIl,3 (H)
)
u′
(
wAIl,3 (H)
)
Multiply u
′ (
wAIl,2 (H)
)
at both sides. Since wAIl,2 (H)< w
AI
l,3 (H), and u
′
is decreasing in w,
we obtain
u
′ (
wAIl,1 (H)
)
−u′
(
wAIl,2 (H)
)
> u
′ (
wAIl,2 (H)
)
−u′
(
wAIl,3 (H)
)
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Now we show that the wage growth is concave under u
′′′
(.)< 0. When u
′′′
(.)< 0, u
′
(.)
is concave. By the property of concave functions, we have
u
′ (
wAIl,1 (H)
)
−u′
(
wAIl,2 (H)
)
<
(
wAIl,1 (H)−wAIl,2 (H)
)
×u′′
(
wAIl,2 (H)
)
Similarly, we have
u
′ (
wAIl,3 (H)
)
−u′
(
wAIl,2 (H)
)
<
(
wAIl,3 (H)−wAIl,2 (H)
)
×u′′
(
wAIl,2 (H)
)
⇕
u
′ (
wAIl,2 (H)
)
−u′
(
wAIl,3 (H)
)
>
(
wAIl,2 (H)−wAIl,3 (H)
)
×u′′
(
wAIl,2 (H)
)
Hence, we have (
wAIl,1 (H)−wAIl,2 (H)
)
×u′′
(
wAIl,2 (H)
)
> u
′ (
wAIl,1 (H)
)
−u′
(
wAIl,2 (H)
)
> u
′ (
wAIl,2 (H)
)
−u′
(
wAIl,3 (H)
)
>
(
wAIl,2 (H)−wAIl,3 (H)
)
×u′′
(
wAIl,2 (H)
)
Then we divide−u′′
(
wAIl,2 (H)
)
at both sides of
(
wAIl,1 (H)−wAIl,2 (H)
)
×u′′
(
wAIl,2 (H)
)
>
(
wAIl,2 (H)−wAIl,3 (H)
)
×u′′
(
wAIl,2 (H)
) ,
we could obtain wAIl,2 (H)−wAIl,1 (H)> wAIl,3 (H)−wAIl,2 (H).
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Abstract
Based on Bi and Langot (2015), we study the welfare impact of redistributively front-
loading unemployment benefit by age. In the two-period context, such a transfer relaxes
information constraint, leading to welfare improvement of the low type and aggregate welfare
improvement. There may be, however, welfare loss for the high type when their cross-
subsidization towards the low type is considerable enough. We find also that such a transfer
can downwards distort the participation margin if workers make participation choice before
search, leading to aggregate output loss. In the three-period benchmark, our result could be
generalized under a fairly strong condition.
Keywords: Competitive search equilibrium, Asymmetric information, Age-targeted Policies
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2.1 Introduction
It is usual to present the optimal unemployment insurance system as an arbitration be-
tween "smoothing" and "incentive": the benefits allow risk averse workers to smooth their
consumption flows, but the timing of these benefits must also lead them to accept quickly a
job proposal (see Shavell and Weiss (1979)). In a principal-agent context with moral hazard,
Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) (hereafter HN) show that the optimal contract consists of
a regressive unemployment benefit which decreases with unemployment spell, as well as a
wage tax which depends positively on the previous unemployment spell after reemployment.
Hairault, Langot, Menard and Sopraseuth (2012) (hereafter HLMS) show that HN’s result is
weakened if age heterogeneity is present. Indeed, with an absorbing state retirement intro-
duced, unemployment workers who are close to retirement have high probability of leaving
permanently the labor force which prevents the principal from recouping the unemployment
benefit transferred to these workers. A pension tax is suggested to remedy the problem.
Michelacci and Ruffo (2015) pursue further through the direction of age-dependent policy.
They show that redistributing unemployment benefit from the older to the younger workers
can bring further gain to the welfare, even if the existing level of unemployment benefits is
already close to optimal. Their result is based on two arguments. Firstly, unemployment in-
surance is relatively more valuable for the young workers, because consumption smoothing is
harder to achieve for the young during a spell of unemployment; Secondly, the issue of moral
hazard for the young generation is relatively mild, because the young should have stronger
incentive of improving their career prospects - their human capital investments have higher
marginal returns. The aim of this paper is to complete the analysis of an unemployment
benefit system based on the worker age, by proposing an argument based on an equilibrium
view of the labor market. Our main argument is the following: by providing additional
revenues to unemployed young workers, the insurance system can better prevent the "bad"
workers (the workers that will quit sooner) from applying to "good" jobs (the jobs that expect
a longer employment relationship) in a market where firms lack information concerning the
workers’ horizon in the labor market (private information). Thus, a redistribution of the
unemployment benefits from young to old workers could reduce the information costs.
Our equilibrium search framework is closest to Guerrieri (2008) and Guerrieri, Shimer and
Wright (2010), and can be summarized as follow. There is only one source of heterogeneity:
the expected horizon of remaining in the firm. Hiring a worker with longer horizon generates
higher expected surplus, hence firms which aim at entering into such long term relationship
are ready to sink more virtual cost ex ante by waiting longer for the match with such a
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worker to take place. However, the workers with short horizon are better off misrepresenting
themselves as workers with longer horizon. The employers are then obliged to post contracts
which induce self-selection - an adverse selection problem then arises. Since there is no
means of further increasing the utility of workers with short horizon to make them less
willing to practice arbitrage, the workers with long horizon’s allocation must be distorted for
this sake. Intuitively, these workers with long horizon generate higher expected surplus, so
it is possible for the firm to sacrifice part of it for the screening process. Hence, a sorting
mechanism is implemented: Bi and Langot (2015) prove the existence of segmented labor
market equilibria when information is asymmetric. The incentive compatible contracts can
endogenously segment the labor market: the "bad" (workers with short horizon) receive
non-distorted contracts, whereas the "good" (those with longer horizon) receive distorted
contracts. Although the discrimination process is directed "against" the bad workers, the
induced cost is "paid for" by the good workers through a distorted contract. The bad workers
receive information rent. The precise structure and context of Bi and Langot (2015) are as
follows. In the benchmark, the workers are modelled as having an exogenous probability of
quitting the labor market. This probability can be high or low, and is perfectly known at the
time of hiring only by the workers.1 We then extend the basic setup to two further frameworks
where the workers are allowed to make participation choice. In the first framework with
participation choice, workers receive, before search, a precise but private signal on their
value of home production for their later stage of life, according to which they choose the
submarket characterized by the length of employment relationship based on this private
information.2 In the second, the heterogeneity is only realised ex post - neither the workers
nor the firms know the worker’s utility of leisure before search, but during the contract
this characteristic becomes observable by the worker.3 At last, we consider a three-period
extension of the benchmark (without participation choice), where the participation shock
takes place recurrently and workers who are once shocked out of the market can become
active again, to check the robustness of the model.
1This first case is close to many models of labor market where the agents’ horizons are bounded: see
Cheron, Hairault and Langot (2011, 2013), or Menzio, Telyukova and Visschers (2015).
2Since the middle of the 90s, the retirement choices are central for the policy maker, given the problems
associated to financing of the Pay-As-You-Go system. Theoretical and empirical works also show how the
labor market status interacts with this retirement choice: see Coile and Levine (2006, 2007, 2011), Hairault,
Langot and Sopraseuth (2010) and Hairault, Langot and Zylberberg (2015).
3This model accounts for information that becomes available after a first part of career: workers have
heterogeneous working conditions, leading to a heterogeneity in the wealth and/or health distributions, and
thus, in the value of leisure in the second part of their careers. These worker-specific experiences may explain
heterogeneity in the age of entry in disability programs (see e.g. Low and Pistaferri (2010)), or in the retirement
age among ex ante identical individuals (see e.g. Cutler, Meara and Richards-Shubik (2011)).
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In this paper, our focus is on the impact of redistribution through front-loading unemploy-
ment benefit by age. Since the policy maker is subject to the same asymmetric information
problem as in the decentralized case, it necessarily involves cross-subsidization across dif-
ferent types of workers. Qualitatively, redistribution induces cross-subsidization of welfare
across workers of different types, which can aggravate (or mitigate) the informational exter-
nality - misrepresenting one’s type may become more (or less) attractive for the low type.
Quantitatively, the extent of such cross-subsidization will depend upon the fraction of each
type of workers who enjoy the unemployment benefit (hereafter UB) in the labor market.
Some results are summarized as follows. In the two-period benchmark, where the shock
occurs only once, redistribution is always beneficial for the “bad”; as for the “good”, their
welfare variation results from a comparison between the loss from cross-subsidization and a
gain from mitigated information externality, and the latter effect dominates when the fraction
of the “good” is sufficiently high. The aggregate welfare always improves, because the cross
subsidization always makes the “bad” comparatively less reluctant to misrepresent their type
- the information constraint is relaxed. Now we allow submarket choice. If this choice is
made before search, the results from the benchmark on the welfare are not altered, however,
we find that the participation margin is further distorted after redistribution in the sense that
redistribution induces larger fraction of workers to choose the one-period submarket (so that
they do not work in the second period). We argue that this could in turn reduce the aggregate
output in the two-period submarket. Hence in this framework, there is potential trade-off
between loss in the aggregate output and gain in aggregate welfare. Now consider that the
participation choice is made after search. When unemployment benefit can not be claimed by
the workers who quit prematurely to enjoy home production, such a transfer has no impact
on the welfare since it does not enter into the information constraint. When it can be claimed,
such redistribution can bring aggregate welfare gain, and it can increase the participation
margin in case of asymmetric information. At last, from the study of a three-period extension
of the benchmark with recurrent participation shock, we establish that the results from the
two-period model could be generalized under a fairly strong condition.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we present the benchmark with exogenous
participation choices. In Section 2, we introduce workers’ participation choice which depends
on their home production shock before search. We move to the situation where such a shock
occurs only after matching, this is done in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the robustness, and
then we conclude.
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2.2 Exogenous quitting probability and age-specific UB
2.2.1 Model Assumptions
Consider a two-period economy with search friction. The number of workers is fixed, whereas
the number of firms is variable and to be determined in the equilibrium. All workers start
unemployed, and get hired by a firm through a job-search process. Denote q the tightness of
the labor market, i.e. the worker/firm ratio. The hiring probability for the firms is H (q), while
F (q) represents workers’ job finding rate. As is usual in the matching models, we assume a
constant return to scale relationship implying that (i) H (q) = qF (q), (ii) the workers’ job
finding rate F (q) is decreasing and concave in q, (iii) the firms’ hiring probability H (q) is
increasing and concave in q, and (iv) the elasticity of firms’ hiring probability is a decreasing
function in q and between (0,1), i.e. ε ′ (q) =
(
H
′
(q)
H(q)/q
)′
< 0 and ε (q) ∈ (0,1).
We assume that an employed worker at the second period may leave the firm with
certain probability for exogenous reasons, hence terminating the employment relationship
prematurely. We focus on two possible types of worker: a fraction α will stay with probability
pH - type “H”; while the rest are type “L” workers, who stay with probability pL, with
pH > pL.
Such a wage posting game has three stages: (i) firms announce wages; (ii) workers
observe the posted wages, and choose where to apply; (iii) the workers who get matched
with firms produce, and payoffs are realized. With full information, Bi and Langot (2015)
show that a competitive search equilibrium is characterized by (i) an optimal level of per
period wage such that wFIH > w
FI
L , (ii) an optimal level of expected queue length such that
qFIH > q
FI
L , (iii) the wages increase less faster than the increase of productivity with respect
to p: (1+β pH)wFIH − (1+β pL)wFIL < (1+β pH)y− (1+β pL)y. Moreover, the workers
who expect to stay longer in the firm enjoy higher expected utility from job search, even if
different types offer the same quality of labor. This situation generates incentives for the type
L workers to visit the submarket for the type H, if information is not perfectly shared. Thus
firms which post long-term employment contracts and are uninformed about the workers’
types may be unable to recoup their vacancy cost if they aim at attracting type H but end up
with type L worker. This leads us to consider the possibility for firms to manipulate wage
profile to induce self-selection among the workers, such that no workers will misrepresent
their types.
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2.2.2 Equilibrium
The optimization program for firms that want to attract pH-type workers is written as follow:
UAIH = maxq,wH,1,wH,2
{
F (q) [u(wH,1)+β pHu(wH,2)]+(1−F (q))
[
u(z)+β pHU1p
]}
s.t. H (q) [y−wH,1+β pH (y−wH,2)] =C
IC constraint F (qH) [u(wH,1)+β pLu(wH,2)]+(1−F (qH))
[
u(z)+β pLU1p
]≤U∗L
where the optimal value of UL is deduced from the optimization program for firms that
want to attract type L workers. This problem is written as:
U∗L = maxq,wL,1,wL,2
{
F (q) [u(wL,1)+β pLu(wL,2)]+(1−F (q))
[
u(z)+β pLU1p
]}
s.t. H (q) [y−wL,1+β pL (y−wL,2)] =C
Finally, for the one-period workers, the optimal contract is deduced from:
U1p = maxq,w {F (q)u(w)+(1−F (q))u(z)}
s.t. H (q) [y−w] =C
This economy is an extension of the theory proposed by Guerrieri, Shimer and Wright
(2010). We will use the superscript “AI” for the equilibrium allocations of the program with
incentive constraint, and the superscript “∗” for the equilibrium allocations of the program
without information constraint. The properties of this equilibrium are the following. Firstly,
the separating equilibrium always exists. Secondly, the submarket allocation for type-L
workers is not distorted, implying that q∗L = qFIL , w∗L,1 = w
∗
L,2 = w
FI
L , and U
∗
L =U
FI
L <U
AI
H ,
where FI stands for full information. Thirdly, the distortions are supported by the type H
workers, leading to wAIH,1 < w
FI
L < w
FI
H < w
AI
H,2, q
FI
H < q
AI
H < q
FI
L and U
FI
L <U
AI
H <U
FI
H .
2.2.3 Redistributive age-specific UB
Now, we distinguish the first-period unemployment benefit z1 and the second-period unem-
ployment benefit z2. The policy maker will redistribute by front-loading the unemployment
benefit from the old to young. Starting with z1 = z2 = z. we lower the second period z2 such
that it becomes equivalent to z minus dz, i.e. z2 = z−dz.
The government will expect to gather money from the following fraction of the old
generation:
α× [β pH (1−F (qAIH ))(1−F (q∗1p))]+(1−α)× [β pL (1−F (q∗L))(1−F (q∗1p))] (2.1)
2.2 Exogenous quitting probability and age-specific UB 57
where α is the fraction of type H workers. At the same time, the government will expect to
redistribute to the following fraction of young generation who suffers from unemployment:
α×
(
1−F
(
qAIH
))
+(1−α)× (1−F (q∗L)) (2.2)
To understand these expressions, notice that the expected fraction of workers who receive
the first period u(z1) consists of those who are not able to find a job in the first period, and
this fraction consists of
(
1−F (qAIH )) for type H, and (1−F (q∗L)) for type L. For similar
reason, the expected fraction of workers who receive the second period u(z2) consists of
β pH
(
1−F (qAIH ))(1−F (q∗1p)) for type H, and β pL (1−F (q∗L))(1−F (q∗1p)) for type
L. To keep budget balanced, every unit of decrease of old generation’s unemployment benefit
dz should be translated to
k ≡ α×[β pH(1−F(q
AI
H ))(1−F(q∗1p))]+(1−α)×[β pL(1−F(q∗L))(1−F(q∗1p))]
α×(1−F(qAIH ))+(1−α)×(1−F(q∗L))
×dz
unit of utility gain for the young generation regardless of the type. Such a transfer is
justified by the fact that the planner has also no information on the agents’ types.4 Notice
that it could be straightforwardly verified that we have β pL < k(
1−F
(
q∗1p
)) < β pH .
Proposition 1. In this case of ex ante heterogeneity on quitting probability, redistributing
unemployment benefit from the old to the young workers will have the following impacts:
(1) type L workers’ welfare increases; (2) type H workers’ welfare decreases when α is
sufficiently low, and increases when α is sufficiently high; (3) the aggregate welfare always
increases.
Proof. (1). By Envelope Theorem, the increase of first-period z brings type L welfare
gain by an amount of△AIL,gain = (1−F (q∗L))×u
′
(z)×kdz. At the same time, the decrease of
second-period z brings type L welfare loss by an amount of△AIL,loss = β pL (1−F (q∗L))
(
1−F
(
q∗1p
))
×
u
′
(z)×dz. So that
Sign
{
△AIL,gain−△AIL,loss
}
= Sign
{
k−β pL×
(
1−F
(
q∗1p
))}
The difference is positive because β pL
(
1−F
(
q∗1p
))
< k. This leads us to conclude
that there is welfare gain for the type L workers by this redistribution.
4If the type is public information, this transfer could be made type-dependent, and does not have first order
gain.
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(2). The increase of first-period unemployment benefit raises type H’s welfare by
△AIH,gain =
(
1−F
(
qAIH
))
×u′ (z)× kdz
+δ
[
(1−F (q∗L))−
(
1−F
(
qAIH
))]
×u′ (z)× kdz
where δ is the Lagrangian multiplier of the incentive constraint.5 Notice that the second term
is always greater than zero, because F (q) is a decreasing function and q∗L > qAIH . At the same
time, the decrease of second-period z brings type H welfare loss by an amount
△AIH,loss = β pH
(
1−F (qAIH ))(1−F (q∗1p))×u′ (z)dz
+δβ pL
[
(1−F (q∗L))
(
1−F (q∗1p))− (1−F (qAIH ))(1−F (q∗1p))]×u′ (z)dz
The second term in this expression is also greater than zero for the same reason just mentioned.
The first term in△AIH,gain is smaller than the first term in△AIH,loss, because of the inequality
k < β pH
(
1−F
(
q∗1p
))
. The second term in △AIH,gain is greater than the second term in
△AIH,loss, because of the inequality β pL
(
1−F
(
q∗1p
))
< k. At this stage, it is still ambiguous
whether it is the gain or loss that dominates. We then make the difference △AIH,gain−△AIH,loss,
and notice that according to the definition of k we are able to reduce it to the following
comparison:
Sign
[
△AIH,gain−△AIH,loss
]
= Sign
 (1−F (qAIH ))×(k−β pH (1−F (q∗1p)))
+δ
[
F
(
qAIH
)−F (q∗L)]×(k−β pL(1−F (q∗1p)))

= Sign
[
−(1−F (qAIH ))× (1−α)(1−F (q∗L))
+δ
[
F
(
qAIH
)−F (q∗L)]× (α)(1−F (qAIH ))
]
Then when α → 1, that is, the fraction of type H is high, there will be welfare gain for
the type H workers; when α → 0, there is welfare loss for the type H workers.
(3). Concerning the variation of the overall welfare, we have
α×
[
△AIH,gain−△AIH,loss
]
+(1−α)×
[
△AIL,gain−△AIL,loss
]
= αδ
[
(1−F (q∗L))−
(
1−F (qAIH ))]×[k−β pL(1−F (q∗1p))]×u′ (z)dz
So that
5Bi and Langot (2015) show that 0 < δ < 1.
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Sign
{
α×
[
△AIH,gain−△AIH,loss
]
+(1−α)×
[
△AIL,gain−△AIL,loss
]}
= Sign
αδ
[
(1−F (q∗L))−
(
1−F
(
qAIH
))]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
× [k−β pL (1−F (q∗1p))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0

= +
Then the aggregate welfare increases. At last, we remark that both the direction of type
L’s welfare variation and the aggregate welfare variation are dependent upon the sign of[
k−β pL
(
1−F
(
q∗1p
))]
. Q.E.D.
This proposition shows that if the “distance to retirement” is measured by an exogenous
probability of remaining participative (private information), then the type L workers are
always the net beneficiary and such a transfer always improves the aggregate welfare;
however, the type H workers may lose or gain depending on effects along two dimensions:
(1) informational externality, and (2) intensity of cross-subsidization.
By informational externality, we mean that such a transfer of unemployment benefit
can relax the informational constraint. To see this, we focus on the incentive constraint:
F (qH) [u(wH,1)+β pLu(wH,2)]+(1−F (qH))
[
u(z1)+β pLU1p
]≤UL. A transfer of unem-
ployment benefit from the old to the young will increase the left-hand side by an amount(
1−F (qAIH ))(k−β pL(1−F (q∗1p)))u′ (z)dz. At the same time, such a redistribution
also increases by an amount (1−F (q∗L))
(
k−β pL
(
1−F
(
q∗1p
)))
u
′
(z)dz at the right-hand
side. Since Bi and Langot (2015) show that “qAIH < q
FI
L and F (q) is a decreasing function”,
the right-hand side increases faster than the left-hand side, which implies that the information
constraint is easier to be satisfied. This suggests that type L workers become comparatively
less willing to misrepresent their type. And we notice in the end of proof Proposition 1 that
the aggregate welfare is enhanced, and the magnitude of that enhancement is solely related
to the information gain which has δ as a multiplier.
We now turn to cross-subsidization. There is heterogeneity in the population: type L
and type H. On one hand, the fact that unemployed type H workers have higher probability
(pH) of remaining in the market tomorrow leads them to be sampled more frequently by the
planner for the collection of unemployment benefit as a source of redistribution. On the other
hand, the fact that they are matched more often in the first period suggests that they are less
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likely to be unemployed in the first period and hence less likely to benefit from any transfer.
A decrease of value dz then will be more likely to be redistributed to the type L workers -
type H will cross-subsidize type L. Then pure cross-subsidization represents a welfare loss
to type H workers, albeit relaxed information constraint tends to raise their welfare. When
the fraction α of type H workers is sufficiently low, it implies that a small fraction of type H
will cross-subsidize a large fraction of type L. Then the gain from reduction of information
externality (captured by the term with δ ) is insufficient compared to the excessive loss from
cross-subsidization6, type H workers are subsequently worse off. On the other hand, if the
fraction α of type H workers is sufficiently high, a large fraction of type H will take care
of a small fraction of type L. Then the loss from cross-subsidization is dominated by the
information gain, so that there is welfare gain for type H.
2.3 Endogenous participation choice before search and age-
specific UB
In the previous section, workers’ premature quit is governed by an exogenous staying
probability ptype. However, to stay in the market for longer or shorter periods is often an id-
iosyncratic decision. Bi and Langot (2015) make a simple modification to the previous model
to enable the possibility that workers make ex ante decisions on submarkets (distinguished by
employment horizon) choice, so that the adjustments through the extensive margin become
possible. Bi and Langot (2015) show that distortion induced by self-selection process can
dampen the participation incentive of workers with lower value of leisure. In this section,
we wish to examine the effectiveness of age-specific unemployment benefits under such a
context.
2.3.1 Equilibrium
The submarket choice is endogenous in the following sense: each agent receives an idiosyn-
cratic signal (private information) at the ex ante stage on her home production value (denoted
h) for the second period. Given this individual characteristic, she chooses ex ante to join
the two-period or the one-period submarket. According to Bi and Langot (2015), the two
submarkets are separated by one threshold hˆ. For values of h below hˆ, the worker chooses to
join the two-period submarket: she will then quit with probability 0, and this worker will
be categorized as type H. Otherwise, the employment relationship is only of one period,
6When α decreases 1 percent, (1−α) increases 1 percent. But their difference in absolute value increases
2 percents.
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and the worker will be categorized as type L. Formally, if h is a continuous variable from
a distribution G(h) over the support
[
h,h
]
, we establish that (i) among the pool of type L
workers, there is no information problem; (ii) among the pool of type H workers, there is
also no information problem; (iii) Type L workers will misrepresent their types as type H
workers. The threshold hˆ is determined by comparing the expected utility from joining each
submarket. With full information, this threshold is determined by UFIL
(
hˆFI
)
=UFIH
(
hˆFI
)
,
and with asymmetric information, it is determined by UL
(
hˆAI
)
=UAIH
(
hˆAI
)
. We derive both
situations and make comparisons.
The maximization problem for the firms in the two-period submarket is:
UAIH (hH ,z1,z2) = maxq,wH,1,wH,2
{
F (qH) [u(wH,1)+βu(wH,2)]
+(1−F (qH))
[
u(z1)+βmax
{
u(hH) ,U1p (hH ,z2)
}] }
s.t. H (qH) [y−wH,1+β (y−wH,2)] =C
IC constraint F (qH) [u(wH,1)]+(1−F (qH)) [u(z1)]+βu(hL)≤U∗L
where the solution for the contract posted by firms that target one-period workers is given
by
U∗L (hL,z1) = maxq,wL {F (q)u(wL)+(1−F (q))u(z1)+βu(hL)}
s.t. H (q) [y−wL] =C
Finally, the optimal contract posted by firms which target workers that prefer to search
for a job at the second period is a solution to the following problem:
U1p (hH ,z2) = maxq,w {F (q)u(w)+(1−F (q)) [u(hH)+u(z2)]}
s.t. H (q) [y−w] =C
The optimal contract is such that (i) the wages satisfy wAIH,1 < w
FI
H < w
AI
H,2, (ii) the queue
lengths are such that qFIH < q
AI
H < q
∗
L = q
FI
L , and (iii) the submarket choice leads to a threshold
hˆAI < hˆFI . With asymmetric information, firms in the two-period market must discourage
the type L workers from misrepresenting their types, and again type L workers receive
information rent. Distorted allocation for type H decreases their expected utility, leading
some of them to choose non-participation. Hence when ex ante decision on participation
is allowed, the distorted contracts lower the aggregate labor supply in the presence of
asymmetric information.
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2.3.2 Age-Specific UB
As previously, the policy consists of front-loading redistributing unemployment benefit by
age through increasing the first-period z by an amount dz, and decreasing the second-period
z by dz. The government will expect to gather money from the following fraction of the old:
G
(
hˆi
)× [β (1−F (qiH))(1−F (q∗1p))] (2.3)
where G
(
hi
)
is the fraction of type H workers who remain in the labor market tomorrow, and
i ∈ {AI,FI}. At the same time, the government will expect to redistribute to the following
fraction of current generation who suffers from unemployment:
G
(
hˆi
)× (1−F (qiH))+ (1−G(hi))× (1−F (qiL)) (2.4)
The expected fraction of workers who receive the first-period u(z1) are those who are not
able to find a job in the first period, and this fraction consists of
(
1−F (qiH)) for type H, and(
1−F (qiL)) for type L. The expected fraction of workers who receive the second-period
u(z2) consists of β
(
1−F (qiH))(1−F (q∗1p)) for type H, and there are no type L workers
who are in the market tomorrow. Now to keep the budget balanced, every unit of decrease of
old generation’s unemployment benefit dz should be translated to
k˜ ≡
G
(
hˆi
)×[β (1−F (qiH))(1−F (q∗1p))]
G
(
hˆi
)× (1−F (qiH))+ (1−G(hˆi))× (1−F (qiL)) ×dz
unit of utility gain for the young generation regardless of the type. Such a type-independent
transfer is justified by the fact that the planner has also no information on the agents’ types.
It could be straightforwardly verified that we have k˜(
1−F
(
q∗1p
)) < β .
Proposition 2.
(1) Front-loading redistribution of unemployment benefit by age has the same impact on
welfare as summarized in Proposition 1.
(2) After redistribution, the participation margin for both full information (hˆFI) and
asymmetric information (hˆAI) decrease.
Proof. We start by (1). By Envelope Theorem, the increase of first-period z brings type
L workers welfare gain by an amount of △iL,gain =
(
1−F (qiL))×u′ (z)× k˜dz. At the same
time, the decrease of second-period z does not concern type L workers. Then there is net
welfare gain for the type L workers by this unemployment insurance redistribution. Now we
turn to type H workers.
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This increase of first-period unemployment benefit raises type H workers’ welfare by
△iH,gain =
(
1−F (qiH))×u′ (z)× k˜dz
+δ
[(
1−F (qiL))− (1−F (qiH))]×u′ (z)× k˜dz
where δ < 1 is the Lagrangian multiplier of the incentive constraint. Notice that the second
term is always greater than zero. At the same time, the decrease of second-period z brings
type H workers welfare loss by an amount
△iH,loss = β
(
1−F (qiH))(1−F (q∗1p))×u′ (z)dz
The first term in△iH,gain is smaller than the first term in△iH,loss, because of the inequality
k˜(
1−F
(
q∗1p
)) < β . The second term in △iH,gain is strictly greater than zero. At this stage, it is
still ambiguous whether it is the gain or loss that dominates. We then make the difference
△iH,gain−△iH,loss, and notice that according to the definition of k we are able to reduce it to
the following comparison:
Sign
[
△iH,gain−△iH,loss
]
= Sign
[
−(1−G(hˆi))(1−F (qiL))
+δ
[
F
(
qiH
)−F (qiL)]×G(hˆi)
]
Again, when G
(
hi
)
is such that the fraction of type H is high, there will be welfare gain
for the type H workers; when G
(
hi
)
is such that the fraction of type H is low, there will be
welfare loss for the type H workers.
Concerning the variation of the aggregate welfare, we have
G
(
hˆi
)×[△iH,gain−△iH,loss]+ (1−G(hˆi))×[△iL,gain−△iL,loss]
= δ
[(
1−F (qiL))− (1−F (qiH))]× k˜G(hˆi)×u′ (z)dz
> 0
Then the aggregate welfare increases after redistribution. Thus we obtain similar result
as before, except that now the fraction is no longer α , but is G
(
hˆi
)
which depends on the
distribution function G(.) and hˆi, the value of which is determined in the equilibrium.
We now investigate (2): how this front-loading redistribution of unemployment benefit by
age has impact on hˆ which is determined by the indifference condition UL
(
hˆFI
)
=UFIH
(
hˆFI
)
for the case of full information and UL
(
hˆAI
)
=UAIH
(
hˆAI
)
for the case of asymmetric informa-
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tion. We start with the case of full information. We established above that UFIL increases but
UFIH decreases due to intergenerational redistribution of z. Then given that both U
FI
L and U
FI
H
are increasing function of h by Envelope Theorem, hˆFI must fall after the intergenerational
transfer takes place to make the equality stay binding. In case of asymmetric information,
although depending on the value of G
(
hˆi
)
the value of UAIH may increase, it can be straight-
forwardly checked that △AIH,gain−△AIH,loss <△AIL,gain−△AIL,loss, which says that the increase
of UFIL is more important compared to increase of U
AI
H , so that again hˆ
AI must fall to make
the equality stay binding after the intergenerational transfer takes place. Q.E.D.
This proposition suggests that there is always aggregate welfare gain from this redis-
tribution, however, the threshold hˆ is downwards distorted: there are more workers who
become reluctant to choose long-horizon employment relationship in the two-period sub-
market, and are willing to switch to the one-period market. We suggest that this situation
implies potential loss in the (economy-wide) aggregate output (the sum of aggregate output
in the second-period and one-period submarket). To proceed heuristically our argument, we
follow literature to propose the measure for the expected aggregate output in the respective
submarket as “expected number of formed matches”7 times “the ex post output” (y for the
one-period and (1+β )y for the two-period market). Given this measure, when workers
switch from two-period to one-period submarket, there is a discrete drop on the ex post
surplus from (1+β )y to y, the magnitude of which depends on β ; At the same time if the
decrease of “expected number of matches” in second-period submarket is not too small
compared to the increase of “expected number of matches” in the one-period submarket, then
in total the reduction of output in the former is more important compared to corresponding
gain in the latter - there is hence economy-wide aggregate output loss.
7The “expected number of matches” is also called a matching function m(N,M), which depends on the
number of unemployed seekers for job (of number N) and number of vacant firms (of number M), is increasing
in both argument, and homogenous in degree 1. In our context, with q= NM , we have H (q) =
m(N,M)
M =m
( N
M ,1
)
,
and F (q) = m(N,M)N . Recall that N is exogenous and M endogenously determined by free entry - zero profit. We
refer readers to p392 of the survey provided by Petrongolo & Pissarides (2001) for more details on matching
functions.
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2.4 Ex-post asymmetric information, participation choices
after matching and age-specific UB
2.4.1 The model
In this section, we consider the situation where ex ante identical workers become informed
about their private value of home production only after getting matched, and such a shock
takes place at the end of the first period during this employment relationship. Depending on
the realization of this home production level, the worker decides to stay for another period or
to quit the labor market early (without paying any compensation to the firm). We assume
that workers’ private information on the home production shock h is drawn randomly from a
cumulative distribution function G(h), with the support
[
h,h
]
. When the value of h is high,
workers are better off quitting the job to enjoy it. Thus the firm’s problem is to propose a
wage contract that (i) guarantees participation (Individual Rationality or I.R.), and (ii) makes
sure that workers reveal truthfully their realisation of h (Incentive Compatibility or I.C.). By
standard mechanism design approach, Bi and Langot (2015) reduce the firm’s maximization
program to the following one:
UAI = max
w1(h),w2(h),e(h),q
F (q)×
[
u(w1)+β
∫ h
h
{
e(h)u(w2 (h))
+(1− e(h))u(h)
}
dG(h)
]
+(1−F (q))
{
u(z)+β
∫ h
h max
{
U1p (h,z) ,u(h)
}
dG(h)
}
s.to resource constraint F (q)
∫ h
h [y−w1+βe(h)× (y−w2)]dG(h)− 1qK = 0
and I.C. + I.R.
∫ h
h e(h)
[
u(w2)−u(h)− G(h)g(h) u
′
(h)
]
dG(h)≥ 0
In this program, e(h) ∈ {0,1} will stand for the probability with which the firm decides
to retain the workers, and we have
U1p (h,z) = max
w
F
(
q1p
)
u
(
w1p
)
+
(
1−F (q1p)) [u(h)+u(z)]
s.to H
(
q1p
)(
y−w1p
)≥C
Also notice that we assume the utility between the home production h and unemployment
benefit to be separable: that is u(h+ z) = u(h)+u(z). Bi and Langot (2015) characterized
the equilibrium properties as follows: (i) the wage profile is such that wAI1 < w
AI
2 < w
FI ,
(ii) the optimal queue length is such that qAI > qFI , (iii) the quitting threshold is such that
hˆAI < hˆFI . Although the first best (full information) allocation can not be achieved, the
constrained efficiency can be obtained. That social planner will maximize the workers’
expected utility from search subject to the following constraints: (1) the resource constraint
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which stipulates that the expected aggregate consumption should not surpass the expected
aggregate output; (2) the individual rationality constraint which requires that the workers
should have incentive to participate and search for the job; (3) given that z is fixed and
can not be redistributed (Guerrieri (2008) terms it nontransferrable), the consumption for
unemployment workers should be at least as great as z: that is to say, Zu ≤ z.
2.4.2 Redistribution by age.
It is straightforward to observe that since the unemployment benefit z does not enter into the
information constraint, there is no welfare gain in the first order from a smaller amount of
redistribution. We now show that in case the workers who quit prematurely have the right to
claim for the unemployment benefit, there is still welfare improvement from front-loading
unemployment benefit. Such a redistribution also raises the participation margin.
Proposition 3. In the case of ex post heterogeneity, redistributing unemployment benefit
by age relaxes information constraint.
Proof. The result that such a transfer brings the improvement of welfare is actually quite
natural, because in the current context, there is no effect from cross-subsidization, and such
a transfer simply relaxes the information constraint, and thus brings improvement to the
welfare. To see this, we consider the following program where we distinguish the first-period
unemployment benefit by denoting it z1 and the second-period unemployment benefit by
labeling it as z2.
UAI (z1,z2) = max
w1(h),w2(h),e(h),q
F (q)
∫ h
h
[
u(w1)+β
[
e(h)u(w2 (h))
+ (1− e(h)) [u(h)+u(z2)]
]]
dG(h)
+(1−F (q))
{
u(z1)+β
∫ h
h max
{
U1p (h,z2) ,u(h)
}
dG(h)
}
s.to Resource F (q)
∫ h
h [y−w1+βe(h)× (y−w2)]dG(h)− 1qK = 0
and Information
∫ h
h e(h)
[
u(w2)−u(h)−u(z2)− G(h)g(h) u
′
(h)
]
dG(h)≥ 0
By Envelope Theorem, an increase of dz for the young workers will bring a welfare gain
of the level
A1︷ ︸︸ ︷(
1−F
(
qAI
))
u
′
(z)× k˘dz
At the same time, a decrease of dz for the old workers (at the second period of the lifetime)
will bring a welfare loss of the magnitude
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A2︷ ︸︸ ︷
βF
(
qAI
)(
1−G(hˆAI))×u′ (z)dz
+
β (1−F (qAI))
∫ h
h
[eI (h)(1−F (qI))+(1− eI (h))]dG(h)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A3
−δ ×G(hˆAI)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A4
×u′ (z)dz
where eI (h) determines the threshold captured by max
{
U1p (h,z) ,u(h)
}
. Analogous
as before, k˘ is defined such that the we have budget balance, that is to say, A1× k˘ =
A2+A3−A4.Given such a relationship, the aggregation of the above gain and loss becomes
A1× k˘−(A2 + A3−A4) =A4> 0= δ×G(hˆAIII ) . Thus, we have shown that such a transfer
has a first order effect on the improvement of welfare, and such an improvement comes solely
from the reduction of information externality.
Bi and Langot (2015) suggest that δ depends negatively on hˆAI . When information
constraint is relaxed, δ becomes smaller, so that the value of hˆAI naturally increases towards
hˆFI . Q.E.D.
We should make some comparisons between the current context and the previous contexts.
The first difference between the current context with ex post heterogeneity and the previous
contexts with ex ante heterogeneity is the absence of cross-subsidization. If there were
cross-subsidization, some types necessarily benefit more than average and some benefit
less than average, and the low types always gain due to cross-subsidization from the high
types. Improving the low type’s welfare makes them less willing to misrepresent their type,
so that there is welfare improvement. The second difference comes from the comparison
between the current context and that of ex ante heterogeneity with submarket choice. With
ex ante heterogeneity, such a transfer by age always further distorts the participation margin
downwards due to the faster increase of welfare of the low type, this has potentially negative
effect on the aggregate output. However, with ex post heterogeneity, such a transfer has an
effect of increasing the participation margin which positively affects the aggregate output.
This is because reducing second-period unemployment benefit makes quitting a less attractive
option. Apart from the above two main differences, all the above contexts predict that such
redistributive transfer by age reduces the information rent.
2.5 Discussion on the robustness of the results
In the previous two-period contexts, the main reason for overall welfare improvement is
that whenever we front-load UB from the second to the first period, the incentive constraint
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is relaxed. At the same time, type L workers benefit from cross-subsidization so that their
welfare is always raised. In this section, we move to a three-period extension of the benchmark
proposed in the discussion section of Bi and Langot (2015).8 We examine whether the results
achieved in the previous section can carry through. In the following, the notations “l”,
“m”, and “s” will represent respectively Long-term, Middle-term, Short-term employment
relationship. The superscript “AI” will be given to the programs with incentive constraints.
The solution of the program without information constraints will be labeled by the superscript
“∗”. Bi and Langot (2015) suggest that the results on equilibrium allocations of the benchmark
could be carried through. The program is
UAIl,1 (H) = maxwl,1,wl,2,wl,3,ql,1
{
F
(
ql,1
)[
u
(
wl,1
)
+β pH
[
u
(
wl,2
)
+β pHu
(
wl,3
)]]
+
(
1−F (ql,1))[u(z1)+β pHUAIl,2 (H)]+β (1− pH)×[β pHU∗l,3]
}
s.to H
(
ql,1
)[
y−wl,1+β pH
(
y−wl,2
)
+β 2 p2H
(
y−wl,3
)]
=C
F
(
ql,1
)[
u
(
wl,1
)
+β pL
[
u
(
wl,2
)
+β pLu
(
wl,3
)]]
+
(
1−F (ql,1))[u(z1)+β pLU∗l,2 (L)]+β (1− pL)×[β pLU∗l,3]≤U∗l,1 (L)
It is important to notice that there is a particular term in the program: β (1− pt)×[
β ptU∗l,3
]
where t ∈ {L,H}. This term comes from the fact that the workers who are inactive
at the second period (captured by β (1− pt)) could be again active in the market at the third
period (captured by β pt). The presence of this term renders our analysis of individual type’s
welfare ambiguous, hence we will put focus on the aggregate welfare, and will suggest in the
Appendix to which extent this term modifies the result. To proceed, there are three situations
to distinguish according to the source and the destination of the redistribution. In the first
situation (Situation 1), we front-load unemployment benefit from the third to the second
period; In the second situation (Situation 2), the transfer is from the third to the first period;
In the third situation (Situation 3), it is from the second to the first period.
Proposition 4.
(1) In Situation 1, the aggregate welfare always improves after front-loading unemploy-
ment benefit.
(2) In Situation 2 and Situation 3, a sufficient condition for the aggregate welfare to
improve is p×
(
1−F
(
q∗m,1 (p)
))
being increasing in p.
Proof. In the Appendix.
8Due to the complexity of the analysis, we mainly focus on the extension of the benchmark here.
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In Appendix, it is shown that the (1− p)× p effect makes the above result on aggre-
gate welfare gain stronger, because this effect brings additional source for the funding.
Absent this effect, we find that the welfare variation depends crucially on the compari-
son between pH
(
1−F
(
qAIm,1 (H)
))
and pL
(
1−F
(
q∗m,1 (L)
))
as shown in the proof, and
this comparison is involved in Situation 2 and Situation 3. In Situation 3, it is related
because the asymmetric information on p for the third period distorts the matching probabil-
ity for the second period; and the relevant comparison is on β pH
(
1−F
(
qAIm,1 (H)
))
and
β pL
(
1−F
(
q∗m,1 (L)
))
. In Situation 2, this comparison becomes β pH
(
1−F
(
qAIm,1 (H)
))
×
β pH
(
1−F
(
q∗1p
))
and β pL
(
1−F
(
q∗m,1 (L)
))
×β pL
(
1−F
(
q∗1p
))
, simply because the
distortion for the second third period is accumulated to the third period. And it is intuitive that
in Situation 1, the comparison rests on β pH
(
1−F
(
q∗1p
))
and β pL
(
1−F
(
q∗1p
))
, which
renders no ambiguity. On one hand, pH > pL: type H workers have higher probability of
remaining in the market; on the other hand,
(
1−F
(
qAIm,1 (H)
))
<
(
1−F
(
q∗m,1 (L)
))
: it is
less probable that type H become unemployed; the comparison between pH
(
1−F
(
qAIm,1 (H)
))
and pL
(
1−F
(
q∗m,1 (L)
))
is hence ambiguous. At the same time, according to Envelope
Theorem, these expressions also correspond respectively to
dUAIm,1(H)
dU1p
and dUm,1(L)dU1p , which
represent the marginal gain from one unit of increase of the value U1p related to another
possibility of search in the subsequent period respectively for type H and type L. Since(
1−F
(
qAIm,1 (H)
))
>
(
1−F
(
q∗m,1 (H)
))
, our assumption that “p×
(
1−F
(
q∗m,1 (p)
))
being increasing in p” hence requires that in case of full information a unit increase of U1p is
always more valuable for the type H workers. Then conversely, a unit decrease of U1p costs
for type H workers more compared to type L, hence cross-subsidization has a direction from
type H towards type L. Based on these descriptions, we think this is a strong assumption.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the welfare impact of front-loading unemployment benefit by age
redistributively. In the two-period benchmark, we find that there is always aggregate welfare
gain from redistribution and the type L workers always benefit from cross-subsidization. We
then allow the workers to choose their horizon. Indeed, when the information is realized
before search, this transfer triggers comparatively larger welfare improvement for the poten-
tial one-period workers, which hence lowers the participation margin, and in turn may bring
down aggregate output; in contrast, when the participation shock is realized after matching,
this redistribution always increases participation margin and the aggregate output. We also
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check the robustness of the benchmark in the three-period setup, and argue that the aggregate
welfare gain could be achieved under a fairly strong condition.
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2.7 Appendix
Proposition 4.
(1) In Situation 1, the aggregate welfare always improves after front-loading unemploy-
ment benefit.
(2) In Situation 2 and Situation 3, a sufficient condition for the aggregate welfare to
improve is p×
(
1−F
(
q∗m,1 (p)
))
being increasing in p.
Proof. We start by Situation 1: Front-loading unemployment benefit from the third to
the second period. The fraction of third-period type H workers who receive unemployment
benefit is
α×

(
1−F
(
qAIl,1 (H)
))
×
[
β pH ×
(
1−F
(
qAIm,1 (H)
))
×β pH
(
1−F
(
q∗s,1
))]
+
[
β pH ×β (1− pH)
(
1−F
(
q∗s,1
))] 
The fraction of third-period type L workers who receive unemployment benefit is
(1−α)×
(
1−F
(
q∗l,1 (L)
))
×
[
β pL×
(
1−F
(
q∗m,1 (L)
))
×β pL
(
1−F
(
q∗s,1
))]
+
[
β pL×β (1− pL)
(
1−F
(
q∗s,1
))] 
The fraction of second-period type H workers who receive unemployment benefit is
α
(
1−F
(
qAIl,1 (H)
))
×β pH ×
(
1−F
(
qAIm,1 (H)
))
The fraction of second-period type L workers who receive unemployment benefit is
(1−α)
(
1−F
(
q∗l,1 (L)
))
×β pL×
(
1−F
(
q∗m,1 (L)
))
To keep budget balanced, every unit of third period unemployment benefit is translated to
k32 unit for the second period unemployed. So that we have
k32 =

α×β pH
(
1−F
(
q∗s,1
)){
β pH ×
(
1−F
(
qAIl,1 (H)
))(
1−F
(
qAIm,1 (H)
))
+β (1− pH)
}
(1−α)×β pL
(
1−F
(
q∗s,1
)){
β pL×
(
1−F
(
q∗l,1 (L)
))(
1−F
(
q∗m,1 (L)
))
+β (1− pL)
}  α
(
1−F
(
qAIl,1 (H)
))
×β pH ×
(
1−F
(
qAIm,1 (H)
))
+(1−α)
(
1−F
(
q∗l,1 (L)
))
×β pL×
(
1−F
(
q∗m,1 (L)
)) 
The next step is to determine how does such a redistribution of a small magnitude dz
alternate the welfare of type L workers, that is, we should find the value of △AIL,gain,32−
△AIL,loss,32. We have
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△AIL,gain,32−△AIL,loss,32
= β pL
(
1−F
(
q∗l,1 (L)
))(
1−F
(
q∗m,1 (L)
))
×
[
k32−
(
1−F
(
q∗s,1
))(
β pL+β (1− pL) 1(
1−F
(
q∗l,1(L)
))
(1−F(q∗m,1(L)))
)]
×u′ (z)dz
So that
Sign
{
△AIL,gain,32−△AIL,loss,32
}
= Sign
{
k32−
(
1−F
(
q∗s,1
))(
β pL+β (1− pL) 1(
1−F
(
q∗l,1(L)
))
(1−F(q∗m,1(L)))
)}
= Sign

(
1−F
(
q∗s,1
))(
β pH +β (1− pH) 1(
1−F
(
qAIl,1(H)
))
(1−F(qAIm,1(H)))
)
−
(
1−F
(
q∗s,1
))(
β pL+β (1− pL) 1(
1−F
(
q∗l,1(L)
))
(1−F(q∗m,1(L)))
)

This term is ambiguous because of the (1− p) p effect. Although pH > pL, the com-
parison between β (1−pH)(
1−F
(
qAIl,1(H)
))
(1−F(qAIm,1(H)))
and β (1−pL)(
1−F
(
q∗l,1(L)
))
(1−F(q∗m,1(L)))
is ambigu-
ous. On one hand (1− pH) < (1− pL), on the other hand, 1(
1−F
(
qAIl,1(H)
))
(1−F(qAIm,1(H)))
>
1(
1−F
(
q∗l,1(L)
))
(1−F(q∗m,1(L)))
, because qAIl,1 (H)< q
∗
l,1 (L) and q
AI
m,1 (H)< q
∗
m,1 (L) from Bi and
Langot (2015). The (1− p) p effect is related to the terms with (1− pt) in the expression.
So that the presence of this (1− p) p effect could either make cross-subsidization for type L
better or worse.
Now we turn to the overall welfare, the improvement of which is measured by
dW32 = α×
(
△AIH,gain,32−△AIH,loss,32
)
+(1−α)×
(
△AIL,gain,32−△AIL,loss,32
)
It is straightforward to show that the resulting expression is only involved with the terms
associated with the Lagrangian multiplier of the information constraint:
dW32 = α×
(
△AIH,gain,32−△AIH,loss,32
)
+(1−α)×
(
△AIL,gain,32−△AIL,loss,32
)
= α×δl×

+
 β pL×(1−F (q∗l,1 (L)))(1−F (q∗m,1 (L)))
×
[
k32−β pL
(
1−F
(
q∗s,1
))
×1
] 
−
 β pL×(1−F (qAIl,1 (H)))(1−F (q∗m,1 (L)))
×
[
k32−β pL
(
1−F
(
q∗s,1
))
×1
] 

×u′ (z)dz
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Then Sign{dW32}= Sign
{[
k32−β pL
(
1−F
(
q∗s,1
))]}
. When the effect of (1− p) p
is absent, it could be shown that Sign{dW32} is always positive. When the effect of (1− p) p
is present, the value of k32 is larger, so that there is always aggregate welfare gain in Situation
1.
We now treat Situation 2: Front-loading unemployment benefit from the third period
to the first period. The fraction of first-period type H workers who receive unemployment
benefit is
α
(
1−F
(
qAIl,1 (H)
))
The fraction of first-period type L workers who receive unemployment benefit is
(1−α)
(
1−F
(
q∗l,1 (L)
))
Budget balance requires that every unit of third period unemployment benefit is translated
to k31 unit for the first period unemployed:
k31 =

α×β pH
(
1−F
(
q∗s,1
)){
β pH ×
(
1−F
(
qAIl,1 (H)
))(
1−F
(
qAIm,1 (H)
))
+β (1− pH)
}
(1−α)×β pL
(
1−F
(
q∗s,1
)){
β pL×
(
1−F
(
q∗l,1 (L)
))(
1−F
(
q∗m,1 (L)
))
+β (1− pL)
}  α
(
1−F
(
qAIl,1 (H)
))
+(1−α)
(
1−F
(
q∗l,1 (L)
)) 
The next step is to determine how does such a redistribution alternate the welfare of type
L workers, that is, we should find the value of △AIL,gain,31−△AIL,loss,31. We have
△AIL,gain,31−△AIL,loss,31
=
(
1−F
(
q∗l,1 (L)
))
×
[
k31−β pL
(
1−F
(
q∗s,1
))(
β pL
(
1−F
(
q∗m,1 (L)
))
+β (1− pL) 1(
1−F
(
q∗l,1(L)
))
)]
Rearranging, we obtain
Sign
{
△AIL,gain,31−△AIL,loss,31
}
= Sign

β pH
(
1−F
(
q∗s,1
)){
β pH
(
1−F
(
qAIm,1 (H)
))
+β (1− pH) 1(
1−F
(
qAIl,1(H)
))
}
− β pL
(
1−F
(
q∗s,1
))(
β pL
(
1−F
(
q∗m,1 (L)
))
+β (1− pL) 1(
1−F
(
q∗l,1(L)
))
)

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Under the condition p
(
1−F
(
q∗m,1 (p)
))
being increasing in p, we have pH
(
1−F
(
q∗m,1 (pH)
))
>
pL
(
1−F
(
q∗m,1 (pL)
))
. According to Bi and Langot (2015), qAIm,1 (H) > q
∗
m,1 (H), so that
β pH
(
1−F
(
qAIm,1 (H)
))
> β pH
(
1−F
(
q∗m,1 (H)
))
as F (.) is a decreasing function. So
we have β pH
(
1−F
(
qAIm,1 (H)
))
> β pL
(
1−F
(
q∗m,1 (L)
))
. However, the sign of the
expression is still ambiguous because of the (1− p) p effect: the comparison between
(1− pH) 1(
1−F
(
qAIl,1(H)
)) and (1− pL) 1(
1−F
(
q∗l,1(L)
)) is ambiguous. On one hand (1− pH)<
(1− pL), on the other hand, 1(
1−F
(
qAIl,1(H)
)) > 1(
1−F
(
q∗l,1(L)
)) . The (1− p) p effect is related
to the terms with (1− pt) in the expression. So that the presence of this (1− p) p effect
could again either make cross-subsidization for type L better or worse.
It is straightforward to find that the aggregate welfare improvement is measured by
dW31 = α×
(
△AIH,gain,31−△AIH,loss,31
)
+(1−α)×
(
△AIL,gain,31−△AIL,loss,31
)
= α×δl×

[(
1−F
(
q∗l,1 (L)
))
−
(
1−F
(
qAIl,1 (H)
))]
×
[
k31−β pL×
[(
1−F
(
q∗m,1 (L)
))
β pL
(
1−F
(
q∗s,1
))]] ×u′ (z)dz
According to Bi and Langot (2015), we have
(
1−F
(
q∗l,1 (L)
))
−
(
1−F
(
qAIl,1 (H)
))
>
0, so
Sign{dW31}
= Sign
{[
k31−β pL×
[
β pL
(
1−F
(
q∗m,1 (L)
))(
1−F
(
q∗s,1
))]]}
When the effect of (1− p) p is absent, it could be shown that Sign{dW31}=Sign
 β
2 p2H
(
1−F
(
qAIm,1 (H)
))
−β 2 p2L
(
1−F
(
q∗m,1 (L)
)) ,
which is always positive under our condition that p
(
1−F
(
q∗m,1 (p)
))
being increasing in
p. When the effect of (1− p) p is present, the value of k31 is again larger.
We now turn to Situation 3: Front-loading unemployment benefit from the second period
to the first period. Define k21 such that every unit of third period unemployment benefit is
equivalently redistributed as k21 unit to the second period unemployed. We have
k21 =
α(1−F(qAIl,1(H)))×β pH×(1−F(qAIm,1(H)))+(1−α)(1−F(q∗l,1(L)))×β pL×(1−F(q∗m,1(L)))[
α
(
1−F
(
qAIl,1(H)
))
+(1−α)
(
1−F
(
q∗l,1(L)
))]
The next step is to determine how does such a redistribution of a small magnitude dz
alternate the welfare of type L workers, that is, we should find the value of △AIL,gain,21−
△AIL,loss,21. We have
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△AIL,gain,21−△AIL,loss,21 =
(
1−F
(
q∗l,1 (L)
))
× k21×u′ (z)dz
−β pL×
(
1−F
(
q∗l,1 (L)
))(
1−F
(
q∗m,1 (L)
))
×1×u′ (z)dz
=
(
1−F
(
q∗l,1 (L)
))[
k21−β pL
(
1−F
(
q∗m,1 (L)
))]
So that
Sign
{
△AIL,gain,21−△AIL,loss,21
}
= Sign
{[
k21−β pL
(
1−F
(
q∗m,1 (L)
))]}
= Sign
{
β pH
(
1−F
(
qAIm,1 (H)
))
−β pL
(
1−F
(
q∗m,1 (L)
))}
Under our condition, it is always greater than zero. The (1− p) p effect is absent here.
The aggregate welfare is measured by
dW21 = α×
(
△AIH,gain,21−△AIH,loss,21
)
+(1−α)×
(
△AIL,gain,21−△AIL,loss,21
)
After calculation, we have
dW21 = α×
(
△AIH,gain,21−△AIH,loss,21
)
+(1−α)×
(
△AIL,gain,21−△AIL,loss,21
)
= αδl×
 [(1−F (q∗l,1 (L)))−(1−F (qAIl,1 (H)))]
×
[
k21−β pL×
(
1−F
(
q∗m,1 (L)
))] ×u′ (z)dz
And so
Sign{dW21}
= Sign
{[
k21−β pL×
(
1−F
(
q∗m,1 (L)
))]}
= Sign
{
β pH
(
1−F
(
qAIm,1 (H)
))
−β pL
(
1−F
(
q∗m,1 (L)
))}
which is always positive under our condition. Q.E.D.
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Abstract
A holdup problem on workers’ skill investment can arise when employers adopt discrim-
inatory hiring norm to extract higher than socially optimal profit. When hiring priority is
determined by both productivity-dependent (skill level) and -independent characteristics
(discrimination), skill investment decision becomes strategic between the discriminated and
favored group. We consider frictional markets with either posted or bargained wage (fixed
sharing rule). With posted wage, depending on market tightness there may be equilibrium or
multiple equilibria on skill investment. With discriminatory hiring, if in equilibrium both
groups stay high skilled, both are worse off and firms better off; In any equilibrium where
one group underinvest, the other group remain high skilled and are better off, while firms are
worse off with discrimination. With bargained wage, similar equilibrium where the favored
group underinvest exists, and firms incur cost for an intermediate range of bargaining power
when they discriminate.
Keywords: Discrimination; Directed Search; Pre-matching Investment
JEL classification: J7, J42
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3.1 Introduction
A holdup problem arises when some investment is sunk ex ante by one party, and the payoff
is shared with that one party’s trading partner. Since cost has no other use once sunk, that
trading partner will have every incentive to squeeze the profit at the ex post stage. In an
important study on such a problem in a labor market with search friction, Acemoglu and
Shimer (1999b) show that with firms’ sinking capital and ex post wage bargaining, the
equilibrium is always inefficient, since wages paid ex post can be so high such that firms’ ex
ante incentive of investment is harmed; while if firms are able to post wages to direct workers’
search, then the holdup problem to firms’ investment no longer appears; the efficiency can be
achieved, because wage posting allows workers to observe offers and choose where to apply,
and it induces workers to optimize their expected payoff from application by making trade-off
between every wage they observe and the probability of obtaining it. Within conventional
wage posting framework, we spot another source of inefficiency in a holdup problem where
workers sink skill investment cost: when the market is crowded for the firms, by adopting a
discriminatory hiring norm firms are able to expropriate higher than socially optimal level of
profit, and this has the consequence of discouraging the investment incentives for both the
favored and discriminated groups. We analyze the impact of such rent seeking behavior of
firms on the structure of market segmentation, and on the workers’ skill investment incentives.
When discrimination is absent, the wage posting economy with workers’ ex ante skill
investment attains efficiency in the equilibria, and we show which equilibrium emerges
depends on the rivalry between the log return to skill and the market tightness (workers/firms
ratio) which measures the degree of market competition. The fundamental reason behind
this efficiency result is that skill achievement is a quality which can be legally written into
the wage contracts. It is a different story when other (binary) characteristics which are not
closely related to productivity, such as gender, race, height, origin etc. enter also into firms’
preference. Under equal pay legislation, posted wages can not be conditioned explicitly on
these characteristics; however, if firms still select workers according to their preference on
these characteristics, a separating equilibrium can result where separate firms post different
levels of wages, and workers of different groups sort themselves and apply to different wages:
the market is then endogenously segregated. On the side of firms, they have incentive to adopt
such discriminatory hiring norm, when workers’ return to skill investment is sufficiently high;
in that case discrimination allows them to grasp higher than the socially optimal level of
operating profit. On the side of the workers, it proves that both the discriminated group and
favored group are worse off: for the former, it is because discrimination discretely reduces the
labor market opportunity of these workers, who anticipate discrimination, then demand lower
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wages, which makes them cheaper to hire; for the latter, it is so because when firms are able
to hire the discriminated workers cheaply, it is as if firms enjoy larger “market power”, which
allows them to suppress further the undiscriminated workers’ expected payoff. Naturally,
anticipating discrimination, all groups expect lower payoff from search, jeopardizing their
skill investment incentives.
A key feature of our study is the multidimensionality of characteristics based on which
workers are ranked. On one hand, there is ranking by productivity-dependent type identity:
workers are either high skilled (type H) or low skilled (type L); high skilled have priority
to low skilled simply because such ranking gives firms higher profit. On the other hand,
there is ranking by productivity-independent group identity: workers belong either to the
favored (group a) or the discriminated group (group b). The resulting ranking schedule
has the following order: aH ≻ bH ≻ aL ≻ bL. It reads: given any skill level, group a
are preferred to group b; the high skilled are always preferred to low skilled. Under such
an “intertwined” ranking order, the skill investment decision for different groups becomes
strategically interdependent. Focusing on Nash pure strategy equilibrium on skill investment,
in the wage posting economy, we find that depending on the value of market tightness there
can be equilibrium or multiple equilibria on skill investment due to that interdependence.
Compared to the case without discrimination, when the market is very crowded (market
tightness is small) for the firms, discrimination is profitable for firms and all the workers
are worse off; as the tightness further increases, both group can choose low skill and in
equilibrium whenever one group underinvest, the other group remain high skilled and are
better off, while the firms are worse off with discrimination. In particular, the equilibrium
where the favored group underinvest, while the discriminated group choose to remain high
skilled exists; And in this case firms’ profits drop since workers’ underinvestment in skill
leads to lower average productivity in the economy compared to the case where discrimination
is absent.
In the economy where wages are bargained (determined according to a fixed sharing
rule) after matching hence do not direct search, we find similar equilibrium where the
favored group underinvest, hence earn lower expected payoff compared to the case without
discrimination within a certain region of bargaining power; in such an equilibrium, surplus is
transferred from firms and favored group to discriminated group. Firms’ profits are piecewise
monotone, because increase of workers’ bargaining power can increase workers’ incentive
of skill investment, hence discretely improves the market skill composition and average
productivity. We also find that there is an intermediate range of workers’ bargaining power
82 Holdup and Hiring Discrimination with Search Friction
for values of which firms are worse off by discriminating, due to discouraged skill investment
from discriminated group. All in all, the key difference between wage posting and wage
bargaining is that the actual wage now exogenously pegs on the productivity, and firms can
no longer manipulate their market power by translating their discriminatory preference into
constantly lower wages.
3.1.1 Relation to the literature
Job search process is an important channel through which discrimination keeps functioning
in the labor market. Several papers have highlighted the impact of discrimination through job
search channel to the wages gaps. To name a few, Pendakur and Woodcock (2010) show that
the existent glass ceilings for the immigrant and minority workers may be attributed by large
measure to their poor access to the jobs in high-wage firms; As well, in an important article
from Ritter and Taylor (2011), they show that most of the disparity in unemployment rate
could not be explained by cognitive skills that emerge at an early stage, although for wage
gap it could be the case. This result concerning the unemployment disparity is confirmed by
the finding that this disparity is still significant even for workers of similar skill levels.
Our work is most closely related to the directed search literature1. In this literature,
search frictions are derived endogenously through agents’ sequential strategic interactions.
Taking into account strategic interaction allows search externality to be internalized. The
resulting economy remains competitive, albeit with a non-Walrasian market structure, and
prices play an allocative role to achieve efficiency. To the best of our knowledge, among the
discrimination literature with search friction, only two of them are built upon wage posting
context. Lang, Manove, and Dickens (2005, hereafter LMD) show that a discriminatory
hiring rule could lead to labor market segmentation and significant wage gap with even
a negligible difference in productivity; however, the discriminated group turn out to have
lower unemployment rate, which is in sharp contrast with evidence. Merlino (2012) aims at
improving the result of LMD (2005). He considers further the pre-matching investment from
the firms’ side, and obtain technology dispersion and realistic unemployment gap. His results
rely on the strong assumption that there is more discrimination in the high technology sector,
and he is silent on the workers’ skill levels. Our paper differs from theirs, in that our focus is
to analyze how hiring discrimination could distort workers’ skill investment incentives and
the structure of market segmentation.
1This literature is sometimes also termed as wage posting game with coordination friction.
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While the setup of wage bargaining (no information of level of wage before matching)
is more prevalent, it neglects an important trade-off that the workers make to some extent
in their search for jobs: the wage and the probability of obtaining it. This endogenous link
between wage and employment probability is especially important, since wages convey
information on whether the employers discriminate. Having information of wages available
before matching, workers are able to adjust accordingly their search strategy to avoid being
discriminated. Workers apply to certain wage only when their expected payoff (wage times
the employment probability) from this application attains certain level, and a high wage
which attracts also the favored group discretely lowers the probability of employment for
the discriminated group to such an extent that the expected payoff for the latter at these high
wage firms does not meet the expected market payoff. This setup is supported by Lang and
Lehmann (2012) and Heckman (1998), who mention that workers do not apply randomly
and they actually avoid prejudiced employers to some extent, which implies between-group
search externality is taken into account by the discriminated workers. Moreover, it is well
known that within-group search externality may be prevalent when wages are bargained;
while in wage posting context, we are able to abstract from search externality and focus
on discrimination. Hall and Krueger (2010) use U.S. data to show that fraction of posted
and bargained wages are both around one third. They also document a negative relationship
between the education level and precise information concerning the expected pay. Brenzel,
Gartner and Shnabel (2013) focus on the employer’s side of the study in Germany, and
showed that around two thirds of the wages are posted, and the bargained wages are more
likely set for those with higher education and qualification. The message is that not only is
wage posting a prevalent wage determination process in the labor market, more importantly,
it is also dominant in the relatively low skilled sector.2 Within our context, employers can not
post wages contingent on workers’ group identity which is irrelevant to productivity, which
could be understood as due to the functioning of the equal opportunity legislation.
Literature addressing discrimination problem in random search context is vaster. However,
to have tractable such model convenient for linking to evidence, the introduced discrimi-
nation is usually taste-based, hence to obtain realistic outcome may often require making
compromise on assuming ex ante differences in parameters governing relevant characteristics.
Rosen (1997) is an exception and shows that discrimination can result even if there are no
differences across groups. Job opportunities arrive stochastically, minority workers choose
reservation productivities above which they accept the job; To avoid majority workers who
2It is consistent with our knowledge that the more skilled workers, whose number is comparatively small,
usually receive more attention and protections.
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are always preferred, they choose to accept jobs even with low reservation wages. Although
private information is the key element in Rosen (1997)’s model, search externality remains
the main channel for the functioning of the discrimination mechanism. Our focus is on
how the ranking order of firms contributes to strategic interdependence in workers’ skill
investment decisions, and search externality is internalized when search is directed.
There is also the important statistical discrimination literature3 which emphasizes the
role of asymmetric information on qualities related to the productivity. One strand of this
literature derives group inequalities endogenously even in the absence of ex ante group
difference on relevant characteristics. Their mechanism is that decision makers’ asymmetric
beliefs on relevant characteristics of members for different groups could subsequently dim
unfavored agents’ incentive on investment on payoff-relevant technology, which in turn
justifies the firms initial beliefs. Our context is different from this literature mainly in the
point that, instead of relying on the information friction which plays central role in generating
the pessimistic outcome, we work through a sequential game where agents could correctly
anticipate the pessimistic outcomes, hence choose to react accordingly in a rational way.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes the case without discrimination.
We then move to the economy with discrimination in Section 3. In section 4, we consider the
case of wage bargaining. Section 5 discusses, and then we conclude.
3.2 The model without discrimination
We start with a context without hiring discrimination. Consider an economy populated by
two kinds of agents, the workers and the firms. The number of workers is N,4 with the index
i ∈ {1,2, ...,N}, and the number of firms is M, with the index j ∈ {1,2, ...,M}. Define the
market tightness as β ≡ NM .
We introduce a pre-matching investment stage in a standard wage posting game. Each
job seeker makes a skill investment decision before entering into the labor market. This skill
choice is assumed to be binary, such that if the worker decides to become highly skilled, an
investment cost EH is paid, and otherwise EL, with EH > EL. A highly skilled job seeker who
pays EH is capable of producing yH ; while a low skilled could only deliver yL. It would be
3We refer readers to the survey from Fang & Moro (2010).
4As noted by Lang, Manove, and Dickens (2005), the number N could be regarded as the expected number
of entrants (job seekers) from the firms’ perspective.
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useful to understand the formulation in the following way: workers who enter labor market
after a longer period of training at school expect to receive higher expected income compared
to those who spend a shorter period in schooling and enter the market at an earlier stage; the
opportunity cost for the former is EH , and for the latter is EL. We assume that workers’ skill
level is public information. The costs {EL,EH} and productivities {yL,yH} are exogenous,
but should satisfy some conditions which will be specified later.
Firms are ex ante identical. Having observed the distribution of skill attainment of job
seekers, they post wages conditional on skills. If firms choose to attract a high skilled
worker, they post wH , and the surplus after matching is yH −wH ; in case a low-skilled
worker is searched for, wL is announced and the surplus is yL−wL. We emphasize that skill
is a characteristic of workers which the wage contracts can be conditioned on; this is in
sharp contrast to other qualities such as gender, race, height etc. which, under equal pay
legislation, should not be conditioned on; so when firms distinguish workers according to
these latter qualities, the wage contract becomes “incomplete”;5 by this, we will say that
firms discriminate.
The timing follows that of a standard wage posting game, augmented with a pre-matching
skill investment stage (Stage 0):
Stage 0: Workers choose skill level, and pay either EH or EL.
Stage 1: Firms observe skills of job seekers, and announce the wage (wL,wH).
Stage 2: Workers observe the wages offers, and choose which wage to apply to.
Stage 3: Firms select workers from the received applications, and they select workers
with same skill levels with equal probability. Then the production is carried on, and payoffs
are realized.
We will focus on subgame perfect equilibria. Firms choose wages to maximize profits,
and workers choose firstly the skill level and then which wage to apply to, in order to
maximize the expected payoff from search.
5Incompleteness of contract is the source of inefficiency for the holdup problem. See Acemoglu and Shimer
(1999) for related literature.
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3.2.1 Specification of the strategies, matching probabilities, and payoff
functions.
To write agents’ payoffs, it is a routine procedure in the directed search literature to first derive
the matching functions. This section provides a quick summary for the general understanding
of the context.
Define a type-t job seeker i’s strategy as a vector of probabilities Θit =
(
θ i1t , ...,θ iMt
)
,
where θ i jt is the probability with which the type-t worker i applies to firm j, and t ∈ {L,H}.
It holds that ∑ j θ
i j
t = 1 for any i and t. As in the literature, it is convenient6 to proceed with
a transformation of variable. We define q, as expected number of applications received per
firm; it is also called the expected queue length.
Denote q j as the queue length of firm j, and q jt as the queue length of the type-t workers
in firm j. If a firm attracts both high and low skilled, we have q j = q jL+q
j
H , where q
j
L and
q jH are the queue length of the corresponding workers in firm j. Since we only consider
symmetric equilibria, for a given firm j, θ i jt has the same value for any type t job seeker, so
we denote θ i jL = θ
j
L and θ
i j
H = θ
j
H for any j. By definition, q
j
t is the number of workers of
type t in firm j times their application probability: q jH = NH ×θ jH , and q jL = NL×θ jL for any
j, where NL and NH are the total number of low skilled and high skilled workers respectively.
Firms. A particular firm j matches with a worker if after the search stage at least one
worker appears, which happens with probability 1−
(
1−θ jt
)Nt
. The probability that no
job seeker sends application to this firm is
(
1−θ jt
)Nt
, and 1−
(
1−θ jt
)Nt
is the probability
of receiving at least one application from type t workers. According to the aboved defined
relationship q jt =Ntθ
j
t , the probability
(
1−
(
1−θ jt
)Nt)
, goes to
(
1− e−q jt
)
when Nt →∞.
This probability is increasing in q, which means that the more the expected number of
applicants, the higher the probability that the firm could fill the vacancy. The firm chooses
wage to maximize their expected profit, which is the product of the probability of meeting
a worker of this type and the net surplus,
(
1− e−q jt
)
×
(
yt −w jt
)
, where yt ∈ {H,L}. In
the following we may occasionally suppress the superscript j whenever it does not raise
confusion.
6When the number of firms and workers are large, it is no longer convenient to operate with the workers’
application strategy θ ji , because it will tend to zero in the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium.
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As shown by Shi (2006), in case workers of both skill levels appear in the market, it is
optimal for firms to post both wL and wH to attract both skill types. Furthermore, firms rank
the high skilled in priority to the low skilled, that is, firms will only consider hiring the low
skilled workers when they did not receive any application from high skilled workers, an event
which happens with probability e−qH . Then the expected profit (from attracting both types of
workers) is
(1− e−qH )× (yH −wH)+ e−qH (1− e−qL)× (yL−wL)
Job seekers. Job seekers observe all the wages w announced by firms, and choose which
wage to apply to. Consider a particular job seeker. Conditional on visiting a particular
firm j, his probability of employment in that firm is
1−
(
1−θ jH
)NH
NHθ
j
H
if he is high skilled,
and
(
1−θ jH
)NH × 1−(1−θ jL)NL
NLθ
j
L
if low skilled (see Appendix for more details). And these
probabilities become 1−e
−q jH
q jH
and e−q
j
H 1−e−q
j
L
q jL
when N → ∞ and M → ∞. Notice that 1−e−qtqt
is decreasing in qt : the higher the expected number of applicants in this firm competing this
job with him, the lower the probability with which this job seeker will be employed. Also
notice that the employment probability of the low skilled workers is a product of e−qH and
1−e−qL
qL
, where the former governs the between-group competition effect, and 1−e
−qL
qL
governs
the within-group competition effect.
We remark that since q is a function of job seekers’ application strategy, it depends on w.
We now look more closely into their causal relationship. We should distinguish two terms:
(1) each job seeker’s expected payoff from application, and (2) her expected “market” payoff.
The expected payoff from application is the payoff that a worker receives when applying
to a certain firm, namely, a product of the wage and the probability of obtaining it at that
firm, namely, 1−e
−qH
qH
×wH for the high skilled, and e−qH 1−e−qLqL ×wL for the low skilled. The
expected market payoff, denoted by Ut , is the maximum level of the expected payoff from
application in the equilibrium. Ut is regarded as an aggregate variable, which is assumed
to be invariant with respect to any variation of an individual agent’s strategy. Consider a
particular type H job seeker. He is willing to send application to a particular firm j, if and
only if his expected payoff 1−e
−q jH
q jH
×w jH from doing so is equal or greater than the expected
market payoff UH . By the definition that UH is the maximum level attainable, we have
q jH

> 0 if 1−e
−q jH
q jH
×w jH =UH
= 0 if 1−e
−q jH
q jH
×w jH <UH
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Job seekers make trade-off between the wage and the probability obtaining it. To highlight
the dependence of qt on wt , we could rewrite the above expressions as
q jH
> 0 if w
j
H >UH
= 0 if w jH ≤UH
Indeed, the employment probability 1−e
−qH
qH
is a number which belongs to the interval
(0,1); if the wage is too low such that w jH ≤UH , it will attract no workers, qH is zero; if
w jH >UH , there is always a positive value qH which satisfies
1−e−q
j
H
q jH
×w jH =UH .
We now formalize the notion of equilibrium and will proceed in two steps. In the first,
we state the notion of equilibrium for the wage posting subgame given a skill distribution
of workers. In the second, we distinguish two notions on how workers optimally choose
their skill level. For the wage posting subgame, the solution concept will be standard
subgame-perfect competitive equilibrium (SPCE) similar to LMD (2005). As emphasized by
LMD (2005), it is ’a simplification of standard subgame-perfection in which the aggregate
variables are assumed constant with respect to the changes in the strategy of an individual
agent.’ Given the fraction of α ∈ [0,1] of high skilled workers, an equilibrium, symmetric
among workers, consists of the expected market payoffs (UH , UL), each firms’ strategy (w∗H ,
w∗L), and workers’ strategies (q∗H , q∗L), that satisfy the following requirements: (i) each firm’s
posted wage (w∗H , w∗L) is a best response to the other firms’ strategy and to the workers’
strategies (q∗H , q∗L), on the assumption that the market expected payoff (UH (w), UL (w))7
remains fixed at UH (w∗) and UL (w∗), and is invariant to the firm’s own wage; and (ii) q∗t (w)
with t ∈ {L,H} is a best response of each worker to any wage vector w, and to the choice of
q∗t (w) by all other workers.
Now we turn to workers’ skill decision which determines the value of α . Workers choose
to be high skilled whenever UH −EH >UL−EL, then the fraction of high skilled workers
is such that α = 1. Workers choose to be low skilled whenever UH −EH <UL−EL, then
the fraction of high skilled workers is such that α = 0. Workers are indifferent between
high and low skill when UH −EH =UL−EL. In the case with indifference, we should make
distinctions on two notions specified as follows:
• Notion 1 (perfect correlation): Whenever indifferent, all workers (within a group)
choose either high or low skilled.
7“w” denotes the wage vector of all the firms.
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• Notion 2 (no perfect correlation): Whenever indifferent, α represents individual
worker’s probability of choosing to be high skilled.
Under Notion 1, all workers in one group, whenever indifferent between two alternatives (L
or H), will randomize towards the same direction: that is to say, we consider the group of
workers as a whole, or there is perfect correlation on their skill choices; as a result, α does
not represent an individual’s probability of choosing high skilled and takes either the value 0
or 1, α ∈ {0,1}. Under Notion 2, each worker can randomize between high and low skill
whenever they are indifferent; since each worker can end up either high or low skilled, after
this randomization, high and low skilled workers can be present at the same time, in contrast
to Notion 1; The equilibrium value of α , denoted by α∗, will be endogenously determined
by the indifference equation, in which case α∗ ∈ (0,1).
In the following analysis in this section without discrimination, we will derive equilibrium
under both notions because technically Notion 1 could be regarded as a subproblem of Notion
2. However, we will focus exclusively on the study under Notion 1 when we turn to the
section with discrimination. By doing so, we are able to abstract from some equilibrium
which only arises under theoretical rigor but at the same time yields insights to a limited
extent and induces unnecessary complexity in analysis.
Solution of the wage posting subgame. According to Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001), the
definition of equilibrium is equivalent to a problem where firms choose wages to maximize
their expected profit, taking into account the best responses of other firms as well as of the
job seekers. As we consider a large economy, in which a single firm’s deviation does not
alter the expected market payoff Ut , the market payoff can be taken as given in the stage
where a firm maximizes its profit, and will later be determined endogenously. Thus, we
consider the optimization problem in which a (deviating) firm j chooses wt with t ∈ {L,H}
to maximize its expected profit, taking expected market payoff Ut (other firms’ responses)
and the functional relationship between wt and qt (job seekers’ responses) as given. When
the firm attracts a single skill type, the equilibrium can be solved by8
maxwt (1− e−qt )× (yt −wt)
s.to 1−e
−qt
qt
×wt =Ut
for t ∈ {L,H}. For a given Ut , solving wt from the constraint, substituting it into the objective
function, and maximizing with respect to qt , we can obtain an optimal functional relationship
8The program could also be understood as a deviating firm’s profit maximization, taking all the other firms’
best response as given. The other firms’ best response is w∗t , which satisfies 1−e
−q∗t
q∗t
w∗t =Ut .
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between q∗t and Ut . Using this obtained relationship, with the help of the constraint, we
then achieve an optimal functional relationship between w∗t and q∗t . And since in symmetric
equilibrium all firms will post the same wages, so that all workers will apply to each firm with
equal probability, by definition of q we have q jH = q
∗
H =
N
M = β and q
j
L = q
∗
L =
N
M = β , when
either all workers are high skilled or all workers are low skilled. This program is applicable
under both Notion 1 and relevant situations of Notion 2. Under Notion 2, in addition, when
workers are indifferent, both skills can be present at the same time, then firms attract both
skill types as in Shi (2006), the problem is
maxwH ,wL (1− e−qH )× (yH −wH)+ e−qL (1− e−qH )× (yL−wL)
s.to 1−e
−qH
qH
×wH =UH
e−qH 1−e
−qL
qL
×wL =UL
Solving the program, we could obtain UH = e−q
∗
H (yH − yL)+ e−q∗H−q∗LyL, while UL =
e−q∗H−q∗LyL; at the equilibrium, we have q∗H =
NH
M , qL =
NL
M and q
∗
H + q
∗
L = β . At last, it is
important to remark that qt depends on wt continuously, as remarked by Shi (2002). In this
way, a marginal change of wage wt can only lead to a marginal modification on the expected
number of applicants qt . By the definition of q, under Notion 2, we have q∗H (α) =
NH
M = αβ ,
and q∗L (α) =
NL
M = (1−α)β . Once the skill investment choice pins down the value of α∗,
we obtain q∗H = α∗β , and q∗L = (1−α∗)β . In the next section, we establish the decentralized
market equilibrium and examine its properties. It is convenient to start with Notion 2.
Decentralized Market Equilibrium without discrimination under Notion 2
Firms’ wage offers are conditioned on job seekers’ skill levels, so we first consider the skill
investment decision of job seekers at first stage. Denote α as the fraction of the job seekers
who choose to invest in high skill, so the remaining fraction (1−α) is low skilled. Under
Notion 2, α is also the probability with which a job seeker chooses to invest in high skill, by
virtue of the Law of Large Number. Let α∗ denote the equilibrium fraction of high skilled
job seekers on the total population. There are three cases:
Case (1). α∗ = 1. All job seekers invest in high skill.
Case (2). α∗ ∈ (0,1). Some invest in high skill, while the remaining in low skill.
Case (3). α∗ = 0. All invest in low skill.
With Case (1) and Case (3), there exists only one skill level in the market, and since
skills can be conditioned on wages, there is only one wage posted in equilibrium. However,
the market with Case (2) features two skill levels. Shi (2006) establishes that in this case it
is optimal for firms to attract both skill types, while ranking the high skilled in priority to
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the low skilled. We now show that the rivalry between the market competition (captured by
market tightness β ) and the magnitude of the return to skill ratio yH−yLEH−EL are crucial in the
determination of which of the above three cases may prevail.
Proposition 1. (return to skills) Given the return to skill ratio yH−yLEH−EL , define βˆ as
yH−yL
EH−EL = e
βˆ .
(i) when 0 < β ≤ βˆ , the unique equilibrium is such that all job seekers choose high skill,
i.e. α∗ = 1.
(ii) when β > βˆ , the equilibrium consists of a unique value α∗ ∈ (0,1) which satisfies
yH−yL
EH−EL = e
α∗β .
(iii) when yH−yLEH−EL ≤ 1 such that
yH−yL
EH−EL = e
βˆ has no positive solution on βˆ , the unique
equilibrium is α∗ = 0.
Proof. In the appendix.
When the value of return to skill yH−yLEH−EL is sufficiently large compared to e
β , which
measures the intensity of competition of the market, job seekers find it a dominant strategy
to invest in high skills; There is no incentive for them to deviate, and the output is highest
among all the equilibria. When the value of yH−yLEH−EL is moderate, there exists an equilibrium
where job seekers are indifferent from being high skilled or low skills; all firms find it optimal
to attract both skill types; the output is lower compared to the previous equilibrium. At last,
when the value of return to skill is sufficiently low, it does not provide them incentive to sink
this fixed cost against the risky job search game they are going to play; the equilibrium level
of output turns out to be the lowest.
Decentralized Market Equilibrium without discrimination under Notion 1
Under Notion 1, there is only one skill type present in the market. When firms attract a single
skill type, they solve
maxwt (1− e−qt )× (yt −wt)
s.to 1−e
−qt
qt
×wt =Ut
In equilibrium, for the high skilled we have: UH = e−q
∗
H yH , w∗H =
e−q
∗
H q∗H
1−e−q∗H yH , where
q∗H = β ; and for the low skilled: UL = e−q
∗
LyL, w∗L =
e−q
∗
L q∗L
1−e−q∗L yL, where q
∗
L = β . So that we
have
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α =

1 when e−β yH −EH > e−β yL−EL
0 or 1 when e−β yH −EH = e−β yL−EL
0 when e−β yH −EH < e−β yL−EL
It turns out that the threshold which makes workers indifferent is the same as βˆ established
under Notion 2.
3.2.2 Constrained efficient allocations
The objective of this section is to find the efficient allocations in the centralized market, and
evaluate whether the decentralized market attains its efficiency. The social planner maximizes
the aggregate output, subject to the same matching friction as in the decentralized equilibrium.
More precisely, the social planner chooses the fraction of workers to be high-skilled, divides
firms into different groups to attract distinct compositions of workers, and assigns workers to
match with a certain group of firms. With the same matching friction as before, the social
planner is restricted to treat workers of the same skill level in the same way, and assures that
workers of the same skill type must match with firms from the same group with the same
probability.
We use the superscript “p” to label the equilibrium allocation chosen by the planner. Let
α be the fraction of high skilled workers the social planner chooses, α ∈ [0,1]. If the optimal
arrangement is α p = 1, all job seekers are high skilled, and only one type of firms exists -
those which attract high skilled workers. It is similar for α p = 0. If α p ∈ (0,1), there are
both high and low skilled job seekers and it is optimal for the planner to assign all firms to
post wages for both the high and low skilled (shown in Shi (2006)). Furthermore, in the last
case the planner can also manage the priority of firms’ hiring workers with different skills
- whether to prefer high skilled to low skilled or otherwise. Let R be the probability with
which the firms rank high skilled workers in priority to the low skilled. And qt is the expected
number of applicants in a firm, t ∈ {L,H}, which governs how the planner assigns workers’
applications. Thus, the social planner’s problem is to maximize the following aggregate
output
M×
[
(1− e−qH )(R× (1− e−qL)+ e−qL)yH
+(1− e−qL)((1−R)(1− e−qH )+ e−qH )yL
]
−N× (αEH +(1−α)EL)
If at least one high skilled visits a certain firm, with probability (1− e−qH ), the firm hires
this high skilled, either with probability 1 when no low skilled worker shows up, which
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happens with probability e−qL , or with probability R if there is at least one low skilled who
shows up at the same firm, which occurs with probability (1− e−qL); it is similar for the case
with low productivity. Since the firms and workers of the same skill are all identical from the
planner’s perspective, we have qH = αβ and qL = (1−α)β . The above objective includes
all cases with different values of α . Solving the problem, we can see that the optimal ranking
is that firms always prefer high skilled workers, i.e., Rp = 1, and we have the following
proposition
Proposition 2. The equilibrium labor allocation and skill investment choice are socially
optimal.
Proof. In the Appendix.
In the proof, we could also verify that the threshold βˆ p for skill investment coincides
with βˆ in the decentralized economy. That is, when 0 < β ≤ βˆ = log yH−yLEH−EL , it is socially
optimal that workers all invest in high skill; when β > βˆ , it is socially optimal that a fraction
α∗ of workers invest in high, while the rest invest in low skill; and yH−yLEH−EL ≤ 1 such that βˆ
has no positive real solution, all invest in low skill. In the rest of the paper, we mainly focus
on the first case, so that whenever workers are discouraged to underinvest, it is due to the
effect of discrimination.
3.3 The model with hiring discrimination
We now introduce discrimination. Consider an economy where workers can be partitioned
into two groups, group a and group b, according to certain trait which is irrelevant to
productivity. Gender, for example, is such one possible binary partition of labor force.
Denote the fraction of group a as γ , and the fraction of group b as 1− γ . The two group
of workers are ex ante identical in all other aspects. Discrimination modifies the matching
functions of agents. Specifically, in order to formulate discrimination, we introduce a term x
called hiring (ranking) rule specified by firms. To be precise, x could be understood as the
probability with which the group a workers are selected when workers from both groups are
present. The probability that a group a worker is employed by this firm is
Fa (qa,qb,x) =
1− e−qa
qa
× [x(1− e−qb)+ e−qb]
Analogously, the probability that a group b worker is employed by this firm is
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Fb (qa,qb,x) =
1− e−qb
qb
× [(1− x)(1− e−qa)+ e−qa]
To understand these expressions, we have to notice that now when job seekers are
considering their probability of being hired, they have to take into account of the impact from
the competition with the other group. The parts 1−e
−qa
qa
and 1−e
−qb
qb
capture the within group
competition, while the remaining parts with x capture the between group competition.
When x = 1, firms hire group b workers only when none of the group a is present. Firms’
preference is such that group a are preferred to group b, although both groups have identical
productivity. This is what we call hiring discrimination. The employment probability for
group a and group b workers become respectively,
Fa (qa,qb,1) = 1−e
−qa
qa
Fb (qa,qb,1) = 1−e
−qb
qb
× [e−qa ]
Another interesting example is x = 12 . The employment probability for group a and group
b workers becomes respectively
Fa
(
qa,qb,
1
2
)
=
1− e−qa
qa
×
[
1
2
× (1− e−qb)+ e−qb]
Fb
(
qa,qb,
1
2
)
=
1− e−qb
qb
×
[
1
2
× (1− e−qa)+ e−qa]
When qa = qb, we have Fa
(
qa,qb, 12
)
= Fb
(
qa,qb, 12
)
, both workers have identical em-
ployment probability, and it is as if there is no discrimination among workers. Furthermore,
we have Fa (qa,qb,1)≥ Fa
(
qa,qb, 12
)
for any positive value of (qa,qb). Then the employment
probability of workers from the preferred group (group a) is higher under discrimination
than that in the case without discrimination. Similarly, when Fb (qa,qb,1)≤ Fb
(
qa,qb, 12
)
for
any positive values of (qa,qb), i.e. the employment probability of the discriminated group
(group b) is lower when there is hiring discrimination. In fact, the employment probability of
group a (group b) is increasing (decreasing) in x.Thus, for a given positive pair of (qa,qb),
there exists xˆ ∈ (0,1) such that Fa (qa,qb, xˆ) = Fb (qa,qb, xˆ), and xˆ could be considered as the
hiring rule without discrimination. Indeed x measures the intensity of firms’ discriminatory
preference. Given qa and qb, for x ∈ [0, xˆ), firms discriminate group a, and for x ∈ (xˆ,1] firms
discriminate against group b. The closer x approaches to the extremes of the interval [0,1],
the more intensive the hiring discrimination is. In the rest of paper, we focus on the case
x = 1 such that group a achieve absolute priority to group b.
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3.3.1 The case of strong discrimination: x = 1
Formally, we introduce two assumptions as in Merlino (2012). These assumptions help
introduce some heterogeneity which is not related to productivity among the labor pool.
Assumption 1: Firms are not allowed to post wages which are dependent on the group
identity.
Assumption 2: Firms prefer group a in the sense that firms only hire workers from group
b when no group a workers are present, i.e. x = 1.
Same as the case without discrimination, workers visit a firm only when they can ob-
tain the expect market payoff from applying to that firm. We denote in this section the
expected market payoff of high skilled job seekers from group a and group b as UaH and UbH
respectively. The above assumptions imply
UaH = FaH (qaH ,qbH)×wH = 1−e−qaHqaH ×wH
UbH = FbH (qaH ,qbH)×wH = 1−e−qbHqbH e−qaH ×wH
For β ≤ βˆ , all workers choose to be high-skilled if there were no discrimination. To
analyze how does discrimination have impact on workers’ expected payoff from search hence
the skill investment incentives, it is important to first study the wage posting subgame with
discrimination given a skill distribution. Without loss of generality, we start with the case
where both groups choose to be high skilled. In the next section, we review the results from
LMD (2005), where they study the case with discrimination but no difference in workers’
skill levels (or productivity).
3.3.2 Existing results revisited and reinterpreted
In a context where there are two groups of workers with identical productivity (skill level)
and firms strongly prefer group a to group b. LMD (2005) show that any subgame-perfect
competitive equilibrium (SPCE) is separating.
Separating equilibrium. LMD (2005) show that there is no wage to which both groups of
job seekers apply. More precisely, no wage can maximize firms’ profit while attracting both
groups of workers simultaneously (with the expected payoff from application attaining the
corresponding market payoff). The equilibrium is separating. That is, there are some firms
posting a higher level of wage attracting only the preferred group a, whereas the rest of firms
offering a lower wage which is applied only by the discriminated group b (see Proposition 2
in LMD (2005)). Notice that the discriminated group have always the choice of applying
to the high wage firms, however, they choose not to do so at all, because they anticipate
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discrimination in these firms. The most essential results of LMD (2005) are summarized as
follows:
(i) At the firms attracting group a workers, expected profit for the firms and the expected
payoff for the workers in the equilibrium are
πSaH =
(
1− e−qSaH −qSaHe−q
S
aH
)
× yH
USaH = e
−qSaH × yH
wSaH =
qSaHe
−qSaH
1−e−qSaH
× yH
ii) At the firms attracting group b workers, expected profit for the firms and the expected
payoff for the workers in the equilibrium are
πSbH =
(
1− e−qSbH
)(
1− e−qSaH
)
× yH ,
wSbH =U
S
aH
USbH =
1−e−qSbH
qSbH
wSbH
Separating equilibrium requires that firms be indifferent between attracting group a and
group b workers, that is
πSaH = π
S
bH
which helps to determine qSbH and q
S
aH jointly.
(iii) Furthermore, we have wSaH > w
S
bH . q
S
aH > β > q
S
bH , both q
S
aH and q
S
bH are increasing
in β and γ , and both qSaH and q
S
bH are independent of yH .
We make some important remarks on the features of the separating equilibrium. Firstly,
the resulted equilibrium allocations are incentive compatible. For any particular bH job
seeker, by deviating to applying for wSaH , the best they can get is e
−qSaH ×wSaH (when none
of the group a shows up in the firm which this bH worker deviates to apply to). However,
this deviating payoff is strictly lower than sticking to applying to wSbH owing to the following
relationship:
e−qSaH ×wSaH = e−q
S
aH × qSa×e−q
S
a
1−e−qSa × yH =
qSa×e−q
S
a
1−e−qSa ×U
S
aH
= e−qSbHUSaH = e
−qSbH wSbH <
1−e−qSbH
qSbH
wSbH =U
S
bH
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. As for any particular aH job seeker, by deviating to wSbH , the best they can get is w
S
bH =U
S
aH ,
which is as good as what he could get if he does not deviate. Secondly, we do not have the
reservation wage structure. A reservation wage structure requires that workers apply to any
wage which gives them an expected payoff higher than certain reservation value, in our case
it would imply group bH should apply to both the low and high wages, however, it is not
the case. This is because the expected payoff from applying to the high wage is a strictly
dominated strategy for group b: the expected payoff from applying to high wages is too low
to match their expected market payoff USbH . Following are several noteworthy properties of
such an equilibrium.
Results from LMD (2005): Compared to the context without discrimination, (1) Both
groups have lower expected payoff. (2) All firms earn higher profits. (3) The expected payoff
of group a and group b are such that USaH >U
S
bH .
Group b workers are worse off, because of firms’ discriminatory hiring norm. Anticipating
discrimination, group b demand lower expected payoff, which makes them cheaper to be
employed. This in turn increases firms’ market power in hiring group a. Group a understand
that if they demand high wages, firms will threat to switch to hiring group b workers instead.
Hence group a workers demand also low wages, and are worse off too. Now more about
firms. Apart from the mechanisms just described, firms are able to earn high profits because
in the regime with discrimination market is segmented, which allows the firms to face
less competition in each segment. As a general remark, discrimination enables firms to
extract higher profit by holding up job seekers’ skill investment and providing all the job
seekers lower expected payoff. Furthermore, since USaH >U
S
bH , it suggests that the group b
job seekers, being discriminated, are hurt to a larger extent. So that group b’ incentive of
skill investment is distorted further downwards. We enter more detailed discussions in the
following section.
3.3.3 Analysis under our context
In the last section, we interpreted the equilibrium of the wage posting subgame given that
all workers choose to be high skilled. In this section, we study how discrimination leads to
different incentives of skill investment for these two groups respectively, and attempt to find
the corresponding equilibrium.
An important observation is that the skill decision for group a and group b is strategic, and
this is a direct consequence of the coexistence of ranking through the productivity-dependent
(skill) and -independent traits (discrimination). Ranking by skills requires that the high
skilled workers have the priority; While ranking by productivity-independent traits means
that group a have the priority. Although multidimensional characteristics are involved, these
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two ranking schedules yield a unique market hierarchy:
aH ≻ bH ≻ aL≻ bL
. It reads as follows: high skilled group a (aH) are preferred to high skilled group b (bH), who
are preferred to low skilled group a (aL), who are then preferred to low skilled group b (bL).
How does the strategic interdependence arise? Take group a as an example for explanation.
Although they are always ranked prior to group b due to discrimination, whenever they
contemplate to lower skill investment, they understand that they will be ranked behind the
high skilled group b; then the term e−qbH which captures the competition from bH will appear
in their payoffs.
Given the strategic interdependence in payoffs from skill investment, we adopt Nash
equilibrium as the solution concept for the skill investment game. We proceed under Notion
1, and regard a whole group as making decision collectively and simultaneously, then all the
workers in one group either end up high or low skilled. And we will focus on pure strategy of
each group. Let αg be the probability of group g’s choosing to be high skilled, for g = a or b.
We have either αg = 1 or αg = 0. We have the following four possibilities as equilibrium:
• (P1) αa = 1 and αb = 1: group a - high, group b - high
• (P2) αa = 1 and αb = 0: group a - high, group b - low
• (P3) αa = 0 and αb = 1: group a - low, group b - high
• (P4) αa = 0 and αb = 0: group a - low, group b - low
To decide the skill investment, workers take into account firms’ best response in the wage
posting stage to infer the expected payoff from application, and compare the payoffs net of
the cost of skill investment. In the wage posting subgame, when facing all workers with
identical skill level (as in case (P1) and (P4)), firms’ optimal strategy is the same as stated
in LMD (2005); that is, some firms post a higher wage which is only applied by group a,
whereas the rest post a lower wage which is only applied by group b. When there are both
low and high skilled workers (as in case (P2) and (P3)), firms post wages conditional on
skill level, and it is optimal for firms to attract both skill levels and rank the high skilled in
priority to low skilled, as in Shi (2006). We then proceed to find workers’ best response in
the skill investment stage, and in turn the equilibrium in this discriminatory context with
skill investment. We will use P1, P2, P3, P4 as the superscript for corresponding equilibrium
allocations. When αa = 1 and αb = 1, workers are composed of type aH and bH. Firms post
wages separately. We have the following payoffs for aH and bH respectively,
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UP1aH = e
−qP1aH yH −EH
and
UP1bH =
1−e−qP1bH
qP1bH
e−qP1aH yH −EH
where we recall that qSaH = q
P1
bH < β < q
P1
aH = q
S
bH .
When αa = 1 and αb = 0, workers are composed of type aH and bL. Firms post wages
conditional on skills, attract both types at the same time, and rank the high skilled in priority
to the low skilled. As for the payoffs, we have
UP2aH = e
−qP2aH (yH − yL)+ e−qP2aH−qP2bL yL−EH
and
UP2bL = e
−qP2aH−qP2bL yL−EL
where qP2aH = γβ , qP2bL = (1− γ)β , and qP2aH +qP2bL = β .
When αa = 0 and αb = 1, workers are composed of different skill levels, aL and bH, we
have similarly
UP3aL = e
−qP3aL−qP3bH yL−EL
and
UP3bH = e
−qP3bH (yH − yL)+ e−qP3aL−qP3bH yL−EH
where qP3aL = γβ , q
P3
bH = (1− γ)β , and qP3aL +qP3bH = β .
When αa = 0 and αb = 0, workers are composed of type aL and bL. Both are of same
skill level, firms will discriminate and post wages as in LMD (2005), and workers’ payoffs
are
UP4aL = e
−qP4aL yL−EH
and
UP4bL =
1−e−qP4bL
qP4bL
e−qP4aL yL−EL
Since the solution of q in LMD (2005) is independent of yH and yL, we have qP1bH = q
P4
bL <
β < qP4aL = qP1bH . The payoff matrix is as follows
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bH bL
aH
bH: 1−e
−qP1bH
qP1bH
e−qP1aH yH −EH
aH: e−qP1aH yH −EH
bL: e−q
P2
aH−qP2bL yL−EL
aH: e−qP2aH (yH − yL)+ e−qP2aH−qP2bL yL−EH
aL
bH: e−q
P3
bH (yH − yL)+ e−qP3aL−qP3bH yL−EH
aL: e−q
P3
aL−qP3bH yL−EL
bL: 1−e
−qP4bL
qP4bL
e−qP4aL yL−EL
aL: e−qP4aL yL−EH
A pure-strategy Nash equilibrium on skill investment consists of a profile of actions
with the property that no single group as a whole can achieve a higher payoff by unilateral
deviation. The equilibrium depends on the value of β . For example, holding group a high
skilled, when we decide whether group b choose to be high or low skill, we must compare
UP1bH and U
P2
bL . And we find that there exists at least one threshold βˆ2 which is determined
by UP1bH =U
P2
bL and is such that βˆ2 < βˆ ; this implies that depending on different values of β ,
the group b may choose high or low skill, leading to potentially different equilibrium. For
tractability, we should introduce the following two conditions which guarantee that any such
threshold as βˆ2 is unique:9
Assumption 3.1 The equality e−q
P1
aH(βˆ1)yH −EH = e−βˆ1yL−EL admits a unique solution
βˆ1.
Assumption 3.2 The equality 1−e
−qP1bH(βˆ2)
qP1bH(βˆ2)
e−q
P1
aH(βˆ2)yH−EH = e−βˆ2yL−EL admits a unique
solution βˆ2.
The results on the equilibrium are summarized as follows:
Proposition 3. Under the above assumptions, there exist two thresholds βˆ2 and βˆ1 with
0 < βˆ2 < βˆ1 < βˆ , such that
(1) When 0 < β < βˆ2, there exists a unique equilibrium in which both group a and group
b invest in high skill, (aH,bH). At β = βˆ2, both (aH,bH) and (aH,bL) can be equilibrium.
(2) When βˆ2 < β < βˆ1, there exists a unique equilibrium in which group a invest in high
skill while group b in low skill, (aH,bL). At β = βˆ1, both (aL,bH) and (aH,bL) can be
equilibrium.
(3) When βˆ1 < β ≤ βˆ , there exist multiple equilibria. Either group a invest in high
skill and group b in low skill, or group a invest in low skill and group b invest in high skill,
(aL,bH) or (aH,bL).
Proof. In the Appendix.
9When yH is sufficiently large compared to yL, these two conditions are satisfied. Take βˆ1 for example. The
related assumption is satisfied when
e−q
P1
aH (β )
dqP1aH
dβ
e−β <
yH
yL
. Since qP1aH does not depend on yL and yH , there exists
always a pair of yL and yH such that this condition is satisfied.
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Fig. 3.1 Equilibrium depending on β
In fact, if one group choose to be low skilled, the best response of the other group is
always to be high skilled, while the best response to the other’s high skill choice depends on
the two thresholds. Furthermore, the rise of market tightness β makes workers have stronger
incentive to deviate from high skill, and group b is more prone to deviate compared to group
a, in the sense that the threshold of β at which group b begins to contemplate to invest in low
skill is lower compared to group a. Interestingly, for values of β close to βˆ , there exists an
equilibrium where the preferred group a choose low skill, while the discriminated group b
choose high skill. The results are summarized in Figure 3.1. We have the following results on
the comparison of workers’ expected payoff and firms’ profits compared to the case without
discrimination.
Corollary. Compared to the case without discrimination,
(1) In (aH,bH) equilibrium, firms always earn higher expected profits; In (aH,bL)
equilibrium and (aL,bH), firms earn lower expected profits.
(2) In (aH,bH) equilibrium, both aH and bH workers earn lower expected payoff; In
(aH,bL) equilibrium, group aH (group bL) earn higher (lower) expected payoff; in (aL,bH)
equilibrium, group bH (group aL) earn higher (lower) expected payoff.
Proof. In the Appendix.
This corollary tells that firms can be worse off with discrimination. Indeed, when
workers anticipate discrimination, their investment incentive may be downwards distorted,
and some group may end up choosing to underinvest. In equilibrium, whenever one group
underinvest and the other group remain high skilled, the firms turn out to earn lower expected
profits compared to the case without discrimination. This is simply due to the fact that
underinvestment in skills discretely drags down the average productivity of the economy.
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3.4 Comparison with fixed sharing rule (wage bargaining)
In this section, we shut down the channel through which firms use wages to influence workers’
choices on applications, and examine whether the inefficiency can be alleviated. Notice that
in this section, the workers only choose the amount of skills to obtain, not where to search.
Consider an economy with the same discriminatory ranking as previous, but the wage
is determined by ex post bargaining after a job seeker meets an employer. The timing of
the economy now is as follows: firstly, workers decide skill levels simultaneously; secondly,
workers and firms get matched according to the matching technology; thirdly, the matched
worker and firm bargain a la Nash to determine how to share the output y. The simplest form
of Nash bargaining widely used in literature is equivalent to a fixed sharing rule of output.
If we denote the bargaining power for all workers as ψ , then from the output yt , workers
receive ψyt , and firms receive (1−ψ)yt . We focus on the case where ψ is the same for both
skill levels, otherwise there is too much degree of freedom.
For the ease of comparison, we require that the matching technology here is the same as
in previous section. The hiring norm is as previous Group aH ≻ Group bH ≻ Group aL≻
Group bL. The corresponding employment probability for different types of workers is
inherited, so that the employment probability is respectively 1−e
−qaH
qaH
for aH, e−qaH 1−e
−qbH
qbH
for bH, e−qaH−qbH 1−e
−qaL
qaL
for aL, and e−qaH−qbH−qaL 1−e
−qbL
qbL
for bH. The expected payoff
(after skill investment) is just the employment probability times ψyt ; for example, we have
for aL people e−qaH−qbH 1−e
−qaL
qaL
×ψyL as the expected payoff from search.
Now, we specify the expected queue lengths qaH , qbH , qaL and qbL parametrically.
Recall the definition of queue length is nb. of workersnb. of vacancies , then we have qaH = γηaβ for
aH workers, qbH = (1− γ)ηbβ for bH workers, qaL = γ (1−ηa)β for aL workers, and
qbL = (1− γ)(1−ηb)β for bL workers, where ηa represents the fraction of high skilled
group a, and ηb the fraction of high skilled group b. The values of ηa and ηb depend on the
comparison between the expected payoff from investing in high or low skill:
ηa

= 1 if 1−e
−qaH
qaH
×ψyH −EH > e−qaH−qbH 1−e−qaLqaL ×ψyL−EL
= 0 if 1−e
−qaH
qaH
×ψyH −EH < e−qaH−qbH 1−e−qaLqaL ×ψyL−EL
∈ {0,1} if 1−e−qaHqaH ×ψyH −EH = e−qaH−qbH 1−e
−qaL
qaL
×ψyL−EL
and
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ηb

= 1 if e−qaH 1−e
−qbH
qbH
×ψyH −EH > e−qaH−qbH−qaL 1−e−qbLqbL ×ψyL−EL
= 0 if e−qaH 1−e
−qbH
qbH
×ψyH −EH < e−qaH−qbH−qaL 1−e−qbLqbL ×ψyL−EL
∈ {0,1} if e−qaH 1−e−qbHqbH ×ψyH −EH = e−qaH−qbH−qaL
1−e−qbL
qbL
×ψyL−EL
To keep consistency with the previous section (under Notion 1), we require that whenever
indifferent, the whole group will choose either high or low skill, so that η is either 0 or 1 in
that case. We will also assume that the group a are the majority: γ ≥ 12 .10
We focus on Nash equilibrium as the solution concept. In the current context, only
workers make skill investment decisions, firms do not post wages since ψ is exogenous. We
consider each group, i.e. group a or group b, as a whole when they are making decisions.
Each group of workers invest in skills simultaneously. Due to the discriminatory rule, the
payoffs from skill investment for different groups of workers are interdependent. This renders
the skill investment strategic. The following proposition helps explain how workers’ expected
payoffs vary with respect to ψ:
Proposition 4. Let γ ≥ 12 so that group a is the majority. There are four thresholds
ψˆaL,b ≤ ψˆbH,a < ψˆbL,a < ψˆaH,b, such that
(1) For ψ ∈ [0, ψˆaL,b), the unique pure strategy nash equilibrium is (aL,bL); for
ψ = ψˆaL,b, the equilibrium can be (aL,bL) or (aL,bH). (2) For ψ ∈
(
ψˆaL,b, ψˆbH,a
)
, the
unique pure strategy nash equilibrium is (aL,bH); (3) For ψ ∈ (ψˆbH,a, ψˆbL,a), there is
no pure strategy nash equilibrium; for ψ = ψˆbL,a, the equilibrium is (aH,bL); (4) For
ψ ∈ (ψˆbL,a, ψˆaH,b), the unique pure strategy nash equilibrium is (aH,bL); at the point
ψ = ψˆaH,b, the equilibrium can be (aH,bL) or (aH,bH). (5) For ψ ∈
(
ψˆaH,b,1
)
, the unique
pure strategy nash equilibrium is (aH,bH). (6) Define the threshold ψˆ of skill investment
without discrimination as ψˆyH 1−e
−β
β −EH = ψˆyL 1−e
−β
β −EL; then ψˆbL,a < ψˆ < ψˆaH,b.
Proof. In the Appendix.
It is not always true that the group a workers are always better off. Notably, there is an
equilibrium similar as before where group a underinvest: It could be observed from the payoff
matrix (provided in the proof of Proposition 4) that in the region ψ ∈ (ψˆaL,b, ψˆbH,a) group
a (group b) workers obtain lower (higher) expected payoff compared to the case without
10We think this case with γ ≥ 12 is more empirically relevant, when we are talking about gender and racial
discrimination for example. The case γ < 12 could be also analogously derived according to the proof of the
following proposition.
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discrimination. This is also closely related to the fact that when γ ≥ 12 the within-group
competition in group a is fiercer. In general, firms’ payoff is written as follows:
π =

(1− e−qaH−qbH )(1−ψ)yH if all high skilled
(1− e−qaH−qbH )(1−ψ)yH
+e−qaH−qbH (1− e−qaL−qbL)(1−ψ)yL
if both high and low skilled
(1− e−qaL−qbL)(1−ψ)yL if all low skilled
According to Proposition 4, we can determine the exact values of the queue lengths in
the expression. Firms’ profit will be piecewise monotone because although ψ increases
continuously, the skill composition hence the average productivity of the market improves
discretely with respect to this bargaining power. The fact that ψˆbL,a < ψˆ < ψˆaH,b suggests that
although firms can gather higher profits for ψ < ψˆ , they encounter loss for ψ ≥ ψˆ compared
to the case without discrimination. The reason is that strategic competition between the group
a and group b deters the discriminated group’s skill investment decision (in the sense that
group b may still choose to be low skilled when ψ is sufficiently high), which pulls down the
market’s average productivity and makes firms’ expected profit dim.
It is interesting to notice that our simple result that discrimination is costly for firms at
high skilled sector (when wages are bargained) questions the plausibility of key assumption
of Merlino (2012) that “there is more discrimination in the high technology sector”. Although
Merlino (2012) mentioned bunches of empirical evidence in support of this assumption11,
our simple result suggest that firms are simply better off not discriminating when wages
are principally bargained, since the loss in profit from discriminating in the high skilled
sector may surpass the gain from discriminating in the low skilled sector. All in all, the
key difference between wage posting and wage bargaining is that the ex post wage now
exogenously pegs on the productivity, and firms can no longer manipulate their market power
by translating their discriminatory preference into constantly lower wages.
3.5 Discussion
Free entry. LMD (2005) have shown that their economy under discrimination with workers’
identical in productivity can be generalized to take into account firms’ free entry. Specifically,
we consider a stage where firms sink capital after observing workers’ skills. Each firm
has different capital cost with C1 <C2 < ... < CM < yL. Then firms which earn expected
11See Merlino (2012) page 4 for more relevant reference.
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non-positive profits after the reduction of capital cost would simply not enter into the market.
In the paper, we observe that the equilibrium is unique with respect to β , which has a one-one
relationship with M - the number of firms in the market, so that the results in the paper could
carry through with free entry. All firms in the market expect positive net profits. When there
are different skill groups, this result could also carry through, because the equilibrium profit
of firms is still an increasing function of β .
Heterogeneity in skill investment cost. Some preliminary attempts from us suggest
that our context could be generalized to a situation where workers are heterogenous in their
skill investment cost (although more complicated): let the low skill investment cost be zero
(EL = 0) for all workers, and the high skill investment cost be, for simplicity, of two values
EH,1 < EH,2; there are still two levels of productivity: yL and yH . Focus on the corresponding
βˆ and define it as βˆ = log yH−yLEH,2−EL . If the contracts can be contingent on EH,1 and EH,2, the
submarkets for type EH,1 workers and type EH,2 workers are separated, and all the results in
the paper carry through for the workers of cost EH,2; as for the workers of cost EH,1, their
skill investment cost is lower, hence they have stronger incentive to remain high skilled; then
for values of β close to βˆ = log yH−yLEH,2−EL , some equilibrium which exists in the EH,2 submarket
may not exist in the EH,1 submarket. If the contracts can not be contingent on EH,1 and EH,2,
both type EH,1 and type EH,2 are in the same market and will compete; as a result, there may
exist a region of β where both high skilled group a and group b, as well as both low skilled
group a and group b, exist at the same time. The extent of the skill investment game is in turn
larger, because, for example, a particular group “a,EH,1”’s skill investment decision should
be a best response of other groups: “a,EH,2”, “b,EH,1”, and “b,EH,2”. If heterogeneity in
skill investment cost is managed, it is possible to extend the model to multiple skill levels.
Shi (2006) shows that in such a model with multiple skill levels free of discrimination, the
result that firms always rank the high skilled workers in priority to the workers with lower
skills can be generalized. The difficulty under the context with discrimination, as just stated,
is on the extent of the game.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we study a holdup problem where firms can use discriminatory hiring norms to
extract higher than socially optimal profits. We find that when firms rank workers according
to both productivity-dependent and productivity-independent characteristics, skill investment
becomes strategic between the discriminated and the favored group. In case wages are posted,
we suggest that depending on the market tightness there may be equilibrium or multiple
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equilibria on skill investment; in some equilibrium the discriminated group can obtain higher
expected payoff compared to the case without discrimination12 and firms can be worse
off. We also consider fixed sharing rule (bargained wage) and make a comparison. Similar
equilibrium, where favored group underinvest while the discriminated group remain high
skilled, exists; however, the discriminated group are in general worse off compared to the
case without discrimination in the sense that they may still choose to underinvest when ψ is
sufficiently high. Firms’ profits are piecewise monotone because the skill composition hence
the average productivity of the market improves discretely with respect to the bargaining
power, and profit loss may be incurred with discrimination within an intermediate range of
bargaining power.
3.7 Appendix
A1. Derivation of matching probabilities.
We now derive a job seeker’s matching probability and expected payoff.
Job seekers. Having observed all the wage w=
{
w1,w2, ...,wM
}
announced by the firms,
job seekers choose which firm (or wage) to visit (or to apply for). Consider a particular
job seeker i’s problem, where i ∈ {1,2, ...,N}. This job seeker thinks in the following way:
Suppose I visit firm j, then conditional on the fact that my application is sent to j, what
is the probability that I could be employed? It depends upon the number of the other job
seekers who also send their job application to the same firm competing with me on this job
in firm j. This number (of the other job seekers) is a random variable which has a realisation
from the set {0,1, ...,N−1} and has a Binomial distribution. To see why it is the case,
we use k to represent the realized number of competitors. If k = 0, which happens with
probability
(
1−θ j)N−1, then the job seeker i will be chosen by the firm with probability
1, because this job seeker is the only candidate. If k = 1, which happens with probability
(N−1)×(θ j)1 (1−θ j)(N−1)−1, this job seeker i will be chosen by the firm with probability
1
2 , because now the firm receives two applications, hence has two candidates, among whom i
is one. Generalising, if k = kˆ, which happens with probability CkˆN−1×
(
θ j
)kˆ (1−θ j)N−1−kˆ,
then this job seeker i will be chosen with probability 1
kˆ+1
, because the firm j has kˆ+ 1
candidates at disposal.
12Recall that without discrimination, it is socially optimal.
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The employment probability for the workers is ∑N−1k=0 C
k
N−1
(
θ j
)k (1−θ j)N−1−k 1k+1 .
This expression could be simplified to
1−(1−θ j)N
Nθ j
13. Hence the job seeker’s expected pay off
is
1−(1−θ j)N
Nθ j ×w j.
A2. Proofs of propositions
Proposition 1. (return to skills) Given the return to skill ratio yH−yLEH−EL , define βˆ as
yH−yL
EH−EL = e
βˆ .
(i) when 0 < β ≤ βˆ , the unique equilibrium is such that all job seekers choose high skill,
i.e. α∗ = 1.
(ii) when β > βˆ , the equilibrium consists of a unique value α∗ ∈ (0,1) which satisfies
yH−yL
EH−EL = e
α∗β .
(iii) when yH−yLEH−EL ≤ 1 such that
yH−yL
EH−EL = e
βˆ has no positive solution on βˆ , the unique
equilibrium is α∗ = 0.
Proof. We will prove only case (i) while the proof of case (ii) and (iii) are highly similar.
Notice first that yH−yLEH−EL ≥ eβ is equivalent to e−β yH −EH ≥ e−β yL−EL.
We prove firstly that the deviation to low skill is not optimal. By this, we prove that
a proportion ε of workers’ deviating to low skill is suboptimal. And it suffices to show
that after deviation, the deviator can not get higher expected payoff. Before deviation,
the expected payoff is e−q∗H yH −EH , where q∗H = β . After deviation, the expected payoff
becomes e−qDH−qDL yL−EL, where qDH +qDL = β . However, under the condition e−β yH−EH ≥
e−β yL−EL, the expected payoff after deviation is weakly lower.
For the uniqueness. We should furthermore show that for the case of α = 0 and α ∈ (0,1),
there will be profitable deviation. When α = 0, the expected payoff from search is e−β yL−EL.
If there is a fraction ε deviating to high skilled, then the expected income for the deviator
becomes e−εβ (yH − yL)+ e−β yL−EH . Then this expected payoff after deviation is greater
than the expected payoff before deviation because. e−εβ (yH − yL)> e−β (yH − yL)≥ EH −
EL. So the deviation is profitable for the deviators. When α ∈ (0,1), the expected income
from search is e−β yL−EL for the low skilled, and e−αˆβ (yH − yL)+ e−β yL−EH for the
type H job seekers, where αˆ should be pinned down by workers’ indifference condition
e−αˆβ (yH − yL) = EH −EL. However, this condition is incompatible for any α < 1 with our
condition e−β yH −EH ≥ e−β yL−EL. So that it is impossible that job seekers are indifferent
from being high or low skilled.
13One way of deriving it could be seen in Melanie Cao & Shouyong Shi, 2000. "Coordination, matching,
and wages". It could also be checked by change of variable, which is also represented in the Appendix.
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All in all, we have proved that when the configuration of parameters is such that e−β yH−
EH > e−β yL−EL, the only equilibrium is all the job seekers choose to obtain high skill, i.e.
α∗ = 1. Q.E.D.
Proposition 2. The equilibrium labor allocation and skill investment choice are socially
optimal.
Proof. We derive the proof for Notion 2, the proof for Notion 1 can be analogously
derived. By definition of q, we have qH = NHM and qL =
NL
M - all firms will attract both skill
types. Since NH = αN and NL = (1−α)N, we have qH = αβ and qL = (1−α)β . When
α = 1 or α = 0, there is only one skill level present in the market; when α ∈ (0,1), there
are both high and low skilled. Define a priority rule R ∈ [0,1], which is the probability of
choosing high skilled job applicants when both high and low skilled are present in the same
firm. The planner chooses α , which hence determines qH and qL, to maximize the aggregate
output
M×
[
(1− e−qH )(R× (1− e−qL)+ e−qL)yH
+(1− e−qL)((1−R)(1− e−qH )+ e−qH )yL
]
−N× (αEH +(1−α)EL)
The objective program can be rearranged to the following way
M×
[
(1− e−qL)(1− e−qH )× [RyH +(1−R)yL]
+e−qLyH + e−qH yL− e−β yH − e−β yL
]
−N× (αEH +(1−α)EL)
Whenever we are with corner solutions on α , i.e. qH = 0 or qL = 0, the expression does
not depend on R. When the solution on α is interior, qH and qL are both positive. And if
we maximize with respect to R, we have (1− e−qH )(1− e−qL)(yH − yL)> 0, so that setting
Rp = 1 is the optimal choice. By doing so, we could further reduce the objective to
M× [(1− e−qH )yH + e−qH (1− e−qL)yL]
−N× (αEH +(1−α)EL)
Now the derivative with respect to α yields
=N︷︸︸︷
Mβ ×
[
e−αβ (yH − yL)
]
−N× (EH −EL)
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where the first line represents the marginal gain from assigning 1% more workers to the
high skilled section, and the second line represents the corresponding marginal loss. For
values of β such that the marginal gain surpasses the marginal loss, the planner will set α = 1,
in which case a threshold βˆ p is determined by eβˆ p (yH − yL) = EH −EL, such that for values
of β not larger than this threshold pinned down by the log-return to skills, the planner finds
socially optimal to assign all workers to the high skilled sector. When the skill to return is such
that (yH − yL)<EH−EL, for all values of β the marginal gain will be lower than the marginal
loss, the planner will choose α p = 0. At last if β satisfies β > βˆ p, such that the log-return to
skill investment is not high enough to offset the market competition (captured by β ), there
is an α p ∈ (0,1) (an interior solution) which is determined by e−α pβ (yH − yL) = EH −EL
such that the planner will recommend ex ante identical workers to randomize on skill choice
and a fraction α p will end up high skilled. It is straightforward to notice that the correspond
values of qpH = α
pβ and qpL = (1−α p)β correspond to the equilibrium allocation.
As a summary, we have shown that the threshold for skill investment βˆ p coincides with
βˆ , and α p conincides with α∗. Q.E.D.
Proposition 3. Under the above assumptions, there exist two thresholds βˆ2 and βˆ1 with
0 < βˆ2 < βˆ1 < βˆ , such that
(1) When 0 < β < βˆ2, there exists a unique equilibrium in which both group a and group
b invest in high skill, (aH,bH). At β = βˆ2, both (aH,bH) and (aH,bL) can be equilibrium.
(2) When βˆ2 < β < βˆ1, there exists a unique equilibrium in which group a invest in high
skill while group b in low skill, (aH,bL). At β = βˆ1, both (aL,bH) and (aH,bL) can be
equilibrium.
(3) When βˆ1 < β ≤ βˆ , there exist multiple equilibria. Either group a invest in high
skill and group b in low skill, or group a invest in low skill and group b invest in high skill,
(aL,bH) or (aH,bL).
Proof. Holding group b high skilled, group a’s best response depends on the comparison
between UP1aH (β ) and UP3aL (β ). On one hand, since q
P1
aH (β )> β , we have
UP1aH
(
βˆ
)
= e−q
P1
aH(βˆ)yH −EH < e−βˆ yH −EH = e−βˆ yL−EL =UP3aL
(
βˆ
)
On the other hand, since qP1aH is increasing in β , when β→ 0, we have UP1aH (β )→ yH−EH
which is greater than UP3aL (0) = yL−EL. Due to the continuity of UP1aH (β ) and UP3aL (β ) on
β , there exists at least one βˆ1 < βˆ such that UP1aH
(
βˆ1
)
= UP3aL
(
βˆ1
)
. According to the
assumptions on the uniqueness of the intersection point, we have UP1aH (β ) > UP3aL (β ) for
β < βˆ1, and UP1aH (β )<UP3aL (β ) for β > βˆ1.
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Holding group b low skilled, group a’s best response depends on the comparison between
UP2aH and U
P4
aL . It turns out that for all values of β < βˆ
UP2aH = e
−γβ (yH − yL)+ e−β yL−EH > e−β yH −EH > e−qP4aH yL−EL =UP4aL
where the last inequality is due to the fact that e−β yH −EH ≥ e−β yL−EL for all β ≤ βˆ
and qP4aH > β , implying that choosing high skill is a dominant strategy for group a when
group b choose low skill.
Holding group a high skilled, group b’s best response depends on the comparison between
UP1bH and U
P2
bL . On one hand, we have
UP1bH
(
βˆ
)
= 1−e
−qP1bH(βˆ)
qP1bH(βˆ)
e−q
P1
aH(βˆ)yH −EH < e−βˆ yH −EH = e−βˆ yL−EL =UP2bL
(
βˆ
)
where the first inequality is due to the fact that 1−e
−qP1bH(βˆ)
qP1bH(βˆ)
e−q
P1
aH(βˆ) < e−q
P1
aH(βˆ) and
qP1aH (β ) > β . On the other hand, since qP1aH (β ) and qP1bH (β ) are increasing in β , when
β → 0, we have UP1bH (β )→ yH − EH which is greater than UP2bL (0) = yL − EL. Due to
the continuity of UP1bH (β ) and U
P2
bL (β ) on β , there exists at least one βˆ2 < βˆ such that
UP1bH
(
βˆ2
)
=UP2bL
(
βˆ2
)
. According to the assumptions on the uniqueness of the intersection
point, we have UP1bH
(
βˆ2
)
>UP2bL
(
βˆ2
)
for β < βˆ2, and UP1bH
(
βˆ2
)
<UP2bL
(
βˆ2
)
for β > βˆ2.
Holding group a low skilled, group b’s best response depends on the comparison between
UP3bH and U
P4
bL . It turns out that for all values of β ≤ βˆ we have
UP3bH = e
−(1−γ)β (yH − yL)+ e−β yL−EH
> e−β yH −EH
≥ e−β yL−EL
> 1−e
−qP4bL (β )
qP4bL(β )
e−qP4aL(β )yL−EL
where the last inequality is due to the fact that e−β > e−qP4aL > 1−e
−qP4bL (β )
qP4bL(β )
e−qP4aL(β ), implying
that choosing high skill is a dominant strategy for group b when group a choose low skill.
To summarize, for values of β ∈
(
0, βˆ2
)
, both groups choosing high skill, i.e. (aH,bH),
is the unique equilibrium; for β ∈
(
βˆ2, βˆ1
)
, group a choosing high skill and group b choosing
low skill, i.e. (aH,bL) is the unique equilibrium; When β ∈
(
βˆ1, βˆ
)
, both (aH,bL) and
(aL,bH) are possible to appear as equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Corollary. Compared to the case without discrimination,
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(1) In (aH,bH) equilibrium, firms always earn higher expected profits; in In (aH,bL)
equilibrium and (aL,bH), firms earn lower expected profits.
(2) In (aH,bH) equilibrium, both aH and bH workers earn lower expected payoff; in
(aH,bL) equilibrium, group aH (group bL) earn higher (lower) expected payoff; in (aL,bH)
equilibrium, group bH (group aL) earn higher (lower) expected payoff.
Proof. (1) In (aH,bH) equilibrium, the result is proved in LMD (2005). We prove the
case for (aH,bL) equilibrium. In (aH,bL) equilibrium, firms’ profits are
πP2aH,bL =
(
1− e−qP2H −qP2H e−q
P2
H
)
yH +
[(
qP2H +1
)
e−qP2H − e−β (β +1)
]
yL
This term is smaller than the profit without discrimination, because
πP2aH,bL =
(
1− e−qP2H −qP2H e−q
P2
H
)
yH +
[(
qP2H +1
)
e−qP2H − e−β (β +1)
]
yL
<
(
1− e−qP2H −qP2H e−q
P2
H
)
yH +
[(
qP2H +1
)
e−qP2H − e−β (β +1)
]
yH
=
(
1− e−β − e−ββ
)
yH
where the inequality uses the fact that (x+1)e−x is a decreasing function and qP2H < β .
The proof for the case of (aL,bH) equilibrium can be analogously reproduced.
(2) For the case (aH,bH), it follows from LMD (2005). For the case of (aH,bL). We
have
UP2aH = e
−γβ (yH − yL)+ e−β yL−EH
> e−β yH −EH
> e−qSaH yH −EH
where the first inequality comes from e−γβ − e−β > 0.
and
UP2bL = e
−β yL−EL
< e−β yH −EH
where the inequality comes from the fact that β ≤ βˆ . The proof for the case of (aL,bH)
equilibrium can be analogously reproduced. Q.E.D.
Proposition 4. Let γ ≥ 12 so that group a is the majority. There are four thresholds
ψˆaL,b ≤ ψˆbH,a < ψˆbL,a < ψˆaH,b, such that
(1) For ψ ∈ [0, ψˆaL,b), the unique pure strategy nash equilibrium is (aL,bL); for
ψ = ψˆaL,b, the equilibrium can be (aL,bL) or (aL,bH). (2) For ψ ∈
(
ψˆaL,b, ψˆbH,a
)
, the
unique pure strategy nash equilibrium is (aL,bH); (3) For ψ ∈ (ψˆbH,a, ψˆbL,a), there is
no pure strategy nash equilibrium; for ψ = ψˆbL,a, the equilibrium is (aH,bL); (4) For
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ψ ∈ (ψˆbL,a, ψˆaH,b), the unique pure strategy nash equilibrium is (aH,bL); at the point
ψ = ψˆaH,b, the equilibrium can be (aH,bL) or (aH,bH). (5) For ψ ∈
(
ψˆaH,b,1
)
, the unique
pure strategy nash equilibrium is (aH,bH). (6) Define the threshold ψˆ of skill investment
without discrimination as ψˆyH 1−e
−β
β −EH = ψˆyL 1−e
−β
β −EL; then ψˆbL,a < ψˆ < ψˆaH,b.
Proof. The payoff matrix is as follows.
bH bL
aH
bH: e−γβ 1−e
−(1−γ)β
(1−γ)β ψyH −EH
aH: 1−e
−γβ
γβ ψyH −EH
bL: e−γβ 1−e
−(1−γ)β
(1−γ)β ψyL−EL
aH: 1−e
−γβ
γβ ψyH −EH
aL
bH: 1−e
−(1−γ)β
(1−γ)β ψyH −EH
aL: e−(1−γ)β 1−e
−γβ
γβ ψyL−EL
bL: e−γβ 1−e
−(1−γ)β
(1−γ)β ψyL−EL
aL: 1−e
−γβ
γβ ψyL−EL
Define ψˆaH,b by e−γβ 1−e
−(1−γ)β
(1−γ)β ψyH −EH = e−γβ 1−e
−(1−γ)β
(1−γ)β ψyL−EL.
Define ψˆaL,b by 1−e
−(1−γ)β
(1−γ)β ψyH −EH = e−γβ 1−e
−(1−γ)β
(1−γ)β ψyL−EL.
Define ψˆbH,a by 1−e
−γβ
γβ ψyH −EH = e−(1−γ)β 1−e
−γβ
γβ ψyL−EL.
Define ψˆbL,a by 1−e
−γβ
γβ ψyH −EH = 1−e
−γβ
γβ ψyL−EL.
When γ ≥ 12 , it can be verified that ψˆaL,b ≤ ψˆbH,a < ψˆbL,a < ψˆaH,b. (1) We first prove
for values of ψ ∈ [0, ψˆaL,b), the unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium is (aL,bL): group a
choose low skill, group b choose low skill. Holding group b high skilled, group a choose to
be low skilled, because ψ < ψˆaL,b < ψˆbH,a. Holding group b low skilled, group a choose to
be low skilled, because ψ < ψˆaL,b < ψˆbL,a. Holding group a high skilled, group b choose to
low skilled, because ψ < ψˆaL,b < ψˆaH,b. Holding group a low skilled, group b choose to be
low skilled, because ψ < ψˆaL,b. At the point ψ = ψˆaL,b, the equilibrium can be (aL,bH) or
(aL,bL).
(2) We prove for values of ψ ∈ (ψˆaL,b, ψˆbH,a), the unique Nash pure strategy equilibrium
is (aL,bH). Holding group b high skilled, group a choose to be low skilled, because
ψ < ψˆbH,a. Holding group b low skilled, group a choose to be low skilled, because ψ <
ψˆbH,a < ψˆbL,a. Holding group a high skilled, group b choose to low skilled, because
ψ < ψˆbH,a < ψˆaH,b. Holding group a low skilled, group b choose to be high skilled, because
ψ > ψˆaL,b. At the point ψ = ψˆbH,a, the unique equilibrium is (aL,bH).
(3) We prove for values of ψ ∈ (ψˆbH,a, ψˆbL,a), there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium
is (aL,bH). Holding group b high skilled, group a choose to be high skilled, because
ψ > ψˆbH,a. Holding group b low skilled, group a choose to be low skilled, because ψ < ψˆbL,a.
Holding group a high skilled, group b choose to low skilled, because ψ < ψˆbL,a < ψˆaH,b.
Holding group a low skilled, group b choose to be high skilled, because ψ > ψˆaL,b. At the
point ψ = ψˆbL,a, the unique equilibrium is (aH,bL).
(4) We prove for values of ψ ∈ (ψˆbL,a, ψˆaH,b), there is a unique pure strategy Nash
equilibrium (aH,bL). Holding group b high skilled, group a choose to be high skilled,
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because ψ > ψˆbH,a. Holding group b low skilled, group a choose to be high skilled, because
ψ > ψˆbL,a. Holding group a high skilled, group b choose to low skilled, because ψ < ψˆaH,b.
Holding group a low skilled, group b choose to be high skilled, because ψ > ψˆaL,b. At the
point ψ = ψˆaH,b, the equilibrium can be (aH,bL) or (aH,bH).
(5) We prove for values ofψ ∈ (ψˆaH,b,1), there is a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium
(aH,bH). Holding group b high skilled, group a choose to be high skilled. Holding group b
low skilled, group a choose to be high skilled. Holding group a high skilled, group b choose
to high skilled, because ψ < ψˆaH,b. Holding group a low skilled, group b choose to be high
skilled, because ψ > ψˆaL,b.
(6) At last, notice that ψˆ = EH−ELyH−yL ×
(
1−e−β
β
)−1
, ψˆbL,a = EH−ELyH−yL ×
(
1−e−γβ
γβ
)−1
, and
ψˆaH,b = EH−ELyH−yL ×
(
e−γβ 1−e
−(1−γ)β
(1−γ)β
)−1
. It is straightforward to verify that ψˆbL,a < ψˆ < ψˆaH,b
because
(
1−e−γβ
γβ
)−1
<
(
1−e−β
β
)−1
<
(
e−γβ 1−e
−(1−γ)β
(1−γ)β
)−1
. Q.E.D.

Chapter 4
“Market Power and Efficiency in a
Search Model” Revisited

Abstract
In a directed search context, Galenianos, Kircher and Virag (2011, IER) show how does
firms’ market power in a finite market lead to misallocation of workers, hence efficiency loss;
they find that unemployment benefit could restore the efficiency, while the minimum wage
can not. I suggest that it is important to make distinction between the qualitative existence of
the market power and its quantitatively asymmetric impact when firms are heterogenous, and
this distinction leads us to spot the distortion on allocation of surplus. Neither unemployment
benefit nor minimum wage alone could correct the misallocation of labor and surplus at the
same time, while a combination of both policies could. I further question the windfall nature
of unemployment benefit, and show that if unemployment benefit is redistributively financed
by the firms, misallocation of labor can never be rectified, while if it is financed by workers’
wage tax, efficiency can result.
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4.1 Introduction
Based on a wage posting context with search friction, Galenianos, Kircher and Virag (2011,
IER) (hereafter GKV) argue that “firms in a finite market1 enjoy market power, in the sense
that a single firm’s action affects the equilibrium outcome of all agents”; they show that with
firms heterogenous in productivity and workers all identical, there is efficiency loss when the
social planner’s objective is to maximize the aggregate welfare. They further establish that
unemployment benefit could restore the efficiency, while the minimum wage leads to further
misallocation of labor.
There is an immediate inconsistency in their exposition: given their definition for the
market power in a finite market, their result should have still been true in the particular case
where firms do not differ in productivity; However, it is straightforward to observe that with
firms identical in productivity, the market allocation of labor corresponds exactly to the social
planner’s allocation, hence there would be no longer efficiency loss in the sense of GKV
(2011). What is the cause for this “disappearance” of firms’ market power? I argue that
the efficiency loss in their paper is in fact due to a compounded effect of two layers: (1)
on the one hand, qualitatively, there is the classical notion of market power, which in our
context is interpreted as individual firm’s ability of using its posted wage to modify the labor
supply curve; (2) on the other hand, quantitatively, there is what I term as the “asymmetry of
market power” in the sense that the market power of firms with different productivity has
asymmetrically different impact in magnitude to the allocation of workers. Both effects take
place when firms are heterogenous in productivity, which is studied in GKV (2011); in case
heterogeneity is absent, still present is the first effect, which contributes to the distortion
on the allocation of surplus: firms tend to pay workers too less and grasp more surplus (or
profit). And this distortion on surplus could be confirmed through decentralizing the social
planner’s problem. Our first result then simply shows that firms earn too much expected
profits and the workers receive too few expected surplus and actual wage compared to the
case absent of market power. As we will argue, confounding the two effects does not invalid
their analysis on efficiency loss, but raises more concern for the policy maker.
GKV (2011) further show that introducing unemployment benefit could restore the
efficiency; but introducing minimum wages exacerbates the misallocation of labor (related
to asymmetry of market power), leading to further efficiency loss. I come up with several
suggestions to complement their results. Firstly, I show that even introducing unemployment
1Here, finite market is referred to a market where the number of workers and firms are not infinite. We
refer readers to GKV (2011) on a discussion of the significance of consideration of such a context.
4.2 The model 119
benefit at the level which allows efficiency to be restored, workers’ expected surplus is
still lower than the socially optimal level. Secondly, although minimum wage detriments
aggregate welfare by increasing misallocation of labor, there exists a feasible value of it which
could fully correct the misallocation of surplus. In this sense, unemployment benefit is not
necessarily a dominant choice over minimum wage. Thirdly, a proper level of combination
of both policies a la GKV can correct both misallocations. I then argue further that direct
comparison of the two policies is not appropriate, because between them lies another sharp
difference - the source of funding. Notice that the unemployment benefit in GKV (2011) is
introduced in a windfall manner. I suggest that it is more appropriate to consider a situation
where this unemployment benefit is financed redistributively. I consider two situations: either
the unemployment benefits are collected from the firms by unemployment tax or from the
workers by wage tax. It is then shown that under the former taxation system, the efficiency in
the sense of GKV (2011) does not obtain, but under the latter efficiency does obtain.
As a quick summary, we revisit GKV (2011) from a traditional Industrial Organization
perspective. On one hand, taking both misallocation of labor and surplus into account
necessitates us to rethink over the effectiveness of the policies involved; on the other hand,
it allows us to have an impression on the possible phenomena which can appear after the
policy is implemented; for example, if we believe that firms have market power and introduce
the unemployment benefit in a windfall manner, then we expect to observe an increase in
unemployment rate and wage gap, but we know that it is for the benefit of aggregate welfare.
The consideration of such a finite labor market where firms have market power is of realistic
importance. For example, Shimer (2007) mentions that if we segment labor market by the
characteristics pair “occupation, geographical area”, then a small number of vacancies may
be potentially facing just a little above 10 job seekers per segment of the market.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3, I will recapitulate the
original model with my remarks; in section 2.4, I state my arguments; in section 3, I consider
the source of funding, and I will conclude in section 4.
4.2 The model
Consider an economy with two types of agents: the workers and the firms. We focus on the
case with two workers and two firms, it allows us to capture most of the important results
within a relatively simple context.
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Workers are identical, and firms are ranked by their productivity y j, with y1 ≥ y2. We
assume that the productivity of any firm is common knowledge. The wage posting game
proceeds with the following timing:
1. Each firm posts a wage w j.
2. Workers observe all the wages announcement w = (w1,w2), and they choose which
wage to apply to simultaneously.
3. Firms collect applications. If more than one worker appears at one firm, this firm
chooses one randomly; if the firm receives no application, then the post of this firm will end
up vacant.
As in standard directed search literature, we search for the subgame perfect equilibria
where firms use pure strategy on wage announcements and workers use mixed strategy in the
job application subgame. We will also restrict attentions on symmetric equilibrium, where
any worker applies to the same level of wage with identical probability, and any firm selects
workers with identical probability. These assumptions help us introduce search friction in a
natural way.
4.2.1 The market economy
This wage posting game is solved backwards by convention, and we start from the application
subgame, where the workers, observing wage announcements {w1,w2}, choose which wage
to apply to strategically.
Workers’ application subgame. Name the two workers by A and B. Consider worker A’s
problem without loss of generality. Given an arbitrary wage pair {w1,w2}, his strategy is
which firm to apply to. Define his probability of applying to firm j as αAj , then his probability
of visiting the other firm is 1−αAj . We proceed to find the matching probability for worker
A conditional on his sending application to firm j.
Conditional on visiting firm j, the worker in question will be hired with probability 1
when the other worker did not apply to this firm j, and will be hired with probability 12
when the other worker’s application also arrived at this firm. The former event happens with
probability
(
1−αBj
)
×1, and the latter event happens with probability αBj × 12 . In total, this
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worker’s employment probability becomes
G
(
αBj
)
=
1
2
×αBj +
(
1−αBj
)
Analogously, worker B’s employment probability becomes
G
(
αAj
)
=
1
2
×αAj +
(
1−αAj
)
A worker’s expected payoff (or expected surplus) is the product of the wage he applied
for and the probability of obtaining it: U j = G
(
α ij
)
×w j where i ∈ {A,B}. Taking αBj , w1
and w2 as given, the worker 1’s best response of visiting firm 1 is
αA1 =

0 if U1 <U2
1 if U1 >U2
(0,1) if U1 =U2
Only in case when the expected payoff from applying to both firms is equivalent, will the
worker mix between these two firms. On the one hand, the payoff G
(
αA1
)×w1 the workers
expect from applying to firm 1 should be no less than the payoff obtained from applying to
firm 2; otherwise no worker will apply to firm 1. On the other hand, if payoff at firm 1 is
strictly greater than the payoff at firm 2, no worker will apply to firm 2, hence the equality.
We remark that when U1 =U2 holds, it defines workers’ labor supply curve:
G(αA1 )
G(αA2 )
= w2w1 . It
is straightforward to verify that the left-hand side of this equality is a decreasing function of
αA1 .
Firms’ wage posting stage. We move to the firms’ wage posting strategies. Take firm
1’s problem as an example and the case of firm 2 can be solved in similar way. Firm 1
will be able to start production if at least one worker appears. The event that no worker
appears happens with probability
(
1−αA1
)(
1−αB1
)
, hence at least one worker appears with
probability 1− (1−αA1 )(1−αB1 ). A firm’s payoff is simply(
1−
(
1−αA1
)(
1−αB1
))
(y1−w1)
Intuitively, a high wage will induce more workers to apply, however, it leaves few ex post
surplus to the firms. The dependence of the worker’s application strategy on wage, i.e. a
functional relationship between α and w, is captured by
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G
(
αB1
)×w1 = G(1−αB1 )×w2
for worker A, and
G
(
αA1
)
×w1 = G
(
1−αA1
)
×w2
for worker B, where the left- and right-hand side are respectively the expected payoff from
applying to firm 1 and firm 2. Since workers are identical, they use the symmetric strategy:
αAj = αBj = α j. The payoff is thus reduced to
(
1− (1−α1)2
)
(y1−w1) for the firms, and
G(α1)×w1 = G(1−α1)×w2 for workers.
We consider firm 1’s optimization problem. Taking firm 2’s strategy w2, as well as the
functional relationship between α1 and w1 as given, firm 1 maximizes the expected profit:
maxw1
(
1− (1−α1)2
)
× (y1−w1)
s.to
(
1− α12
)×w1 = (1− α22 )×w2
To solve this problem, we firstly substitute out w1 according to the binding indifference
constraint.
(
1− (1−α1)2
)
× y1−
(
1− (1−α1)2
)
× 1+α1
2−α1 ×w2
Differentiating with respect to α1, we obtain the first order condition
2(1− αˆ1)× y1− (1+2αˆ1)×w2 = 0
If we proceed analogously for firm 2, we have
2(1− αˆ2)× y2− (1+2αˆ2)×w1 = 0
Moving the terms with w1 and w2 to the right-hand side respectively and make the ratio,
we obtain
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(1− αˆ1)× y1
(1− αˆ2)× y2 =
(1+2αˆ1)×w2
(1+2αˆ2)×w1
=
(1+2αˆ1)× (2− αˆ1)
(1+2αˆ2)× (2− αˆ2)
where the second equality comes from workers’ labor supply curve. Rearrange to get
y1
y2
=
(1+2αˆ1)× (2− αˆ1)× (1− αˆ2)
(1+2αˆ2)× (2− αˆ2)× (1− αˆ1)
where αˆ2 = 1− αˆ1. The right-hand side hence is a function of αˆ1. It could be shown that
the right-hand side is increasing, so that there is a unique solution to this polynomial. Term
the solution as αˆ1 (y1,y2). According to the first order conditions, the equilibrium wages are
then given by
wˆ1 (y1,y2) =
2(1− αˆ2 (y1,y2))× y2
(1+2αˆ2 (y1,y2))
and
wˆ2 (y1,y2) =
2(1− αˆ1 (y1,y2))× y1
(1+2αˆ1 (y1,y2))
Results (GKV) 1. When y1 > y2,
(1) The workers application strategies are such that αˆ1 > 12 > αˆ2
(2) The wages are such that wˆ1 > wˆ2
(3) The expected unemployment rate is 12 ×
(
1−2αˆ1+2(αˆ1)2
)
A high productivity firm in the equilibrium offers higher wage and attracts the workers to
visit them more often than the low productivity firm.
Market payoff and market power
Given the wage announcements, workers are allowed to calculate the corresponding expected
payoff at each firm which is a product of the actual wage and the probability of obtaining it.
Based on all these calculated expected payoffs, workers decide which firm to apply to: for
example, if the expected payoff from firm 1 is strictly lower than that provided by firm 2,
then no workers will apply to firm 1.
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To attract a worker, firm 1 should offer an expected payoff such that 2−α12 ×w1 ≥ 2−α22 ×
w2, analogously, firm 2 should offer an expected wage such that 2−α22 ×w2 ≥ 2−α12 ×w1. The
workers’ supply curve is hence pinned down: 2−α12 ×w1 = 2−α22 ×w2. Then when we search
for a mixed strategy equilibrium, each firm understands that the expected payoff offered
by it must attain certain reference level, which is the expected payoff offered by the other
firm. This reference level depends on the wages posted by both firms,2 which implies that an
individual firm’s action has impact on workers’ supply curve. In this sense, we say that firms
have market power.
To see more exactly why market power is distortive, it is useful to introduce an aggregate
variable U named market payoff, which is defined as the payoff that workers receive in
the equilibrium of the subgame, or equivalently U = max{U1,U2}. So that 2−α12 ×w1 =
2−α2
2 ×w2 = U (w1,w2). By this equality, We can express α1 (and analogously α2) as a
function of w1 and w2 as follows:
α1 = 2×
(
1− U(w1,w2)w1
)
Differentiating with respect to w1, we obtain:
dα1
dw1
= ∂α1∂w1
>0
+ ∂α1∂U
<0
× ∂U∂w1
>0
In case ∂U∂w j = 0, an individual firm’s strategy has no impact on the aggregate variable U ,
and I show later that in this case the socially optimal allocation can result. Here, ∂U∂w j > 0, so
a distortive term ∂α1∂U × ∂U∂w1 is present; this term introduces a wedge in the marginal benefit
for the firms, leading firms to post lower wages.
4.2.2 The social planner’s problem
We move to the social planner’s problem, and establish that the market allocation differs
from the social planner’s allocation. The social planner maximizes aggregate welfare of the
economy, which coincides with the aggregate output due to risk neutrality. The objective is
written as follows:
maxα1,α2
(
1− (1−α1)2
)
y1+
(
1− (1−α2)2
)
y2
s.to α1+α2 = 1
It could be shown that the social planner’s allocation features
2From the labor supply curve, we observe that α1 (hence α2) is a function of both w1 and w2.
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y1
y2
=
α p1
1−α p1
Result 2 (GKV): α p2 < αˆ2 <
1
2 < αˆ1 < α
p
1
The result suggests that in the market economy workers apply to the high productivity
firm less frequently. When market payoff depends on wages, an additional term will distort
downwards marginal benefit, which renders firms’ profits to be maximized at inferior levels
of wage. When both firms reduce wages, the high productivity firm reduces wage dispro-
portionately to a larger extent, which results in the misallocation of workers. There is also
implication on the expected unemployment rate. Notice that the expected unemployment rate,
1
2 ×
(
(α1)2+(1−α1)2
)
, is a parabola, decreasing for α1 ∈
[
0, 12
)
, minimized at α1 = 12 ,
and increasing for α1 ∈
(1
2 ,1
]
. In the market economy, this rate is simply lower compared
to the social planner’s problem, and it is because workers apply to the low productivity
firm too often. Hence, there is a conflicting objective between minimizing the expected
unemployment rate and maximizing the aggregate welfare.
4.2.3 Policy implications
GKV (2011) then show that: Unemployment benefit can restore efficiency, while minimum
wage can not. Let me give more details on how they obtain the result.
Minimum wage. When minimum wage policy is effective, the low productivity firm’s
wage is raised mechanically to a higher level. This leads firm 2 to attract even more frequent
application from workers, hence further exacerbates the problem of the misallocation of
labor, pushing the economy further away from efficiency.
Technically, suppose now that the government intervenes by imposing a minimum wage
level w2. Notice that in case w2 < wˆ2, the minimum wage policy simply affects no firm
and has no impact. We hence focus on the case where we have w2 ≥ wˆ2, so that when this
minimum wage policy is enforced, the equilibrium value of wage announced by firm 2 will be
simply w2 instead of wˆ2. When this minimum wage is effective for firm 2, firm 2 is not able
to maximize profit. From workers’ indifference equation 2−α12 ×w1 = 2−α22 ×w2, we express
simply workers’ application strategy α1 as a function of
{
w1,w2
}
. Let firm 1 maximize with
respect to w1, from its first order condition 2
(
1− αˆ1
)× y1− (1+2αˆ1)×w2 = 0, we notice
that αˆ1 is simply inferior to αˆ1. This implies that the misallocation is even more severe
compared to the case where minimum wage is not introduced.
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GKV (2011) remark that the original economy, where minimum wage is imposed to firm
2, is equivalent to an alternative economy where firm 2 has a productivity level y˜2 > y2. By
this parallelization, they find that minimum wage makes the firm 2 hire even more often so
that the inefficiency becomes more severe. Intuitively, when the productivity gap between
two firms reduces, the impact from the asymmetry of market power decreases, then both α1
and α2 tend to be closer to 12 .
Unemployment benefit. GKV (2011) then introduces unemployment benefit in a wind-
fall manner. Since unemployment benefit raises workers’ outside option, workers are willing
to take more “risk”. Although the event of being not employed occurs more often in the high
productivity firm, workers could receive the unemployment benefit at a more frequent basis
compared to applying to the low productivity firm. So as the benefit increases, workers shift
gradually their visiting frequency to the high productivity firm. GKV (2011) establish that
under this particular context, such an unemployment benefit could correct misallocation of
labor.
Technically, with unemployment benefits, the model could be rewritten as follows:
maxw1
(
1− (1−α1)2
)
× (y1−w1)
s.to
(
1− α12
)× (w1−b) = (1− α22 )× (w2−b)
for firm 1, and
maxw2
(
1− (1−α2)2
)
× (y2−w2)
s.to
(
1− α12
)× (w1−b) = (1− α22 )× (w2−b)
for firm 2. By making a change of variable from Wj = w j− b, it could be shown that
this economy is equivalent to an economy where y1 becomes y1−b, and y2 becomes y2−b.
Thus in order to determine whether introducing b could raise efficiency, it suffices to examine
whether the following expression
y1−b
y2−b =
(
1+2αˆb1
)× (2− αˆb1)× (1− αˆb2)(
1+2αˆb2
)× (2− αˆb2)× (1− αˆb1)
leads to a higher level of αˆb1 when b increases. The answer is affirmative, since the
left-hand side is increasing in b, and the right-hand side is also increasing in αˆb1 . GKV (2011)
concludes that there exists an unemployment benefit level such that the corresponding αˆb1
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could be brought back to the efficient level αˆ p1 , so that it is a more effective policy under this
particular economy.
An accompanying result is that with b introduced, the wage gap w1−w2 actually increases.
Hence, if in reality it is believed that firms have market power, then when b is introduced
we may observe both increase in wage inequality and increase in the unemployment rate
controlling for workers’ ability.
4.2.4 Critics
On the source of inefficiency
GKV (2011) note that “firms in a finite market enjoy market power, in the sense that a single
firm’s action affects the equilibrium outcome of all agents”. According to this definition,
market power should exist in any market with finite number of workers and firms. However,
it is immediate to observe that, in the original model, if we impose y1 = y2, i.e. if firms have
identical productivity, then the optimal solution αˆ1 in the market economy coincides with
the choice α p1 in the social planner’s problem: αˆ1 = α
p
1 =
1
2 . Consequently, according to the
interpretation of GKV (2011) there will not be any efficiency loss because there is no loss of
the aggregate output in the market economy.
Does it mean that the effect of market power vanishes in case y1 = y2? Not really. Recall
the interpretation of GKV (2011) on their model with y1 > y2: “the high productivity firm
will respond to market power by decreasing its wage by a larger amount, which leads to the
misallocation of workers”.3 Then in the extreme case with y1 = y2, the result αˆ1 = α
p
1 =
1
2
is simply due to the fact that firms respond to market power by decreasing their wages to the
same magnitude, such that the allocation on the application of workers is not disturbed. The
difference is plainly on what I term as the asymmetry of the market power. That is to say,
although both firms lower their wages when taking into consideration their market power,
different productivity leads to disproportionately different amounts of wages reduction; so
that workers’ application decision is distorted due to the quantitatively asymmetric impact
from the reduction of wages by firms with different productivities. And more importantly,
although in case of identical productivity this asymmetry of market power is not in action, the
market power is still qualitatively present: in a finite market, “firms face less competition and
they post lower wages than they would if they take their market power into consideration”;4
3See GKV (2011) Page 10.
4See GKV (2011) page 9
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I then suggest that even when the allocation of labor is not distorted, the allocation of surplus
can be distorted: firms can enjoy higher expected surplus than they would have if they do not
take their market power into consideration.
To show that in the market economy firms enjoy higher expected surplus and workers
suffer from lower expected surplus, it suffices to decentralize social planner’s problem, and
then make the comparison. Formally, according to section 2.1.1., in the decentralized social
planner’s problem we could simply neglect the firms’ taking into account of their market
power by forcing the aggregate variable market payoff U invariant to any individual firms’
price variation, i.e. ∂U∂w j = 0. For example, firm 1’s problem now becomes:
maxw1
(
1− (1−α1)2
)
× (y1−w1)
s.to
(
1− α12
)×w1 =U
where U is invariant to w1 and w2. Solving the first order condition, we obtain that U =(
1−αD1
)
y1. Analogously, we obtain U =
(
1−αD2
)
y2 from firm 2’s optimization problem.
By these two equalities we obtain y1y2 =
1−αD2
1−αD1
, which pins down the level of αD1 . We verify
that the so obtained αD1 coincides with social planner’s allocation α
D
1 = α
p
1 . We have then
the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Compared to the efficient level, in the market economy (1) firms enjoy
higher expected surplus and workers suffer from lower expected surplus; (2) workers suffer
from lower actual wages.
Proof. In the Appendix.
As remarked above, when the market payoff depends on wages, a distortive term in the
firm’s marginal benefit arises, which leads firms to post lower wages when they maximize
profit. This suggests that the surplus is misallocated towards the firms, and the low wages
imply low market payoff. In total there is deadweight loss and the aggregate output is lower.
It is also important to point out that when market power is present, the equilibrium functional
relationship between the wage w j and the application strategy α j is different in problem
of the market economy compared to that of the decentralized economy. So that even if the
allocation of labor is corrected to the socially optimal level, the misallocation of surplus
persists - a result summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary. Even if we replace αˆ1 by α
p
1 in the market economy, the resulted workers’
expected surplus is lower than its efficient level.
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On policy
Policy 1: Unemployment benefit. In the section 2.3, GKV (2011) show that unemployment
benefit could restore the efficiency: by introducing a proper level of b, αb1 could be rectified to
the efficient level α p1 ; so that the aggregate output where unemployment benefit is introduced
could reach the socially optimal level.(
1− (1−αb1)2)y1+(1− (1−αb2)2)y2
=
(
1− (1−α p1 )2)y1+(1− (1−α p2 )2)y2
However, in the section 2.4.1 we see that this merely corrects the misallocation of workers,
not the misallocation of surplus. Now define the level of b at which the efficiency is restored
in the sense of GKV (2011) as bA. We have the following result showing that even taking
into account this bA, workers’ expected surplus is inferior to its efficient level. Define the
workers’ expected surplus in the market economy with unemployment benefit as U
(
bA
)
, we
have the following proposition:
Proposition 2. In the market economy augmented with unemployment benefit bA, the
workers’ expected surplus U
(
bA
)
is strictly lower than the efficient level U p.
Proof. In the Appendix.
As a result, if the allocation of labor and of surplus are both of concern, the level b
required to correct the misallocation of labor does not at the same time bring workers’ surplus
back to its efficient level. If we further increase b beyond bA, we are able to increase further
the workers’ surplus; however, the misallocation of labor will be distorted again, but to such
an extent that workers apply too often (more than the efficient level) to the high productivity
firm, where they are employed at less frequent basis. Hence, if b is the only instrument at
the policy maker’s disposal, both misallocations can not be addressed at the same time. We
have the following comparative statics to see how the productivity gap has impact on firms’
market power.
Proposition 3 (comparative statics). The level of bA increases with the productivity gap
y1− y2.
Proof. In the Appendix.
The result suggests that as the productivity gap becomes larger, the level of b required to
correct the misallocation of labor increases. Intuitively, as the productivity gap increases,
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the reduction of wage from the high productivity firm becomes more and more important
relatively to that from the low productivity firm, which increasingly worsens the misallocation
of labor.
Policy 2: Minimum wage. In GKV (2011), it is shown that minimum wage has the effect
of discouraging the workers from visiting the high productivity firm, leading to misallocation
of labor. By this, GKV (2011) concludes that minimum wage is a less effective political
instrument compared to unemployment benefit. This result should be taken with caution.
Indeed, although minimum wage further distorts the allocation of labor, it increases workers’
expected surplus, hence can correct the misallocation of surplus:
Proposition 4. There exists a level of wc ∈ (wˆ2,y2) such that the misallocation of surplus
can be completely corrected.
Proof. In the Appendix.
A sharp difference between the minimum wage and the kind of unemployment benefit
introduced by GKV (2011) is that the former does not cost government’s budget - in their
context, the unemployment benefit is essentially regarded as coming from external resources -
a windfall. Since Proposition 2 implies that the level of b required to correct the misallocation
of surplus is greater than that required for the misallocation of labor, minimum wage is more
effective in correcting the surplus distortion. Before entering into the next section, we suggest
the natural result that a combination of unemployment benefit and minimum wage can correct
the misallocation of labor and surplus at the same time:
Corollary. Introducing a proper level of unemployment benefit, together with minimum
wage, can correct both the misallocation of labor and misallocation of surplus.
Proof. In the Appendix.
4.3 Further discussions
4.3.1 On funding source of unemployment benefit
In this section, we focus exclusively on the misallocation of labor. We want to examine
whether GKV (2011)’s result on unemployment benefit could still hold if the funding source
is not of a windfall manner. Given that firms enjoy extra profit from their market power,
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a natural starting point is a type of redistributive economy where the firms pay for the
unemployment consequence caused by themselves.
We name now the taxation system in GKV(2011) as system A. We then follow Geromicha-
los (2014) to study one type of funding for unemployment benefit which we call taxation
system B: given an unemployment benefit level b, each firm pays to each worker who applied
to it but did not get employed an equal amount of unemployment benefit. We have the
following program for firm 1 (firm 2’s problem is analogous),
maxw1
(
1− (1−α1)2
)
× (y1−w1)− (α1)2 b
s.to 2−α12 × (w1−b) = 2−α22 × (w2−b)
where α21 represents the probability with which firm 1 has to pay the workers who applied
to it but ended up not being selected by it. And We have the following proposition for the
results:
Proposition 5. In system B, there exists no unemployment benefit level bB such that the
efficiency is restored in the sense of GKV(2011).
Proof. In the Appendix.
If we compare system B with the economy with no unemployment benefit, the intro-
duction of the term
(
α j
)2 b on one hand increases the marginal cost of firms, giving firms
incentive to lower wage; on the other hand, workers demand higher wages due to the raised
outside option b. Which effect dominates? My analysis shows that, the high productivity
firm further decreases its wage hence the former effect dominates, while the low productivity
firm increases its wage, hence the latter effect dominates. Recall that without unemployment
benefit, both firms actually post too low wages, we can conclude that introducing this taxation
system does not restore the efficiency caused by misallocation of labor.
We now propose another source of funding for the unemployment benefit: workers’ wage
taxation. We show that under this system the misallocation of labor could be corrected.
Suppose workers pay a tax T when they get matched, and they will receive an amount η×T
whenever they end up unemployed, where η is a scalar which keeps the planner’s budget
non-negative. When a worker applies to firm 1, her expected payoff is
(
1− α12
)× (w1−T )+
α1
2 ηT ; since she applies to firm 1 with probability α1, her contribution to the tax system
when applying to firm 1 is: α1×
[(
1− α12
)× (−T )+ α12 ηT ]. When she applies to firm 2,
132 “Market Power and Efficiency in a Search Model” Revisited
she expects
(
1− α22
)× (w2−T )+ α22 ηT ; since she applies to firm 2 with probability α2, her
corresponding contribution to the tax system is: α2×
[(
1− α22
)× (−T )+ α22 ηT ]. Since we
require that η is such that the planner does not have any contribution, the system should be
self-financing:
α1×
[(
1− α12
)× (−T )+ α12 ηT ]+α2× [(1− α22 )× (−T )+ α22 ηT ]≥ 0
Assuming T to be positive, it could be cancelled out. Rearranging, we obtain: η ≥
2
(α21+α
2
2)
− 1. Since α21 +α22 < (α1+α2)2 = 1, we have η ≥ 2(α21+α22) − 1 > 2− 1 = 1.
So that one unit of wage taxation can be redistributively translated into η > 1 units of
unemployment benefit. The important implication is that the planner could simply adjust
the amount of unemployment benefit from ηT to T , by which the planner can gain some
extra budget and there is always a T such that the misallocation of labor is corrected. To
see how, we replace ηT by T , and since workers are indifferent from applying to any
firm, we require
(
1− α12
)× (w1−T )+ α12 T = (1− α22 )× (w2−T )+ α22 T , which could be
rewritten as
(
1− α12
)× (w1−2T ) = (1− α22 )× (w2−2T ). And the firm 1’s problem (firm
2’s problem is similar) becomes:
maxw1
(
1− (1−α1)2
)
× (y1−w1)
s.to 2−α12 × (w1−2T ) = 2−α22 × (w2−2T )
Replacing 2T by b, GKV (2011) show that there is always a b (hence T ) such that the
misallocation of labor is corrected. As a quick summary, we have shown that the redistributive
wage taxation system is superior compared to the redistributive unemployment benefit system
where the firms pay the bills, because the former allows the misallocation of labor to be
rectified, and may allow the government to earn extra budget. In the following section, we
consider another type of policy intervention: imposing wage to be a fixed proportion of
productivity.
4.3.2 Imposing wage to be a fixed proportion of productivity
Consider the case where wages are forced to represent a fixed proportion of productivity.
Specifically, workers receive a fixed part of production βy1 from firm 1 or βy2 from firm 2,
and firm 1 receives (1−β )y1 and firm 2 receives (1−β )y2. Workers know which firm is of
which level of productivity, and they are still able to choose where to apply. The timing is as
previous. We are interested in the case where workers are indifferent from applying to high
and low productivity firms where they anticipate receiving βy1 and βy2 respectively, and the
indifference condition becomes
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2−αNB1
2
×βy1 = 2−α
NB
2
2
×βy2
Notice that αNB1 is determined by y1 and y2, and does not depend on β due to risk
neutrality.5 Firstly, we are interested in the comparison of αNB1 with the socially optimal
level α p1 which is determined by
y1
y2
=
α p1
1−α p1
, and the market level αˆ1 which is determined by
y1
y2
= (1+2αˆ1)×(2−αˆ1)×(1−αˆ2)(1+2αˆ2)×(2−αˆ2)×(1−αˆ1) . It could be shown that we have
αˆ1 < α
p
1 < α
NB
1
Hence, workers apply to the high productivity firm too often with fixed sharing rule.
Secondly, we are interested to see how this rule affects the allocation of surplus. For
this sake, we define β such that workers’ expected surplus with bargaining achieves the
socially optimal level U p. Accordingly, βNB is determined by 2−α
NB
1 (y1,y2)
2 ×βNBy1 =
2−αNB2 (y1,y2)
2 ×βNBy2 =U p. We have the following claim summarizing the main results.
Claim. With fixed sharing rule βNB such that workers’ expected payoff is equal to U p,
(1) the high (low) productivity firm offers higher (lower) wage compared to the case
where wages are posted.
(2) both the high and low productivity firm earn lower profit compared to the case where
wages are posted.
Proof. In the Appendix.
I compare this policy experiment with minimum wage. Recall that introducing minimum
wage reduces the wage gap, and leads the workers to apply to the low productivity firm more
often compared to the socially optimal case; With the fixed sharing rule, which introduces a
perfect correlation between the wage of high and low productivity firms, the result is reversed:
the wage gap widens, and the workers apply to the high productivity firm too often.
4.4 Conclusion
In this paper, I revisit GKV (2011), and emphasize the distinction between the qualitative
existence of market power and its quantitatively asymmetric impact due to productivity
heterogeneity. Making this distinction allows me to spot the misallocation of surplus, apart
5The condition of y1 < 2y2 should be imposed to make sure that 0 < αNB1 < 1.
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from the misallocation of labor which is central in their context. I reexamine unemployment
benefit and minimum wage policy on both misallocations. I then question the windfall nature
of the unemployment benefit, and propose to study the case where this benefit is financed
redistributively. If unemployment benefit is financed by the firms, efficiency can never result,
but if it is financed by workers’ wage taxes, efficiency can obtain.
To how much extent are the results robust? My preliminary analysis shows that all the
results could hold true when we have finitely many firms and workers while limiting the
degree of productivity heterogeneity to be two. At last, it may be argued that in GKV (2011),
the misallocation of surplus is not crucial in the sense that the efficient level of aggregate
welfare can be achieved as long as there is no misallocation of labor. The underlying reason
for this particular result is the over-simplified functional form for the surplus of firms and
workers. For example, it is straightforward to check that adding risk aversion will make the
wages appear in the aggregate welfare, which makes the difference. We consider it as the
direction for the next step of the current work.
4.5 Appendix
Proposition 1. Compared to the efficient level, in the market economy (1) firms enjoy higher
expected surplus and workers suffer from lower expected surplus; (2) workers suffer from
lower actual wages.
Proof. (1) Firstly, we prove that workers suffer from lower expected surplus. In the
market economy, the level of market payoff is simply
UM = 2−αˆ12 ×
wˆ1︷ ︸︸ ︷
2(1− αˆ2)× y2
(1+2αˆ2)
= 1+αˆ2(1+2αˆ2)
× (1− αˆ2)× y2
While the level of market utility in the planner’s economy is simply
U p =
(
1−α p2
)× y2
Since 1+αˆ2(1+2αˆ2) < 1, and (1− αˆ2)<
(
1−α p2
)
, we have the result UM <U p for the workers.
Seconly, we prove that firms enjoy higher surplus. In the market economy firm 2’s
expected surplus, after some arrangement, is
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πMf irm2 =
(
1− (1− αˆ2)2
)
y2− 1+ αˆ21+2αˆ2 ×2αˆ2 (1− αˆ2)y2
While in the decentralized economy, firm 2’s expected surplus, after some arrangement
becomes
πDf irm2 =
(
1− (1−α p2 )2)y2−2α p2 × (1−α p2 )y2
Since αˆ2 > α
p
2 ,
1+αˆ2
1+2αˆ2 < 1 and π
D
f irm2 is increasing in α
p
2 , we have
πMf irm2
>
(
1− (1− αˆ2)2
)
y2−2αˆ2 (1− αˆ2)y2
> πDf irm2
As for firm 1, its surplus in the market economy is
πMf irm1 =
(
1− (1− αˆ1)2
)
(y1− wˆ1)
where αˆ1 and wˆ1 should satisfy the workers’ indifference condition which can be rear-
ranged to αˆ1 = 2wˆ1−wˆ2wˆ1+wˆ2 . We notice that αˆ1 is increasing in wˆ1 and decreasing in wˆ2 according
to this relationship.
While in the decentralized economy, firm 1’s expected surplus is
πDf irm1 =
(
1− (1−α p1 )2)(y1−wp1)
where α p1 and w
p
1 should also satisfy workers’ indifference condition which can be
rearranged as α p1 =
2wp1−wp2
wp1+w
p
2
. Again, α p1 is increasing in w
p
1 and decreasing in w
p
2 . We have
πMf irm1 =
(
1− (1− αˆ1 (wˆ1, wˆ2))2
)
(y1− wˆ1)
>
(
1− (1− αˆ1 (wp1 , wˆ2))2)(y1−wp1)
>
(
1− (1− αˆ1 (wp1 ,wp2))2)(y1−wp1)
where the first inequality is due to revealed preference, and the second inequality is due
to the fact that wˆ2 < w
p
2 , a result which we are going to prove in the part 2 of the proof.
(2) Firstly, we prove wˆ1 < w
p
1 . We have wˆ1 =
2(1−αˆ2)
(1+2αˆ2)
×y2, and wp1 =
2(1−α p2 )
1+α p2
×y2. Then
we know that
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wˆ1 =
2(1−αˆ2)
(1+2αˆ2)
× y2
< 2(1−αˆ2)(1+αˆ2) × y2
<
2(1−α p2 )
(1+α p2 )
× y2 = wp1
where the second inequality is due to the fact that 1−x1+x is a decreasing function and
αˆ2 > α
p
2 .
Secondly, we prove wˆ2 < w
p
2 . We have wˆ2 =
2(1−αˆ1)
(1+2αˆ1)
× y1, and wp2 =
2(1−α p2 )
2−α p2
× y2. Then
we know that
wˆ2 =
2(1−αˆ1)
(1+2αˆ1)
× y1
= (1+αˆ2)(1+2αˆ2)
2(1−αˆ2)
(2−αˆ2) × y2
<
2(1−α p2 )
(2−α p2 )
× y2 = wp2
where the second equality is obtained by the condition which determines αˆ1, i.e. y1y2 =
(1+2αˆ1)×(2−αˆ1)×(1−αˆ2)
(1+2αˆ2)×(2−αˆ2)×(1−αˆ1) ; the inequality is obtained because
(1+αˆ2)
(1+2αˆ2)
< 1 and (1−αˆ2)(2−αˆ2) is a decreas-
ing function of αˆ2. Q.E.D.
Proposition 2. In the market economy augmented with unemployment benefit bA, the
workers’ expected surplus U
(
bA
)
is strictly lower than the efficient level U p.
Proof. Recall that bA is determined by
y1−bA
y2−bA =
(
1+2α p1
)× (2−α p1 )× (1−α p2 )(
1+2α p2
)× (2−α p2 )× (1−α p1 )
We obtain then bA as a function of α p1 : b
A = y2− y1−y2(1+2α p1 )×(2−α p1 )×(1−α p2 )
(1+2α p2 )×(2−α
p
2 )×(1−α
p
1 )
−1
< y2 < y1.
Defining K
(
α p1
)
=
(1+2α p1 )×(2−α p1 )×(1−α p2 )
(1+2α p2 )×(2−α p2 )×(1−α p1 )
, we have bA = y2− y1−y2K(α p1 )−1 .
We start by calculating U
(
bA
)
. By definition, we know that
U
(
bA
)
=
(
1− α
p
2
2
)
wˆ2
(
bA
)
+
[
1−
(
1− α
p
2
2
)]
×bA
=
(
1− α
p
2
2
)
× (wˆ2 (bA)−bA)+bA
where wˆ2
(
bA
)
is the equilibrium wage when bA is introduced, and more precisely wˆ2
(
bA
)
is the solution of the following program:
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maxw2
(
1− (1−α2)2
)
× (y2−w2)
s.to
(
1− α12
)× (w1−b) = (1− α22 )× (w2−b)
This program gives wˆ2
(
bA
)−bA = 2(1−α p1 )
(1+2α p1 )
× (y1−bA). We then have
U
(
bA
)
=
(
1− α
p
2
2
)
× 2(1−α
p
1 )
(1+2α p1 )
× (y1−bA)+bA
=
(
1+α p1
)× (1−α p1 )
(1+2α p1 )
× (y1−bA)+bA
We now make use of the expression of bA which we obtained in the beginning of the
proof, and we have
U
(
bA
(
α p1
))
=
1−(α p1 )
2
1+2α p1
×K(α p1 )−1
K(α p1 )−1
× (y1− y2)+ y2
At the same time, we know that U p =
(
1−α p1
)
y1. We could do the following arrange-
ment:
U p =
(
1−α p1
)
(y1− y2)+
(
1−α p1
)
y2
=
(
1−α p1 −α p1 y2y1−y2
)
(y1− y2)+ y2
=
(
1−α p1 11−(y2/y1)
)
(y1− y2)+ y2
Since y2y1 =
(1−α p1 )
α p1
, we could finally obtain
U p =
1−α p1 1
1−(1−α
p
1 )
α p1
(y1− y2)+ y2
=
(
1− (α
p
1 )
2
2α p1−1
)
(y1− y2)+ y2
Then it suffices to compare the coefficient in front of (y1− y2) in U
(
bA
(
α p1
))
and U p
respectively. Numerically we are able to verify that U
(
bA
(
α p1
))
< U p. As shown in the
following graph, the X −axis represents α p1 , the curve below corresponds to U
(
bA
(
α p1
))
,
and the curve above corresponds to U p. Q.E.D.
Proposition 3 (comparative statics). The level of bA increases with the productivity gap
y1− y2.
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Fig. 4.1 Comparison between U p and U
(
bA
(
α p1
))
Proof. Recall that bA is such that
y1−bA
y2−bA =
(
1+2α p1
)× (2−α p1 )× (1−α p2 )(
1+2α p2
)× (2−α p2 )× (1−α p1 )
i.e., the planner’s allocation α p1 is recovered. Then we can solve b
A as bA = y2 −
y1−y2
(1+2α p1 )×(2−α
p
1 )×(1−α
p
2 )
(1+2α p2 )×(2−α
p
2 )×(1−α
p
1 )
−1
. We can substitute y1 for y1 =
α p1
1−α p1
y2. So that we could obtain
bA = y2×
1− 2α
p
1−1
1−α p1
(1+2α p1 )×(2−α
p
1 )×(1−α
p
2 )
(1+2α p2 )×(2−α
p
2 )×(1−α
p
1 )
−1
 where we express bA as a function of α p1 . It could
be verified that this function of α p1 is increasing in α
p
1 . Besides, we know from y1 =
α p1
1−α p1
y2
that α p1 is increasing in y1, so that b
A is increasing in y1. Q.E.D.
Proposition 4. There exists a level of wc ∈ (wˆ2,y2) such that the misallocation of surplus
can be completely restored.
Proof. We know that α p1 is determined by
y1
y2
=
α p1
1−α p1
. According to U p =
(
1−α p1
)
y1 =(
1−α p2
)
y2, we are able to solve U p as function of y1 and y2: U p =
y1y2
y1+y2
. We want to prove
that under minimum wage policy, there is a level of minimum wage wc < y2 such that the
workers’ expected surplus can be restored completely to the socially optimal level.
We now proceed to find the workers’ expected surplus when the minimum wage policy is
effective such that firm 2, which offers lower wage than firm 1, has to pay the workers the
minimum wage w. Then the firm 1 solves the following program:
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maxw1
(
1− (1−α1)2
)
× (y1−w1)
s.to
(
1− α12
)×w1 = (1− α22 )×w
Since the constraint defines a one-one positive correlation between w1 and α1, we can
also maximize with respect to α1, which turns out to be more convenient. We could obtain as
the first order condition 1−αˆ
w
1
1+2αˆw1
= wy1 ×
1
2 , where αˆ
w
1 denotes the equilibrium value of α1 when
minimum wage policy touches firm 2. We can solve the value of αˆw1 , and can calculate the
workers’ expected utility as U (w) =
(
1− αˆ22
)
×w = 14 × 4y1+wy1+w ×w. This is an increasing
function of w.
Now it suffices to prove that for some feasible values of w with w < y2, it is possible
that U p is smaller than U (w) . For this sake, we can define a variable δ such that w = δy2
where δ ∈ (0,1). Then on one hand, we have U p = y1y2y1+y2 , on the other hand, we have
U (w) = 14 × 4y1+δy2y1+δy2 × δy2 =
y1×δy2+(δy2)
2
4
y1+δy2
, which is greater than U p when δ = 1. By
continuity of δ , we could conclude that there exists a wc such that workers’ expected surplus
can be restored. Q.E.D.
Corollary. Introducing a proper level of unemployment benefit, together with minimum
wage, can correct both the misallocation of labor and misallocation of surplus.
Proof. When both unemployment benefit and minimum wage are introduced and
the minimum wage is effective, expected payoff of workers from applying to firm 1 is(
1− α12
)
w1+
α1
2 b, and at firm 2 it is
(
1− α22
)
w+ α22 b. Firm 1 solves the following program:
maxw1
(
1− (1−α1)2
)
× (y1−w1)
s.to
(
1− α12
)× (w1−b) = (1− α22 )× (w−b)
Maximizing with respect to α1, we obtain as the first order condition 1−α˜11+2α˜1 =
w−b
y1−b ×
1
2 ,
where α˜1 denotes the equilibrium value of α1. This defines α˜1 as a function of the policy
instruments w and b. We impose α˜1 = α
p
1 so that the misallocation of labor is corrected, then
we obtain a first relationship between w and b.
We now want to find the second relation, and it is done by imposing the expected payoff
to be equivalent to its socially optimal level: the misallocation of surplus is corrected.
We calculate the workers’ expected payoff: U (w) =
(
1− α˜22
)
×w+ α˜22 b =
(
1− α˜22
)
×
(w−b)+b. We let it be equal to the socially optimal payoff U p = (1−α p1 )y1. So that we
have
(
1− α˜22
)
× (w−b)+b = (1−α p1 )y1.
Rearranging, it suffices that the system of equations where w and b serve as variables
admits a solution:
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
(
1+2α p1
1−4α p1
)
w+b =
2×(1−α p1 )
1−4α p1
y1(
1+α p1
1−α p1
)
w+b = 2y1
We are able to obtain b =
2
1+α p1
− 2
1+2α p1(
1
1+α p1
+ 1
1−α p1
)
−
(
2
1+2α p1
)y1 and w = 2×
(
1− 1−α
p
1
1−4α p1
)
(
1+α p1
1−α p1
)
−
(
1+2α p1
1−4α p1
)y1.
It could be checked that w > b > 0. Q.E.D.
Proposition 5. In system (B), there exists no unemployment benefit level bB such that the
efficiency is restored in the sense of GKV(2011).
Proof. Under unemployment benefit system B, firm 1 pays a level of unemployment
benefit (α1)2 b, and firm 2 pays a level of unemployment benefit (α2)2 b, where (α1)2 and
(α2)2 are respectively the probability of paying b to the workers who applied but did not
get the job. This is quite intuitive: in expectation, a firm has to pay this b only when both
workers apply to it but one among them will not be selected, an event which takes place with
probability α2. Hence the problems for the firms are written as
maxw1
(
1− (1−α1)2
)
× (y1−w1)− (α1)2 b
s.to 2−α12 × (w1−b) = 2−α22 × (w2−b)
and
maxw2
(
1− (1−α2)2
)
× (y2−w2)− (α2)2 b
s.to 2−α12 × (w1−b) = 2−α22 × (w2−b)
The first order conditions now become
2(1− αˆ1)× (y1−b)− (1+2αˆ1)× (w2−b)− (2αˆ1)b = 0
and
2(1− αˆ2)× (y2−b)− (1+2αˆ2)× (w1−b)− (2αˆ2)b = 0
Combining these two, we obtain
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y1− 11−αˆb1 b
y2− 11−αˆb2 b
=
(
1+2αˆb1
)× (2− αˆb1)× (1− αˆb2)(
1+2αˆb2
)× (2− αˆb2)× (1− αˆb1)
It is more useful to write this condition as
(
1− αˆb1
)
y1−b(
1− αˆb2
)
y2−b
=
(
1+2αˆb1
)× (2− αˆb1)(
1+2αˆb2
)× (2− αˆb2)
Suppose there is a bB such that αˆb1 could be restored to the socially optimal level α
p
1 , then
the above equality becomes
(
1−α p1
)
y1−bB(
1−α p2
)
y2−bB
=
(
1+2α p1
)× (2−α p1 )(
1+2α p2
)× (2−α p2 )
Since we have
(
1−α p1
)
y1 =
(
1−α p2
)
y2. It requires that
(1+2α p1 )×(2−α p1 )
(1+2α p2 )×(2−α p2 )
= 1 which is
impossible because (
1+2α p1 )×(2−α p1 )
(1+2α p2 )×(2−α p2 )
is always greater than 1 when α p1 >
1
2 > α
p
2 . Q.E.D.
Claim. With fixed sharing rule βNB such that workers’ expected payoff is equal to U p,
(1) the high (low) productivity firm offers higher (lower) wage compared to the case
where wages are posted.
(2) both the high and low productivity firm earn lower profit compared to the case where
wages are posted.
Proof of (1). We start to compare βNBy1 and w
p
1 . Recall that w
p
1 =
2
2−α p1
(
1−α p1
)
y1, and
βNBy1 = 2
2−αNB1
×(1−α p1 )y1. Since αNB1 >α p1 , we have wp1 < βNBy1. We now compare
βNBy2 and w
p
2 . Recall that w
p
2 =
2
2−α p2
(
1−α p2
)
y2, and βNBy2 = 2
2−αNB2
× (1−α p2 )y2.
Since αNB2 < α
p
2 , we have w
p
2 > β
NBy2.
Proof of (2). We prove the result for firm 1, and the proof for firm 2 will be analogous.
We know that wp1 and α
p
1 solve the following program for firm 1:
max
(
1− (1−α1)2
)
(y1−w1)
s.to 2−α12 ×w1 =U p
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Define wNB1 = β
NBy1. We also know that αNB1 and w
NB
1 also satisfies the constraint,
however αNB1 is different from α
p
1 , and w
p
1 is different from α
p
1 . By this, we are able to
conclude that (
1− (1−α p1 )2)(y1−wp1)
>
(
1−
(
1−αNB1
)2)(
y1−wNB1
)
Q.E.D.
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